51 research outputs found
Verifiable Random Oracles
Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, Random Oracle zu instanziieren, ohne dabei Sicherheit zu verlieren,
die im Random Oracle Modell bewiesen wurde. Das dies mit Funktionsfamilien nicht geht
ist eine wohl bekannte Aussage, die zuerst von Halevi et al. (IACR’1998) gezeigt wurde. Wir
werden aus diesem Grund auf Interaktion zurückgreifen, aber versuchen, den erzeugten
Overhead möglichst zu reduzieren.
Um möglichst wenig zu Interagieren führen wir ein neues ideales Modell mit Namen
Verifiable Random Oracle ein. Dieses Modell bietet zusätzlich zum Random Oracle ein
Verifikations-Orakel, welches bei Eingabe (x, h) 1 ausgibt, falls RO(x) = h und anderenfalls
0. Wir stellen danach zwei konkrete Instanziierungen für Verifiable Random Oracle vor,
von denen eine keine vertrauenswürdige Party benötigt. Zusätzlich reduzieren wir den
Netzwerk-Overhead (also die Gesamtgröße der verwendeten Nachrichten).
Wenn wir unsere Instanziierungen zusammen mit der Fiat-Shamir Transformation verwen-
den, bleibt die Simulation-Soundness Extractability Eigenschaft erhalten. Der Beweiser der
Fiat-Shamir Transformation verliert leider seine nicht-Interaktivität. Der Verifizierer bleibt
jedoch Nicht-interaktiv, da die Instanziierungen des Verifikations-Orakels nicht-interaktiv
sind. Die Beweise für diese Behauptungen bilden einen signifikanten Teil dieser Arbeit
Optimal security limits of RFID distance bounding protocols
In this paper, we classify the RFID distance bounding protocols having bitwise fast phases and no final signature. We also give the theoretical security bounds for two specific classes, leaving the security bounds for the general case as an open problem. As for the classification, we introduce the notion of k-previous challenge dependent (k-PCD) protocols where each response bit depends on the current and k-previous challenges and there is no final signature. We treat the case k = 0, which means each response bit depends only on the current challenge, as a special case and define such protocols as current challenge dependent (CCD) protocols. In general, we construct a trade-off curve between the security levels of mafia and distance frauds by introducing two generic attack algorithms. This leads to the conclusion that CCD protocols cannot attain the ideal security against distance fraud, i.e. 1/2, for each challenge-response bit, without totally losing the security against mafia fraud. We extend the generic attacks to 1-PCD protocols and obtain a trade-off curve for 1-PCD protocols pointing out that 1-PCD protocols can provide better security than CCD protocols. Thereby, we propose a natural extension of a CCD protocol to a 1-PCD protocol in order to improve its security. As a study case, we give two natural extensions of Hancke and Kuhn protocol to show how to enhance the security against either mafia fraud or distance fraud without extra cost
A framework for analyzing RFID distance bounding protocols
Many distance bounding protocols appropriate for the RFID technology have been proposed recently. Unfortunately, they are commonly designed without any formal approach, which leads to inaccurate analyzes and unfair comparisons. Motivated by this need, we introduce a unied framework that aims to improve analysis and design of distance bounding protocols. Our framework includes a thorough terminology about the frauds, adversary, and prover, thus disambiguating many misleading terms. It also explores the adversary's capabilities and strategies, and addresses the impact of the prover's ability to tamper with his device. It thus introduces some new concepts in the distance bounding domain as the black-box and white-box models, and the relation between the frauds with respect to these models. The relevancy and impact of the framework is nally demonstrated on a study case: Munilla-Peinado distance bounding protocol
Recommended from our members
The Turing test as interactive proof
In 1950, Alan Turing proposed his eponymous test based on indistinguishability of verbal behavior as a replacement for the question "Can machines think?" Since then, two mutually contradictory but well-founded attitudes towards the Turing Test have arisen in the philosophical literature. On the one hand is the attitude that has become philosophical conventional wisdom, viz., that the Turing Test is hopelessly flawed as a sufficient condition for intelligence, while on the other hand is the overwhelming sense that were a machine to pass a real live full-fledged Turing Test, it would be a sign of nothing but our orneriness to deny it the attribution of intelligence. The arguments against the sufficiency of the Turing Test for determining intelligence rely on showing that some extra conditions are logically necessary for intelligence beyond the behavioral properties exhibited by an agent under a Turing Test. Therefore, it cannot follow logically from passing a Turing Test that the agent is intelligent. I argue that these extra conditions can be revealed by the Turing Test, so long as we allow a very slight weakening of the criterion from one of logical proof to one of statistical proof under weak realizability assumptions. The argument depends on the notion of interactive proof developed in theoretical computer science, along with some simple physical facts that constrain the information capacity of agents. Crucially, the weakening is so slight as to make no conceivable difference from a practical standpoint. Thus, the Gordian knot between the two opposing views of the sufficiency of the Turing Test can be cut.Engineering and Applied Science
Formalizing group blind signatures and practical constructions without random oracles
Group blind signatures combine anonymity properties of both group signatures and blind signatures and offer privacy for both the message to be signed and the signer. The primitive has been introduced with only informal definitions for its required security properties. In this paper, we offer two main contributions: first, we provide foundations for the primitive and present formal security definitions. In the process, we identify and address some subtle issues which were not considered by previous constructions and (informal) security definitions. Our second main contribution is a generic construction that yields practical schemes with a round-optimal signing protocol and constant-size signatures. Our constructions permit dynamic and concurrent enrollment of new members and satisfy strong security requirements. To the best of our knowledge, our schemes are the first provably secure constructions in the standard model. In addition, we introduce some new building blocks which may be of independent interest. © 2013 Springer-Verlag
- …