119 research outputs found
Somewhat Non-Committing Encryption and Efficient Adaptively Secure Oblivious Transfer
Designing efficient cryptographic protocols tolerating adaptive
adversaries, who are able to corrupt parties on the fly as the
computation proceeds, has been an elusive task. Indeed, thus far no
\emph{efficient} protocols achieve adaptive security for general
multi-party computation, or even for many specific two-party tasks
such as oblivious transfer (OT). In fact, it is difficult and
expensive to achieve adaptive security even for the task of
\emph{secure communication}, which is arguably the most basic task
in cryptography.
In this paper we make progress in this area. First, we introduce a
new notion called \emph{semi-adaptive} security which is slightly
stronger than static security but \emph{significantly weaker than
fully adaptive security}. The main difference between adaptive and
semi-adaptive security is that, for semi-adaptive security, the
simulator is not required to handle the case where \emph{both}
parties start out honest and one becomes corrupted later on during
the protocol execution. As such, semi-adaptive security is much
easier to achieve than fully adaptive security. We then give a
simple, generic protocol compiler which transforms any
semi-adaptively secure protocol into a fully adaptively secure one.
The compilation effectively decomposes the problem of adaptive
security into two (simpler) problems which can be tackled
separately: the problem of semi-adaptive security and the problem of
realizing a weaker variant of secure channels.
We solve the latter problem by means of a new primitive that we call
{\em somewhat non-committing encryption} resulting in significant
efficiency improvements over the standard method for realizing
(fully) secure channels using (fully) non-committing encryption.
Somewhat non-committing encryption has two parameters: an
equivocality parameter (measuring the number of ways that a
ciphertext can be ``opened\u27\u27) and the message sizes . Our
implementation is very efficient for small values ,
\emph{even} when is large. This translates into a very efficient
compilation of many semi-adaptively secure protocols (in particular,
for a task with small input/output domains such as bit-OT) into a
fully adaptively secure protocol.
Finally, we showcase
our methodology by applying it to the recent Oblivious Transfer
protocol by Peikert \etal\ [Crypto 2008], which is only secure
against static corruptions, to obtain the first efficient, adaptively secure and composable OT protocol.
In particular, to transfer an -bit message, we use a constant number of rounds and public key operations
A Framework for Efficient Adaptively Secure Composable Oblivious Transfer in the ROM
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a fundamental cryptographic protocol that finds a
number of applications, in particular, as an essential building block for
two-party and multi-party computation. We construct a round-optimal (2 rounds)
universally composable (UC) protocol for oblivious transfer secure against
active adaptive adversaries from any OW-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme
with certain properties in the random oracle model (ROM). In terms of
computation, our protocol only requires the generation of a public/secret-key
pair, two encryption operations and one decryption operation, apart from a few
calls to the random oracle. In~terms of communication, our protocol only
requires the transfer of one public-key, two ciphertexts, and three binary
strings of roughly the same size as the message. Next, we show how to
instantiate our construction under the low noise LPN, McEliece, QC-MDPC, LWE,
and CDH assumptions. Our instantiations based on the low noise LPN, McEliece,
and QC-MDPC assumptions are the first UC-secure OT protocols based on coding
assumptions to achieve: 1) adaptive security, 2) optimal round complexity, 3)
low communication and computational complexities. Previous results in this
setting only achieved static security and used costly cut-and-choose
techniques.Our instantiation based on CDH achieves adaptive security at the
small cost of communicating only two more group elements as compared to the
gap-DH based Simplest OT protocol of Chou and Orlandi (Latincrypt 15), which
only achieves static security in the ROM
On Pseudorandom Encodings
We initiate a study of pseudorandom encodings: efficiently computable and decodable encoding functions that map messages from a given distribution to a random-looking distribution. For instance, every distribution that can be perfectly and efficiently compressed admits such a pseudorandom encoding. Pseudorandom encodings are motivated by a variety of cryptographic applications, including password-authenticated key exchange, “honey encryption” and steganography. The main question we ask is whether every efficiently samplable distribution admits a pseudorandom encoding. Under different cryptographic assumptions, we obtain positive and negative answers for different flavors of pseudorandom encodings, and relate this question to problems in other areas of cryptography. In particular, by establishing a twoway relation between pseudorandom encoding schemes and efficient invertible sampling algorithms, we reveal a connection between adaptively secure multiparty computation for randomized functionalities and questions in the domain of steganography
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On Black-Box Complexity and Adaptive, Universal Composability of Cryptographic Tasks
