41,650 research outputs found
Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography
This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum
trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers
entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is
continually updated on the webpage
\url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers
suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail
(\textit{[email protected]})
Combining Spot and Futures Markets: A Hybrid Market Approach to Dynamic Spectrum Access
Dynamic spectrum access is a new paradigm of secondary spectrum utilization
and sharing. It allows unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to exploit
opportunistically the under-utilized licensed spectrum. Market mechanism is a
widely-used promising means to regulate the consuming behaviours of users and,
hence, achieves the efficient allocation and consumption of limited resources.
In this paper, we propose and study a hybrid secondary spectrum market
consisting of both the futures market and the spot market, in which SUs
(buyers) purchase under-utilized licensed spectrum from a spectrum regulator,
either through predefined contracts via the futures market, or through spot
transactions via the spot market. We focus on the optimal spectrum allocation
among SUs in an exogenous hybrid market that maximizes the secondary spectrum
utilization efficiency. The problem is challenging due to the stochasticity and
asymmetry of network information. To solve this problem, we first derive an
off-line optimal allocation policy that maximizes the ex-ante expected spectrum
utilization efficiency based on the stochastic distribution of network
information. We then propose an on-line VickreyCClarkeCGroves (VCG) auction
that determines the real-time allocation and pricing of every spectrum based on
the realized network information and the pre-derived off-line policy. We
further show that with the spatial frequency reuse, the proposed VCG auction is
NP-hard; hence, it is not suitable for on-line implementation, especially in a
large-scale market. To this end, we propose a heuristics approach based on an
on-line VCG-like mechanism with polynomial-time complexity, and further
characterize the corresponding performance loss bound analytically. We finally
provide extensive numerical results to evaluate the performance of the proposed
solutions.Comment: This manuscript is the complete technical report for the journal
version published in INFORMS Operations Researc
Incentive Mechanisms for Hierarchical Spectrum Markets
In this paper, we study spectrum allocation mechanisms in hierarchical
multi-layer markets which are expected to proliferate in the near future based
on the current spectrum policy reform proposals. We consider a setting where a
state agency sells spectrum channels to Primary Operators (POs) who
subsequently resell them to Secondary Operators (SOs) through auctions. We show
that these hierarchical markets do not result in a socially efficient spectrum
allocation which is aimed by the agency, due to lack of coordination among the
entities in different layers and the inherently selfish revenue-maximizing
strategy of POs. In order to reconcile these opposing objectives, we propose an
incentive mechanism which aligns the strategy and the actions of the POs with
the objective of the agency, and thus leads to system performance improvement
in terms of social welfare. This pricing-based scheme constitutes a method for
hierarchical market regulation. A basic component of the proposed incentive
mechanism is a novel auction scheme which enables POs to allocate their
spectrum by balancing their derived revenue and the welfare of the SOs.Comment: 9 page
The 2006 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, and Payments: an overview
This Policy Discussion Paper summarizes the papers presented at the 2006 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, and Payments. Every summer since 2002, some of the best researchers in the areas of theory, policy, and quantitative analysis relating to money, banking, and payments systems have met in Cleveland to discuss their latest work. The papers presented at the 2006 workshop cover a vast spectrum of issues and use a wide variety of methods. Still, there is an underlying theme, which is an effort to enhance our understanding of monetary economics, broadly defined, and to uncover new ways to think about important substantive issues. Hopefully, this helps not only theoretical monetary economists, but also economists such as central bankers with a more practical policy-oriented view.Monetary policy ; Monetary theory ; Banks and banking
NORTH AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL MARKET INTEGRATION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FOOD AND FIBER SYSTEM
