Local food and tourism in the Global South

Many countries in the Global South import a significant share of the food served to tourists. For decades, closer linkages of local food producer and the resort industry have been heralded as an antidote to this unsustainable circumstance, further encouraged by the current consumer trend around local food. Reflections on two qualitative research projects in resorts in South Africa and Fiji challenge the notion that tourists move out of their comfort zone to eat local dishes to any greater extent. Large-scale, internationally branded and managed resorts serve predominantly what their tourists from the Global North like to eat: a Western cuisine. If farmers want to benefit from this resort industry, they have to grow food according to the Western palate, which in turn has questionable impacts on biodiversity levels and environmental health in general. The discussion around localising tourism-related food chains in countries of the Global South needs to acknowledge for whose agenda food is being produced. “Corporate resorts” endorse neither a very sustainable nor a locally adaptable culinary agenda.Keywords: agriculture–tourism linkages, cuisine, Fiji, Global South, local food, South Africa, sustainable touris

‘Mountain resorts’: origins and evolution

The paper discusses the background for the emergence of such ‘mountain resorts’, their types and changes in their mode of operation. Some theoretical and practical issues will be illustrated with examples derived from Europe, North America, Asia and Africa

Economic and social survival strategies of migrants in Southern Africa: a case study of Ghanaian migrants in Johannesburg, South Africa

Magister Artium (Development Studies) - MA(DVS)The international migrant stock has continued to grow at a fast pace increasing from 222 million in 2010 to 244 million in 2015. Reasons for migration are diverse and include conflicts, poverty and natural tragedies. South to South migration is the most prevalent on the African continent; similarly, half of migrants from developing countries, the world over, are estimated to reside in other developing countries. South Africa is amongst the continent’s most popular destinations for Africa’s migrants. Among the international migrants of African descent who reside in South Africa, are Ghanaians; a migrant population rarely considered by migration studies conducted in the country. Ghanaians receive less than 5% of the permits granted by South Africa to migrants every year. Among this lot of migrants, are undocumented Ghanaians who live in the country with little or no social protection. They are exposed to various health and social conditions and resort to survivalist strategies as a coping mechanism. However, very little is known about the specifics of the aforementioned challenges and the strategies they use to cope with these, in South Africa, for studies in this regard are largely non-existent. With the aim of filling this gap, this study explores the economic and social survival strategies of Ghanaian migrants in Johannesburg, South Africa. Using qualitative research methods, it draws data from 10 Key Informant Individual Interviews and three Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and analyses the experiences of documented and undocumented Ghanaian migrants in relation to access to livelihood, health, housing and their use of social networks in South Africa. The findings of this research indicated that economic reason is the main push factor for the migration of Ghanaians to South Africa. It is hoped that the relevant authorities in Ghana and South Africa that are positioned to address the challenges faced by migrants will find the results of this study useful in their efforts to mitigate the plight of documented and undocumented Ghanaian migrants in the informal sector of South Africa

Program: The 15th International Conference on Gambling & Risk Taking

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"Promoting Equality Through an Employment of Last Resort Policy"

To put an economy on an equitable growth path, economic development must be based on social efficiency, equity, and job creation. It has been shown that unemployment has far-reaching effects, all leading to an inequitable distribution of well-being. But many economists assume that unemployment tends toward a natural rate below which it cannot go without creating inflation. The paper considers a particular employment strategy: a government job creation program, such as an employment guarantee or employer-of-last-resort scheme, that would satisfy the noninflationary criteria. The paper analyzes the international experience of government job creation programs, with particular emphasis on the cases of Argentina and India. We conclude by considering the application of an employer-of-last-resort policy to the developing world and as a vehicle to meeting the Millennium Development Goals.

