Using global analysis, partial specifications, and an extensible assertion language for program validation and debugging

We discuss a framework for the application of abstract interpretation as an aid during program development, rather than in the more traditional application of program optimization. Program validation and detection of errors is first performed statically by comparing (partial) specifications written in terms of assertions against information obtained from (global) static analysis of the program. The results of this process are expressed in the user assertion language. Assertions (or parts of assertions) which cannot be checked statically are translated into run-time tests. The framework allows the use of assertions to be optional. It also allows using very general properties in assertions, beyond the predefined set understandable by the static analyzer and including properties defined by user programs. We also report briefly on an implementation of the framework. The resulting tool generates and checks assertions for Prolog, CLP(R), and CHIP/CLP(fd) programs, and integrates compile-time and run-time checking in a uniform way. The tool allows using properties such as types, modes, non-failure, determinacy, and computational cost, and can treat modules separately, performing incremental analysis

Proof Theory, Transformations, and Logic Programming for Debugging Security Protocols

We define a sequent calculus to formally specify, simulate, debug and verify security protocols. In our sequents we distinguish between the current knowledge of principals and the current global state of the session. Hereby, we can describe the operational semantics of principals and of an intruder in a simple and modular way. Furthermore, using proof theoretic tools like the analysis of permutability of rules, we are able to find efficient proof strategies that we prove complete for special classes of security protocols including Needham-Schroeder. Based on the results of this preliminary analysis, we have implemented a Prolog meta-interpreter which allows for rapid prototyping and for checking safety properties of security protocols, and we have applied it for finding error traces and proving correctness of practical examples