Optimal Resource Allocation Over Time and Degree Classes for Maximizing Information Dissemination in Social Networks

We study the optimal control problem of allocating campaigning resources over the campaign duration and degree classes in a social network. Information diffusion is modeled as a Susceptible-Infected epidemic and direct recruitment of susceptible nodes to the infected (informed) class is used as a strategy to accelerate the spread of information. We formulate an optimal control problem for optimizing a net reward function, a linear combination of the reward due to information spread and cost due to application of controls. The time varying resource allocation and seeds for the epidemic are jointly optimized. A problem variation includes a fixed budget constraint. We prove the existence of a solution for the optimal control problem, provide conditions for uniqueness of the solution, and prove some structural results for the controls (e.g. controls are non-increasing functions of time). The solution technique uses Pontryagin's Maximum Principle and the forward-backward sweep algorithm (and its modifications) for numerical computations. Our formulations lead to large optimality systems with up to about 200 differential equations and allow us to study the effect of network topology (Erdos-Renyi/scale-free) on the controls. Results reveal that the allocation of campaigning resources to various degree classes depends not only on the network topology but also on system parameters such as cost/abundance of resources. The optimal strategies lead to significant gains over heuristic strategies for various model parameters. Our modeling approach assumes uncorrelated network, however, we find the approach useful for real networks as well. This work is useful in product advertising, political and crowdfunding campaigns in social networks.Comment: 14 + 4 pages, 11 figures. Author's version of the article accepted for publication in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. This version includes 4 pages of supplementary material containing proofs of theorems present in the article. Published version can be accessed at http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.251254

Maximizing Welfare in Social Networks under a Utility Driven Influence Diffusion Model

Motivated by applications such as viral marketing, the problem of influence maximization (IM) has been extensively studied in the literature. The goal is to select a small number of users to adopt an item such that it results in a large cascade of adoptions by others. Existing works have three key limitations. (1) They do not account for economic considerations of a user in buying/adopting items. (2) Most studies on multiple items focus on competition, with complementary items receiving limited attention. (3) For the network owner, maximizing social welfare is important to ensure customer loyalty, which is not addressed in prior work in the IM literature. In this paper, we address all three limitations and propose a novel model called UIC that combines utility-driven item adoption with influence propagation over networks. Focusing on the mutually complementary setting, we formulate the problem of social welfare maximization in this novel setting. We show that while the objective function is neither submodular nor supermodular, surprisingly a simple greedy allocation algorithm achieves a factor of $(1-1/e-\epsilon)$ of the optimum expected social welfare. We develop \textsf{bundleGRD}, a scalable version of this approximation algorithm, and demonstrate, with comprehensive experiments on real and synthetic datasets, that it significantly outperforms all baselines.Comment: 33 page

Environmental analysis for application layer networks

Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Rechnern über das Internet lies die Vision von Application Layer Netzwerken aufkommen. Sie umfassen Overlay Netzwerke wie beispielsweise Peer-to-Peer Netzwerke und Grid Infrastrukturen unter Verwendung des TCP/IP Protokolls. Ihre gemeinsame Eigenschaft ist die redundante, verteilte Bereitstellung und der Zugang zu Daten-, Rechen- und Anwendungsdiensten, während sie die Heterogenität der Infrastruktur vor dem Nutzer verbergen. In dieser Arbeit werden die Anforderungen, die diese Netzwerke an ökonomische Allokationsmechanismen stellen, untersucht. Die Analyse erfolgt anhand eines Marktanalyseprozesses für einen zentralen Auktionsmechanismus und einen katallaktischen Markt. --Grid Computing

Resources and Tools:A Step-by-Step Methodological Guide for Costing HIV/AIDS Activities

Many developing countries have recognized the need for comprehensive national reforms and comprehensive prevention, treatment, and care and support initiatives to reduce future transmission of and to meet the growing demand for HIV/AIDS services. As a part of these national health reform initiatives, governments are exploring ways to allocate resources in the most efficient and effective way to mitigate the HIV/AIDS epidemic. However, many countries lack information on the level and nature of the costs of HIV/AIDS programs. This document provides an introduction to the procedure for calculating and analyzing the costs of HIV/AIDS programs and describes how to measure directly the actual costs of a program that is up and running. The step-by-step guide is intended to provide project managers in the field with a framework for how to do measure costs for a single, recent year in the life of an HIV/AIDS program. An illustrative activities list in the report annex will assist the user to develop an activities-based framework. The information gleaned from the costing framework will enable policymakers and program managers to make informed resource allocation decisions