Two main goals of modern cryptography are to identify the minimal assumptions necessary to construct secure cryptographic primitives as well as to construct secure protocols in strong and realistic adversarial models. In this thesis, we address both of these fundamental questions. In the first part of this thesis, we present results on the black-box complexity of two basic cryptographic primitives: non-malleable encryption and optimally-fair coin tossing. Black-box reductions are reductions in which both the underlying primitive as well as the adversary are accessed only in an input-output (or black-box) manner. Most known cryptographic reductions are black-box. Moreover, black-box reductions are typically more efficient than non-black-box reductions. Thus, the black-box complexity of cryptographic primitives is a meaningful and important area of study which allows us to gain insight into the primitive. We study the black box complexity of non-malleable encryption and optimally-fair coin tossing, showing a positive result for the former and a negative one for the latter. Non-malleable encryption is a strong security notion for public-key encryption, guaranteeing that it is impossible to "maul" a ciphertext of a message m into a ciphertext of a related message. This security guarantee is essential for many applications such as auctions. We show how to transform, in a black-box manner, any public-key encryption scheme satisfying a weak form of security, semantic security, to a scheme satisfying non-malleability. Coin tossing is perhaps the most basic cryptographic primitive, allowing two distrustful parties to flip a coin whose outcome is 0 or 1 with probability 1/2. A fair coin tossing protocol is one in which the outputted bit is unbiased, even in the case where one of the parties may abort early. However, in the setting where parties may abort early, there is always a strategy for one of the parties to impose bias of Omega(1/r) in an r-round protocol. Thus, achieving bias of O(1/r) in r rounds is optimal, and it was recently shown that optimally-fair coin tossing can be achieved via a black-box reduction to oblivious transfer. We show that it cannot be achieved via a black-box reduction to one-way function, unless the number of rounds is at least Omega(n/log n), where n is the input/output length of the one-way function. In the second part of this thesis, we present protocols for multiparty computation (MPC) in the Universal Composability (UC) model that are secure against malicious, adaptive adversaries. In the standard model, security is only guaranteed in a stand-alone setting; however, nothing is guaranteed when multiple protocols are arbitrarily composed. In contrast, the UC model, introduced by (Canetti, 2000), considers the execution of an unbounded number of concurrent protocols, in an arbitrary, and adversarially controlled network environment. Another drawback of the standard model is that the adversary must decide which parties to corrupt before the execution of the protocol commences. A more realistic model allows the adversary to adaptively choose which parties to corrupt based on its evolving view during the protocol. In our work we consider the the adaptive UC model, which combines these two security requirements by allowing both arbitrary composition of protocols and adaptive corruption of parties. In our first result, we introduce an improved, efficient construction of non-committing encryption (NCE) with optimal round complexity, from a weaker primitive we introduce called trapdoor-simulatable public key encryption (PKE). NCE is a basic primitive necessary to construct protocols secure under adaptive corruptions and in particular, is used to construct oblivious transfer (OT) protocols secure against semi-honest, adaptive adversaries. Additionally, we show how to realize trapdoor-simulatable PKE from hardness of factoring Blum integers, thus achieving the first construction of NCE from hardness of factoring. In our second result, we present a compiler for transforming an OT protocol secure against a semi-honest, adaptive adversary into one that is secure against a malicious, adaptive adversary. Our compiler achieves security in the UC model, assuming access to an ideal commitment functionality, and improves over previous work achieving the same security guarantee in two ways: it uses black-box access to the underlying protocol and achieves a constant multiplicative overhead in the round complexity. Combining our two results with the work of (Ishai et al., 2008), we obtain the first black-box construction of UC and adaptively secure MPC from trapdoor-simulatable PKE and the ideal commitment functionality
Two-Round Adaptively Secure MPC from Isogenies, LPN, or CDH
We present a new framework for building round-optimal (two-round) secure MPC. We show that a relatively weak notion of OT that we call (r-iOT) is enough to build two-round, adaptively secure MPC against adversaries in the CRS model. We then show how to construct r-iOT from CDH, LPN, or isogeny-based assumptions that can be viewed as group actions (such as CSIDH and CSI-FiSh). This yields the first constructions of two-round adaptively secure MPC against malicious adversaries from CDH, LPN, or isogeny-based assumptions. We further extend our non-isogeny results to the plain model, achieving (to our knowledge) the first construction of two-round adaptively secure MPC against semi-honest adversaries in the plain model from LPN.
