Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography

This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is continually updated on the webpage \url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail (\textit{[email protected]})

Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks

This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. %This queue represents the congestion of the multiple SUs sharing the operator's single \ON-\OFF channel that models the primary users (PUs) traffic. We provide a queueing delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition and iterative algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators, two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market, we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.Comment: 30 pages, one column, double spac

Spectrum sharing models in cognitive radio networks

Spectrum scarcity demands thinking new ways to manage the distribution of radio frequency bands so that its use is more effective. The emerging technology that can enable this paradigm shift is the cognitive radio. Different models for organizing and managing cognitive radios have emerged, all with specific strategic purposes. In this article we review the allocation spectrum patterns of cognitive radio networks and analyse which are the common basis of each model.We expose the vulnerabilities and open challenges that still threaten the adoption and exploitation of cognitive radios for open civil networks.L'escassetat de demandes d'espectre fan pensar en noves formes de gestionar la distribució de les bandes de freqüència de ràdio perquè el seu ús sigui més efectiu. La tecnologia emergent que pot permetre aquest canvi de paradigma és la ràdio cognitiva. Han sorgit diferents models d'organització i gestió de les ràdios cognitives, tots amb determinats fins estratègics. En aquest article es revisen els patrons d'assignació de l'espectre de les xarxes de ràdio cognitiva i s'analitzen quals són la base comuna de cada model. S'exposen les vulnerabilitats i els desafiaments oberts que segueixen amenaçant l'adopció i l'explotació de les ràdios cognitives per obrir les xarxes civils.La escasez de demandas de espectro hacen pensar en nuevas formas de gestionar la distribución de las bandas de frecuencia de radio para que su uso sea más efectivo. La tecnología emergente que puede permitir este cambio de paradigma es la radio cognitiva. Han surgido diferentes modelos de organización y gestión de las radios cognitivas, todos con determinados fines estratégicos. En este artículo se revisan los patrones de asignación del espectro de las redes de radio cognitiva y se analizan cuales son la base común de cada modelo. Se exponen las vulnerabilidades y los desafíos abiertos que siguen amenazando la adopción y la explotación de las radios cognitivas para abrir las redes civiles

Analysis Framework for Opportunistic Spectrum OFDMA and its Application to the IEEE 802.22 Standard

We present an analytical model that enables throughput evaluation of Opportunistic Spectrum Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OS-OFDMA) networks. The core feature of the model, based on a discrete time Markov chain, is the consideration of different channel and subchannel allocation strategies under different Primary and Secondary user types, traffic and priority levels. The analytical model also assesses the impact of different spectrum sensing strategies on the throughput of OS-OFDMA network. The analysis applies to the IEEE 802.22 standard, to evaluate the impact of two-stage spectrum sensing strategy and varying temporal activity of wireless microphones on the IEEE 802.22 throughput. Our study suggests that OS-OFDMA with subchannel notching and channel bonding could provide almost ten times higher throughput compared with the design without those options, when the activity and density of wireless microphones is very high. Furthermore, we confirm that OS-OFDMA implementation without subchannel notching, used in the IEEE 802.22, is able to support real-time and non-real-time quality of service classes, provided that wireless microphones temporal activity is moderate (with approximately one wireless microphone per 3,000 inhabitants with light urban population density and short duty cycles). Finally, two-stage spectrum sensing option improves OS-OFDMA throughput, provided that the length of spectrum sensing at every stage is optimized using our model

Investment and Pricing with Spectrum Uncertainty: A Cognitive Operator's Perspective

This paper studies the optimal investment and pricing decisions of a cognitive mobile virtual network operator (C-MVNO) under spectrum supply uncertainty. Compared with a traditional MVNO who often leases spectrum via long-term contracts, a C-MVNO can acquire spectrum dynamically in short-term by both sensing the empty "spectrum holes" of licensed bands and dynamically leasing from the spectrum owner. As a result, a C-MVNO can make flexible investment and pricing decisions to match the current demands of the secondary unlicensed users. Compared to dynamic spectrum leasing, spectrum sensing is typically cheaper, but the obtained useful spectrum amount is random due to primary licensed users' stochastic traffic. The C-MVNO needs to determine the optimal amounts of spectrum sensing and leasing by evaluating the trade off between cost and uncertainty. The C-MVNO also needs to determine the optimal price to sell the spectrum to the secondary unlicensed users, taking into account wireless heterogeneity of users such as different maximum transmission power levels and channel gains. We model and analyze the interactions between the C-MVNO and secondary unlicensed users as a Stackelberg game. We show several interesting properties of the network equilibrium, including threshold structures of the optimal investment and pricing decisions, the independence of the optimal price on users' wireless characteristics, and guaranteed fair and predictable QoS among users. We prove that these properties hold for general SNR regime and general continuous distributions of sensing uncertainty. We show that spectrum sensing can significantly improve the C-MVNO's expected profit and users' payoffs.Comment: A shorter version appears in IEEE INFOCOM 2010. This version has been submitted to IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computin

