Rational and Irrational Intentions. An Argument for Externalism

There is plenty of evidence, e.g. in mathematics, in the sciences, and in economics, that rationality is paramount to all other cognitive powers. There is further evidence that intentions are borne and originate in the mind. We therefore might be inclined to conclude that rational intentions are brought about in the mind internally by the best of all cognitive powers. In this case it would be enough to analyse mental representations which are antecedent to decision making in order to find the basic ingredients causing rational or irrational intentions. But there is neither evidence for representations of this sort nor for mental causes of rational intentions. It is true that intending is a mental state or act, but it would, indeed, be false to believe that intentions are produced or brought about internally, i.e., without reference to the external world. Some intentions seem to be irrational although their mental origin is not different from the origin of rational ones. I shall argue that this indifference of origin of rational and irrational intentions is due to the fact that intentions like all volitional attitudes - have external meanings. This implies that the criteria of rationality themselves are external to the mental activities of reasoning and intending. `External' here means that the contents of volitional attitudes are individuated by the objects they are directed to and not by the mental acts or performances of intending themselves. I shall further argue that the indifference of origin of rational and irrational intentions sheds light on the hybrid nature of rationality. For the sake of argument I shall use examples from the theory of choice. The gist of my argument is that intentional states enable us to choose mental acts, speech acts or non-verbal actions without reflecting alternatives beforehand

An Instrumental Theory of Speech Acts

In this paper I present a theory of speech acts with two parts: an account of the normativity of speech acts and a method for individuating them. The first part holds that instrumental rationality gives speech acts normative force. I have in mind a simple kind of means-end normativity—given that a speaker has a desire to φ, she has an instrumental reason to adopt the appropriate means to φ. When we perform speech acts, we take part in linguistic conventions. In doing so, our desires interact with those conventions in ways that generate speech-act-specific instrumental reasons for us. For example, when I make a promise, the act of promising generates a new instrumental reason for me to follow through on that promise. This is because if I don’t, I will be liable for sanctions like blame. Since I don’t want to be liable for blame, I have a reason to keep my promise. The second part of the theory holds that we should distinguish speech acts by their normative properties—the kinds of instrumental reasons they generate for the speaker. I argue that two speech acts token distinct act types just in case they differ in the kind of instrumental reasons they generate for the speaker. For example, I argue that promises, oaths, and vows are the same act type because they generate the same kind of reason to follow through. What results is a new way of taxonomizing speech acts. I call this the Instrumental theory of speech acts, or Instrumentalism

Dialectical tier argumentation as structured by proposing and advising

This paper discusses the parameters of an arguer\u27s duties on the dialectical tier of argument appraisal. Argumentative burdens incurred in making proposals will be compared with probative obligations which may be taken on in advising. The burdens t ypically incurred in these two kinds of illocutionary acts are strikingly different; accordingly, the arguer\u27s obligation to response to objections would be circumscribed differently depending on which speech acts initiates the dialogue. This claim has i mplications for how we delimit a good case for deliberative propositions. It also casts light on manifest rationality and the role of rhetorical art in argumentation

The fascination of authority and the authority of fascination : rationalization and legal theory in Habermas revised

The requalification of Habermas’ discussions on political philosophy and legal theory after the publication of Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion (2005), and his most recent texts and debates on religion and the public sphere, suggest a revision of the Habermasian theory of rationalization as it was firstly presented in Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (1982), especially on what concerns the processes of dessacralization and the linguistification of religious authority. In search of contributing to this revision, this paper intends to focus on the problem of a supposedly “lost” aesthetic-expressive understanding of religious authority in Habermas’s theory of rationalization, which may have contributed to a theory of law in Faktizität und Geltung (1992) that does not give satisfactory account to the aesthetical-expressive character of the modern understanding of legal authority. A better understanding of this special character, however, may contribute not only to the avoidance of fundamentalisms and new attempts of “aesthetization of politics”, but also to a rational strengthening of the solidarity of the citizens of democratic constitutional states

"Freedom" through Repression: Epistemic Closure in Agricultural Trade Negotiations

A central concern of critical theory is that of how the forces of Modern reason cause certain logics to become reified in the name of rational progress. Two such logics – the ongoing spread of liberal capitalism, and territorial particularism – are simultaneously embodied within social institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) that regulate the global economy, a phenomenon that occurs on the premise of maximising global welfare. Building upon a critical reading of Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action, this article undertakes an empirical immanent critique of the extent to which such logics repress the possibility of normative imperatives being considered within agricultural trade negotiations. Specifically, it argues that the dialectic of functionalist and communicative rationality, operating as a theoretical heuristic, reveals that the DDA is susceptible to an ethical indictment that arises from its inability to countenance the alternatives to the dual logics of neo-liberalism and state-interest that could otherwise emerge from a free and rational discussion. The nature of the WTO as a site of social action is revealed to be that of a closed epistemic community in which important normative claims are repressed, and as such, one in which the underlying rational bases for communication are fundamentally distorted

The philosophical significance of binary categories in Habermas’s discourse ethics

The philosophical programme associated with the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas has been widely discussed in the literature. The fact that Habermas has devoted a considerable part of his work to the elaboration of this philosophical programme indicates that discourse ethics can be regarded as a cornerstone of his communication-theoretic approach to society. In essence, Habermas conceives of discourse ethics as a philosophical framework which derives the coordinative power of social normativity from the discursive power of communicative rationality. Although there is an extensive literature on Habermas’s communication-theoretic account of society, almost no attention has been paid to the fact that the theoretical framework which undergirds his discourse ethics is based on a number of binary conceptual divisions. It is the purpose of this paper to shed light on the philosophical significance of these binary categories in Habermas’s discourse ethics and thereby demonstrate that their complexity is indicative of the subject’s tension-laden immersion in social reality

Exploring Discourse Ethics for Tourism Transformation

The 'critical turn' in tourism studies is defined as a research perspective that explores social transfor- mation in and through tourism by facing the negative impact of strategic-instrumental rationality on this activity. This work explores the features of discourse ethics that may normatively support tourism transformation, a gap that has not been thoroughly discussed in tourism research. For this purpose, the study combines the use of critical and ethical theory with an analysis of discourse ethics in tourism literature to demonstrate that the use of Habermasian discourse ethics needs to be complemented with the Apelian approach. Through these steps the work reveals the theoretical bases of discourse ethics to discuss whether understandings between stakeholders guided by strategic-instrumental rationality can be reached not only in the political sphere —Habermas—, but also in the ethical field —Apel