The social diagnostics of stroke-like symptoms: healers, doctors and prophets in Agincourt Limpopo Province, South Africa

This paper focuses on the clinical and social diagnostics of stroke-like symptoms in Limpopo Province, South Africa. The research questions addressed here are: what are the lay understandings of strokelike symptoms and what are the health-seeking behaviours of Tsongan Mozambican refugees and South Africans in this area? The study site is ten villages in the Agincourt sub-district of Limpopo Province which are within the health surveillance area of the Agincourt Health and Population Unit (AHPU) of the University of Witwatersrand. The population are Tsongan who speak Shangaan and comprise self-settled Mozambican refugees who fled to this area during the 1980s across the nearby border and displaced South African citizens. The latter were forcibly displaced from their villages to make way for game reserves or agricultural development and moved to this area when it was the former ‘homeland’ of Gazankulu. The team collected data using rapid ethnographic assessment and household interviews as part of the Southern Africa Stroke Prevention Initiative (SASPI). The main findings are that stroke-like symptoms are considered to be both a physical and social condition, and in consequence plural healing using clinical and social diagnostics is sought to address both these dimensions. People with stroke-like symptoms maintain their physical, mental and social well-being and deal with this affliction and misfortune by visiting doctors, healers, prophets and churches

“Temporal not Permanent:” The impact of Covid-19 cities lockdown on improving Air Quality — a critical review of Africa

The WHO declared the novel Covid-19 virus a global pandemic shortly after it broke out. The deadly virus spread has affected human health and seriously halted many economic and industrial activities globally. However, there has been a blight as there has generally been an improvement in air quality since the deadly Covid-19 pandemic caused various governments to lockdown their cities to regulate the spread of the virus. Since the widespread of Covid-19, there have been several researches to measure the extent of impact Covid-19 city lockdown has had global air quality, but no critical review has been done in Africa as a continent to assess the impact of Covid-19 on the impact of lockdowns on air quality. This study is geared towards a critical review of the impact of lockdowns on air quality in Africa. A total of 117 studies were found after a thorough review, and 87 studies met the screening criteria for the review. The literature was examined from Scopus, Google Scholar, PubMed and Web of Science. The study unraveled that in Africa, most of the studies were carried out on West Africa (45.6%), followed by North Africa (26.6%), East Africa (12.6%), South Africa (10.6%), and Central Africa (4.6%). Most of the studies have assessed the air pollutants like PM2.5, NO2, SO2 and CO. The study shows a significant improvement in air quality in Africa during the Covid-19 city lockdown. The research concludes that economic and industrial activities have resumed as various governments resort to partial city lockdowns. The improved air quality has just become an almost lost battle. Various governments in Africa should lock for other effective means to help continue the fight against air pollution in Africa since Covid-19 lockdowns seem to be short-lived. This varied study on the impact of Covid-19 city lockdowns on air quality will certainly aid policymakers in Africa in finding any gaps, as it defines the perceptions of the existing systematic research. Keywords: Covid-19 pandemic, urban city lockdown, air pollution, air quality, Afric

No. 66: Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Denialism, Minimalism, Realism