Non-Cooperative Spectrum Access -- The Dedicated vs. Free Spectrum Choice

We consider a dynamic spectrum access system in which Secondary Users (SUs) choose to either acquire dedicated spectrum or to use spectrum-holes (white spaces) which belong to Primary Users (PUs). The trade-off incorporated in this decision is between immediate yet costly transmission and free but delayed transmission (a consequence of both the possible appearance of PUs and sharing the spectrum holes with multiple SUs). We first consider a system with a single PU band, in which the SU decisions are fixed. Employing queueing-theoretic methods, we obtain explicit expressions for the expected delays associated with using the PU band. Based on that, we then consider self-interested SUs and study the interaction between them as a non-cooperative game. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and characterize the equilibrium behavior explicitly. Using our equilibrium results, we show how to maximize revenue from renting dedicated bands to SUs and briefly discuss the extension of our model to multiple PUs. Finally, since spectrum sensing can be resource-consuming, we characterize the gains provided by this capability.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS-0915988)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS-0916263)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS-1054856)National Science Foundation (U.S.). Engineering Research Centers Program (Center for Integrated Access Networks Grant EEC-0812072)United States. Office of Naval Research (Grant N00014-12-1-0064)United States. Army Research Office. Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (Grant W911NF-08-1-0238

Spectrum Sharing Etiquette Considering Primary User Activity Pattern in Dynamic TVWS via Cournot Game Theory

Television White Space (TVWS) networks only utilizes a licensed channel in the absence of a primary user network (PUN). Therefore, the performance of TVWS networks are greatly depended on activity pattern of PUN. In this paper, we address the problem of spectrum sharing in cognitive radio environment consisting of PUN and TVWS networks from the perspective of spectrum quality. We propose a self‐indicating distributive dynamic Cournot spectrum economic game using non‐cooperative game. To capture the dynamic parameter that characterizes dynamic TVWS, a differentiating parameter known as the Channel Instability Index (CII), β, was introduced to grade the leased PUN channel holding time (with consideration of the time‐varying radio attributes of the dynamic TVWS environment) and to enforce truthfulness in spectrum transactions. Based on the CII model, two possible scenarios were considered. Case I occurs if β = 0, which signifies stable PUN bandwidth and Case II, occurs if 0.1 ≤ β ≤ 0.9, which denotes an unstable PUN bandwidth spectrum. Based on our model, it was showed that utility and QoS measured in‐terms of probability of dropped packets of TVWS networks were increased by more than 15 % in any epoch with the key enabler as β

An Economic Framework For Resource Management And Pricing In Wireless Networks With Competitive Service Providers

A paradigm shift from static spectrum allocation to dynamic spectrum access (DSA) is becoming a reality due to the recent advances in cognitive radio, wide band spectrum sensing, and network aware real--time spectrum access. It is believed that DSA will allow wireless service providers (WSPs) the opportunity to dynamically access spectrum bands as and when they need it. Moreover, due to the presence of multiple WSPs in a region, it is anticipated that dynamic service pricing would be offered that will allow the end-users to move from long-term service contracts to more flexible short-term service models. In this research, we develop a unified economic framework to analyze the trading system comprising two components: i) spectrum owner--WSPs interactions with regard to dynamic spectrum allocation, and ii) WSP--end-users interactions with regard to dynamic service pricing. For spectrum owner--WSPs interaction, we investigate various auction mechanisms for finding bidding strategies of WSPs and revenue generated by the spectrum owner. We show that sequential bidding provides better result than the concurrent bidding when WSPs are constrained to at most single unit allocation. On the other hand, when the bidders request for multiple units, (i.e., they are not restricted by allocation constraints) synchronous auction mechanism proves to be beneficial than asynchronous auctions. In this regard, we propose a winner determination sealed-bid knapsack auction mechanism that dynamically allocates spectrum to the WSPs based on their bids. As far as dynamic service pricing is concerned, we use game theory to capture the conflict of interest between WSPs and end--users, both of whom try to maximize their respective net utilities. We deviate from the traditional per--service static pricing towards a more dynamic model where the WSPs might change the price of a service almost on a session by session basis. Users, on the other hand, have the freedom to choose their WSP based on the price offered. It is found that in such a greedy and non-cooperative behavioral game model, it is in the best interest of the WSPs to adhere to a price threshold which is a consequence of a price (Nash) equilibrium. We conducted extensive simulation experiments, the results of which show that the proposed auction model entices WSPs to participate in the auction, makes optimal use of the common spectrum pool, and avoids collusion among WSPs. We also demonstrate how pricing can be used as an effective tool for providing incentives to the WSPs to upgrade their network resources and offer better services