Our results allow us to build a two-round adaptively secure MPC against malicious adversaries from essentially all of the well-studied assumptions in cryptography. In addition, our constructions from isogenies or LPN provide the first post-quantum alternatives to LWE-based constructions for round-optimal adaptively secure MPC. Along the way, we show that r-iOT also implies non-committing encryption(NCE), thereby yielding the first constructions of NCE from isogenies or LPN
Efficient and Universally Composable Protocols for Oblivious Transfer from the CDH Assumption
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a simple, yet fundamental primitive which suffices to achieve almost every cryptographic application. In a recent work (Latincrypt `15), Chou and Orlandi (CO) present the most efficient, fully UC-secure OT protocol to date and argue its security under the CDH assumption. Unfortunately, a subsequent work by Genc et al. (Eprint `17) exposes a flaw in their proof which renders the CO protocol insecure. In this work, we make the following contributions: We first point out two additional, previously undiscovered flaws in the CO protocol and then show how to patch the proof with respect to static and malicious corruptions in the UC model under the stronger Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption. With the proof failing for adaptive corruptions even under the GDH assumption, we then present a novel OT protocol which builds on ideas from the CO protocol and can be proven fully UC-secure under the CDH assumption. Interestingly, our new protocol is actually significantly more efficient (roughly by a factor of two) than the CO protocol. This improvement is made possible by avoiding costly redundancy in the symmetric encryption scheme used in the CO protocol. Our ideas can also be applied to the original CO protocol, which yields a similar gain in efficiency
On Adaptively Secure Multiparty Computation with a Short CRS
In the setting of multiparty computation, a set of mutually distrusting parties wish to securely compute a joint function of their private inputs. A protocol is adaptively secure if honest parties might get corrupted \emph{after} the protocol has started. Recently (TCC 2015) three constant-round adaptively secure
protocols were presented [CGP15, DKR15, GP15]. All three constructions assume that the parties have access to a \emph{common reference string} (CRS) whose size depends on the function to compute, even when facing semi-honest adversaries. It is unknown whether constant-round adaptively secure protocols exist, without assuming access to such a CRS.
In this work, we study adaptively secure protocols which only rely on a short CRS that is independent on the function to compute.
First, we raise a subtle issue relating to the usage of \emph{non-interactive non-committing encryption} within security proofs in the UC framework, and explain how to overcome it. We demonstrate the problem in the security proof of the adaptively secure oblivious-transfer protocol from [CLOS02] and provide a complete proof of this protocol.
Next, we consider the two-party setting where one of the parties has a polynomial-size input domain, yet the other has no constraints on its input. We show that assuming the existence of adaptively secure oblivious transfer, every deterministic functionality can be computed with adaptive security in a constant number of rounds.
Finally, we present a new primitive called \emph{non-committing indistinguishability obfuscation}, and show that this primitive is \emph{complete} for constructing adaptively secure protocols with round complexity independent of the function
Fast and Universally-Composable Oblivious Transfer and Commitment Scheme with Adaptive Security
Adaptive security embodies one of the strongest notions of security that allows an adversary to corrupt parties at any point during protocol execution and gain access to its internal state. Since it models real-life situations such as ``hacking , efficient adaptively-secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols are desirable. Such protocols demand primitives such as oblivious transfer (OT) and commitment schemes that are adaptively-secure as building blocks. Efficient realizations of these primitives have been found to be challenging, especially in the no erasure model. We make progress in this direction and provide efficient constructions that are Universally-Composable in the random oracle model.