Violent xenophobia has become a regular feature of South African life. Everyday animosity frequently spills over into violence against individual migrants and refugees and their economic enterprises. Some of these incidents reach the scrutiny of the media and officialdom, but most remain invisible and unremarked. The fact that most of the violence occurs in marginal urban locations of informal settlements, townships and inner-city suburbs in South Africa has prompted intense debate over the nomenclature and identification of the underlying causes. Explanations for the large-scale anti-migrant violence that swept the country in May 2008, and continues in more isolated and sporadic fashion through to the present day, fall into three general categories: “xenophobia denialism”, “xenophobia minimalism” and “xenophobia realism.” The denialists reject the argument that xenophobia plays any role in violence against migrants and refugees. The South African government, initially bewildered by the unexpectedness and ferocity of the May 2008 violence, settled on an official position that the deaths, destruction and displacement were the work of criminal elements in the affected areas. This argument that attacks on migrants and refugees are simply acts of criminality, not xenophobia, is now state orthodoxy. Xenophobia denialism has also shaped official South African responses to criticism from the international community. Violence perpetrated by the police and South African citizens continues to be explained away by politicians as criminal acts by isolated, anti-social elements. The government’s position has been echoed by some researchers and political commentators who suggest that only a very small group of individuals engage in such acts and that these are not symptomatic of wider prejudice against migrants within South African society. Another form of denialism shifts the blame from xenophobia to the state’s dereliction of its duties, particularly its failure to control borders. According to this view, the problem is that the state has not seriously engaged with the “foreign threat.” It is difficult to see how South Africa’s draconian border and immigration controls can be considered either soft or lenient. The post-apartheid state has intensified border and immigration enforcement and, even at the height of the 2008 violence, officials were deporting displaced victims they claimed had entered South Africa illegally. State agencies have typically focused on identifying irregular migrants among victims of violence and deporting them, reinforcing the biases and prejudices that fuelled the violence to begin with. The xenophobia minimalists also eschew it as an explanation for violence against migrants and refugees, seeing it instead as an epiphenomenon or symptom of a deeper malaise. This is a particularly prevalent tendency amongst neo-marxist scholars seeking a materialist explanation for the violence, which they view as the outworking of structural economic inequalities and the capture of the African National Congress by neoliberalism, with the consequent inability of the state to effect a fundamental transformation and redistribution of wealth and resources in the country. The minimalists essentially argue that although xenophobia might exist, it is an epiphenomenon that does not get at the root causes of violence. One strand of minimalism sees the violence as a signifier of a broader, deepening social crisis in South Africa tied to intense competition for scarce resources such as jobs, shelter and services. According to this view, the effects of the inadequate post-apartheid transition have been felt most acutely in marginal urban locations where much of the violence has occurred and where difference has become the site around which the palpable anger and frustrations of those left out has been expressed. Certainly, the spatial incidence of violence in May 2008 was strongly correlated with the geography of poverty. But this simply begs the question of why not all poor areas (including many in which migrants and refugees resided) erupted or why poor South Africans were not attacking each other with similar ferocity. The economic insecurity of the offenders may account for their extreme anxiety and heightened dissatisfaction, but it does not explain why only certain groups were and are singled out for deadly assault. Furthermore, if economic competition between poor residents and migrants is the underlying cause of aggressive hostility, it does not explain why wealthy and privileged groups, who do not face direct or even indirect competition from these migrants, also espouse these prejudices. When vicious attacks on migrants are conceived primarily as the outcome of material realities and economic competition between citizens and “foreigners”, then the frames of reference are automatically loaded against the latter. Seen in such terms, resentment and antipathy towards migrants and other outsiders become inevitable aspects of the social landscape, justifying stringent controls over immigration, and exclusion (or at best very limited inclusion) of migrants. This distinction invigorates the very idea that the presence of migrants and refugees poses a perpetual threat to “legitimate insiders”. Similarly, the crises of governance and frustrated hopes in South Africa, particularly at local levels, have little if anything to do with the presence of migrants. These connections need to be constructed more carefully to avoid reproducing the very prejudices that need to be confronted. One cannot deny that there is rivalry between locals and migrants. However, migrants represent a very small minority in terms of South Africa’s total population, and the detrimental effects of this economic competition have been seriously overstated. Both xenophobia denialism and xenophobia minimalism ignore or sideline the evidence that most South Africans hold extremely negative views about migrants and refugees and want the state to exercise greater coercive power to purge the country of their presence. The realists suggest, by contrast, that xenophobia is a pervasive phenomenon throughout South African society and that there is a predisposition to resort to violence on the part of a considerable number of South Africans. This viewpoint is based on systematic representative sampling of the South African population as a whole. The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) has been monitoring the perceptions and attitudes of South Africans towards migrants and refugees since the late 1990s. These periodic surveys provide unequivocal evidence of deep-rooted and pervasive hostility and animosity towards migrants and refugees in the country. Three general findings are of relevance to our argument: (a) the nature and strength of myths about migrant and migration; (b) the level of public endorsement of coercive state measures to keep migrants out of the country and to remove those who are present; and (c) the degree of willingness to resort to coercion and violence against migrants. In this paper, we argue that xenophobia realism is the best way to make sense of the phenomenon of extreme xenophobia, that is, the translation of hostile attitudes into violent actions. We conceptualize extreme xenophobia as a heightened form of xenophobia in which hostility and opposition to those perceived as outsiders and foreigners is strongly embedded and expressed through aggressive acts directed at migrants and refugees. South Africans hold migrants responsible for crime, bringing disease, and “stealing” jobs, services and resources and view them as being illegally in the country. Moreover, perceptions of a rapid increase in the number of migrants intensify the levels of threat attached to them. Rights and entitlements for residents are directly and in a discriminatory fashion linked to migration and citizenship status, drawing the boundaries between those who are seen to belong and others who are not. High levels of migrant antipathy lead to recurrent episodes of violence. The primary challenge for xenophobia realists is to explain why, if hostility is so widespread, violence tends to be more confined, targeted at poorer neighbourhoods in the cities. First, whether and where animosity translates into actions depends on community-specific dynamics such as the nature of local leadership, the absence of dispute resolution mechanisms and the character of policing. Second, all of the common myths about migrants are offered by residents to explain why the attacks take place. Migration myths are not epiphenomena or post-hoc rationalizations; they have powerful mobilizing and animating effects spurring those who believe them into acts of extreme xenophobia. Disowning the existence of xenophobia not only flies in the face of a large body of quantitative and qualitative research, it illustrates a continuing lack of political will to own the problem and act against one of the most destructive and anti-democratic forces in post-apartheid South Africa