Economic change and market dynamics have fundamentally altered the structure and performance of agricultural markets in the United States, Canada, and Mexico within the last 25 years. Many factors have helped shape the current North American food and fiber system, including technological change, domestic farm policies, international trade agreements, and the economic forces of supply and demand. Ratification of NAFTA, for example, helped integrate the North American market, sparking a surge in trade and investment among the United States, Canada, and Mexico. In recent years, efforts to further integrate the continental market seem to have slowed. Broadening the scope of NAFTA to include institutional reforms that lead to a more unified system of commercial law, the establishment of common antitrust and regulatory procedures, harmonization of product standards, and increased coordination of domestic farm, market, and macroeconomic policies would deepen market integration and enhance market efficiency and growth within North America.agriculture, market integration, market segmentation, law of one price, price transmission, elasticities, exchange-rate pass-through, market efficiency, bilateral trade intensity, regional trade agreements, NAFTA, CUSTA, trade policy, WTO, GATT, Industrial Organization, International Relations/Trade, Marketing,
Spatial organization of production in India: contesting themes and conflicting evidence
The emergence of space as a determinant in the functional relations linked to production and growth is a recent development in theories of industrial organization. This paper primarily reviews the contesting themes in explaining changes in relative importance of space. In reference to industrial clusters in India, the paper argues that it is the heterogeneity of the industrial organizations that captures âspaceâ as an analytical category and broad generalizations often do not address the spatial dimensions. Neither also is it true, at least for developing countries such as India, that small enterprise clusters always reflect the post-Fordist dimension of change in the production organization. In the context of global production chain, this paper further argues that participation in such value chains might lead to contradictory outcomes in production organization giving rise to increased rift between the âglobalâ and the âlocalâ.endogenous growth, region, technology, fragmentation, footloose industry
Quality Sensitive Price Competition in Spectrum Oligopoly:Part 1
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where primaries lease their
channels to secondaries in lieu of financial remuneration. Transmission quality
of a channel evolves randomly. Each primary has to select the price it would
quote without knowing the transmission qualities of its competitors' channels.
Each secondary buys a channel depending on the price and the transmission
quality a channel offers. We formulate the price selection problem as a non
co-operative game with primaries as players. In the one-shot game, we show that
there exists a unique symmetric Nash Equilibrium(NE) strategy profile and
explicitly compute it. Our analysis reveals that under the NE strategy profile
a primary prices its channel to render high quality channel more preferable to
the secondary; this negates the popular belief that prices ought to be selected
to render channels equally preferable to the secondary regardless of their
qualities. We show the loss of revenue in the asymptotic limit due to the non
co-operation of primaries. In the repeated version of the game, we characterize
a subgame perfect NE where a primary can attain a payoff arbitrarily close to
the payoff it would obtain when primaries co-operate.Comment: Accepted for publication in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. 41
pages single column format.Conference version is available at arXiv:1305.335
Spatial Competition in Quality, Demand-Induced Innovation, and Schumpeterian Growth
We develop a general equilibrium model of vertical innovation in which multiple firms compete monopolistically in the quality space. The model features many firms, each of which holds the monopoly to produce a unique quality level of an otherwise homogenous good, and consumers who are heterogeneous in their valuation of the good's quality. If the marginal cost of production is convex with respect to quality, multiple rms coexist, and their equilibrium markups are determined by the degree of convexity and the density of quality-competition. To endogenize the latter, we nest this industry setup in a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth. Each firm enters the industry as the technology leader and successively transits through the product cycle as it is superseded by further innovations. The intrinsic reason that innovation happens in our economy is not one of displacing the incumbent; rather, innovation is a means to di-erentiate oneself from existing firms and target new consumers. Aggregate growth arises if, on the one hand, increasingly wealthy consumers are willing to pay for higher quality and, on the other hand, private firms' innovation generates income growth by enlarging the set of available technologies. Because the frequency of innovation determines the toughness of product market competition, in our framework, the relation between growth and competition is reversed compared to the standard Schumpeterian framework. Our setup does not feature business stealing in the sense that already marginal innovations grant non-negligible prots. Rather, innovators sell to a set of consumers that was served relatively poorly by pre-existing firms. Nevertheless, "creative destruction" prevails as new entrants make the set of available goods more di-erentiated, thereby exerting a pro-competitive e-ect on the entire industry.
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