Oblivious Transfer: We present the first round optimal framework for building adaptively-secure OT in the programmable random oracle (PRO) model, relying upon the framework of Peikert et al. (Crypto 2008). When instantiated with Decisional Diffie Hellman assumption, it incurs a minimal communication overhead of one k bit string and computational overhead of 5 random oracle queries over its static counterpart, where k is the security parameter. This computation overhead translates to 0.02% and 1% in the LAN and WAN setting. Additionally, we obtain a construction of adaptively-secure 1-out-of-N OT by extending the result of Naor et al. (Journal of Cryptology 2005) that transforms logN copies of 1-out-of-2 OTs to one 1-out-of-N OT in the PRO model. We complete the picture of efficient OT constructions by presenting the first adaptively secure OT Extension, extending the protocol of Asharov et al. (Eurocrypt 2015) for the adaptive setting using PRO. Our OT extension enables us to obtain adaptive OTs at an amortized cost of 3 symmetric key operations and communication of 3k bit strings. It incurs a runtime overhead of 2% and 11.95%, in the LAN and WAN setting and almost no communication overhead over the static OT extension protocol. In concrete terms, the cost is 2microsecs and 115 microsecs for each OT in LAN and WAN.
Commitment Scheme: We present an adaptively secure commitment scheme in the Global Random Oracle model solely relying on observable random oracle (ORO). Our commitment scheme has a one-time offline setup phase, where a common reference string (crs) is generated between the parties using an ORO. In the online phase, the parties use the crs and ORO to generate commitments in a non-interactive fashion. Our construction incurs communication of 4k bit strings and computation of 4 exponentiations and 4 random oracle queries for committing to an arbitrary length message. Empirically, it takes around 0.18ms and 0.2 ms for committing to 128 bits and 2048 bits respectively. It finds applications in secure two-party computation (2PC) protocols that adopt offline-online paradigm, where the crs can be generated in the offline phase and the scheme can be used in the online phase
On the Power of Secure Two-Party Computation
Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky and Sahai (STOC 2007, SIAM JoC 2009) introduced the powerful ``MPC-in-the-head\u27\u27 technique that provided a general transformation of information-theoretic MPC protocols secure against passive adversaries to a ZK proof in a ``black-box\u27\u27 way. In this work, we extend this technique and provide a generic transformation of any semi-honest secure two-party computation (2PC) protocol (with mild adaptive security guarantees) in the so called oblivious-transfer hybrid model to an adaptive ZK proof for any NP language, in a ``black-box\u27\u27 way assuming only one-way functions. Our basic construction based on Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson\u27s 2PC protocol yields an adaptive ZK proof with communication complexity proportional to quadratic in the size of the circuit implementing the NP relation. Previously such proofs relied on an expensive Karp reduction of the NP language to Graph Hamiltonicity (Lindell and Zarosim (TCC 2009, Journal of Cryptology 2011)).
As an application of our techniques, we show how to obtain a ZK proof with an ``input-delayed\u27\u27 property for any NP language without relying on expensive Karp reductions that is black-box in the underlying one-way function. Namely, the input delayed property allows the honest prover\u27s algorithm to receive the actual statement to be proved only in the final round. We further generalize this to obtain a ``commit and prove\u27\u27 protocol with the same property where the prover commits to a witness w in the second message and proves a statement x regarding the witness w in zero-knowledge where the statement is determined only in the last round. This improves a previous construction of Lapidot and Shamir (Crypto 1990) that was designed specifically for the Graph Hamiltonicity problem and relied on the underlying primitives in a non-black-box way.
Additionally, we provide a general transformation to construct a randomized encoding of a function f from any 2PC protocol that securely computes a related functionality (in a black-box way) from one-way functions. We show that if the 2PC protocol has mild adaptive security guarantees (which are satisfied by both the Yao\u27s and GMW\u27s protocol) then the resulting randomized encoding (RE) can be decomposed to an offline/online encoding
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