Care-seeking patterns for fatal malaria in Tanzania.

BACKGROUND\ud \ud Once malaria occurs, deaths can be prevented by prompt treatment with relatively affordable and efficacious drugs. Yet this goal is elusive in Africa. The paradox of a continuing but easily preventable cause of high mortality raises important questions for policy makers concerning care-seeking and access to health systems. Although patterns of care-seeking during uncomplicated malaria episodes are well known, studies in cases of fatal malaria are rare. Care-seeking behaviours may differ between these groups.\ud \ud METHODS\ud \ud This study documents care-seeking events in 320 children less than five years of age with fatal malaria seen between 1999 and 2001 during over 240,000 person-years of follow-up in a stable perennial malaria transmission setting in southern Tanzania. Accounts of care-seeking recorded in verbal autopsy histories were analysed to determine providers attended and the sequence of choices made as the patients' condition deteriorated.\ud \ud RESULTS\ud \ud As first resort to care, 78.7% of malaria-attributable deaths used modern biomedical care in the form of antimalarial pharmaceuticals from shops or government or non-governmental heath facilities, 9.4% used initial traditional care at home or from traditional practitioners and 11.9% sought no care of any kind. There were no differences in patterns of choice by sex of the child, sex of the head of the household, socioeconomic status of the household or presence or absence of convulsions. In malaria deaths of all ages who sought care more than once, modern care was included in the first or second resort to care in 90.0% and 99.4% with and without convulsions respectively.\ud \ud CONCLUSIONS\ud \ud In this study of fatal malaria in southern Tanzania, biomedical care is the preferred choice of an overwhelming majority of suspected malaria cases, even those complicated by convulsions. Traditional care is no longer a significant delaying factor. To reduce mortality further will require greater emphasis on recognizing danger signs at home, prompter care-seeking, improved quality of care at health facilities and better adherence to treatment

Revising the WHO verbal autopsy instrument to facilitate routine cause-of-death monitoring.

OBJECTIVE: Verbal autopsy (VA) is a systematic approach for determining causes of death (CoD) in populations without routine medical certification. It has mainly been used in research contexts and involved relatively lengthy interviews. Our objective here is to describe the process used to shorten, simplify, and standardise the VA process to make it feasible for application on a larger scale such as in routine civil registration and vital statistics (CRVS) systems. METHODS: A literature review of existing VA instruments was undertaken. The World Health Organization (WHO) then facilitated an international consultation process to review experiences with existing VA instruments, including those from WHO, the Demographic Evaluation of Populations and their Health in Developing Countries (INDEPTH) Network, InterVA, and the Population Health Metrics Research Consortium (PHMRC). In an expert meeting, consideration was given to formulating a workable VA CoD list [with mapping to the International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) CoD] and to the viability and utility of existing VA interview questions, with a view to undertaking systematic simplification. FINDINGS: A revised VA CoD list was compiled enabling mapping of all ICD-10 CoD onto 62 VA cause categories, chosen on the grounds of public health significance as well as potential for ascertainment from VA. A set of 221 indicators for inclusion in the revised VA instrument was developed on the basis of accumulated experience, with appropriate skip patterns for various population sub-groups. The duration of a VA interview was reduced by about 40% with this new approach. CONCLUSIONS: The revised VA instrument resulting from this consultation process is presented here as a means of making it available for widespread use and evaluation. It is envisaged that this will be used in conjunction with automated models for assigning CoD from VA data, rather than involving physicians