7,864 research outputs found
Some Remarks on the Model Theory of Epistemic Plausibility Models
Classical logics of knowledge and belief are usually interpreted on Kripke
models, for which a mathematically well-developed model theory is available.
However, such models are inadequate to capture dynamic phenomena. Therefore,
epistemic plausibility models have been introduced. Because these are much
richer structures than Kripke models, they do not straightforwardly inherit the
model-theoretical results of modal logic. Therefore, while epistemic
plausibility structures are well-suited for modeling purposes, an extensive
investigation of their model theory has been lacking so far. The aim of the
present paper is to fill exactly this gap, by initiating a systematic
exploration of the model theory of epistemic plausibility models. Like in
'ordinary' modal logic, the focus will be on the notion of bisimulation. We
define various notions of bisimulations (parametrized by a language L) and show
that L-bisimilarity implies L-equivalence. We prove a Hennesy-Milner type
result, and also two undefinability results. However, our main point is a
negative one, viz. that bisimulations cannot straightforwardly be generalized
to epistemic plausibility models if conditional belief is taken into account.
We present two ways of coping with this issue: (i) adding a modality to the
language, and (ii) putting extra constraints on the models. Finally, we make
some remarks about the interaction between bisimulation and dynamic model
changes.Comment: 19 pages, 3 figure
Evidence and plausibility in neighborhood structures
The intuitive notion of evidence has both semantic and syntactic features. In
this paper, we develop an {\em evidence logic} for epistemic agents faced with
possibly contradictory evidence from different sources. The logic is based on a
neighborhood semantics, where a neighborhood indicates that the agent has
reason to believe that the true state of the world lies in . Further notions
of relative plausibility between worlds and beliefs based on the latter
ordering are then defined in terms of this evidence structure, yielding our
intended models for evidence-based beliefs. In addition, we also consider a
second more general flavor, where belief and plausibility are modeled using
additional primitive relations, and we prove a representation theorem showing
that each such general model is a -morphic image of an intended one. This
semantics invites a number of natural special cases, depending on how uniform
we make the evidence sets, and how coherent their total structure. We give a
structural study of the resulting `uniform' and `flat' models. Our main result
are sound and complete axiomatizations for the logics of all four major model
classes with respect to the modal language of evidence, belief and safe belief.
We conclude with an outlook toward logics for the dynamics of changing
evidence, and the resulting language extensions and connections with logics of
plausibility change
Bisimulation and expressivity for conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief
Plausibility models are Kripke models that agents use to reason about
knowledge and belief, both of themselves and of each other. Such models are
used to interpret the notions of conditional belief, degrees of belief, and
safe belief. The logic of conditional belief contains that modality and also
the knowledge modality, and similarly for the logic of degrees of belief and
the logic of safe belief. With respect to these logics, plausibility models may
contain too much information. A proper notion of bisimulation is required that
characterises them. We define that notion of bisimulation and prove the
required characterisations: on the class of image-finite and preimage-finite
models (with respect to the plausibility relation), two pointed Kripke models
are modally equivalent in either of the three logics, if and only if they are
bisimilar. As a result, the information content of such a model can be
similarly expressed in the logic of conditional belief, or the logic of degrees
of belief, or that of safe belief. This, we found a surprising result. Still,
that does not mean that the logics are equally expressive: the logics of
conditional and degrees of belief are incomparable, the logics of degrees of
belief and safe belief are incomparable, while the logic of safe belief is more
expressive than the logic of conditional belief. In view of the result on
bisimulation characterisation, this is an equally surprising result. We hope
our insights may contribute to the growing community of formal epistemology and
on the relation between qualitative and quantitative modelling
Epistemicism and modality
What kind of semantics should someone who accepts the epistemicist theory of vagueness defended in Timothy Williamson’s Vagueness (1994) give a definiteness operator? To impose some interesting constraints on acceptable answers to this question, I will assume that the object language also contains a metaphysical necessity operator and a metaphysical actuality operator. I will suggest that the answer is to be found by working within a three-dimensional model theory. I will provide sketches of two ways of extracting an epistemicist semantics from that model theory, one of which I will find to be more plausible than the other
Approximated Computation of Belief Functions for Robust Design Optimization
This paper presents some ideas to reduce the computational cost of
evidence-based robust design optimization. Evidence Theory crystallizes both
the aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in the design parameters, providing
two quantitative measures, Belief and Plausibility, of the credibility of the
computed value of the design budgets. The paper proposes some techniques to
compute an approximation of Belief and Plausibility at a cost that is a
fraction of the one required for an accurate calculation of the two values.
Some simple test cases will show how the proposed techniques scale with the
dimension of the problem. Finally a simple example of spacecraft system design
is presented.Comment: AIAA-2012-1932 14th AIAA Non-Deterministic Approaches Conference.
23-26 April 2012 Sheraton Waikiki, Honolulu, Hawai
Perspectives, Questions, and Epistemic Value
Many epistemologists endorse true-belief monism, the thesis that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. However, this view faces formidable counterexamples. In response to these challenges, we alter the letter, but not the spirit, of true-belief monism. We dub the resulting view “inquisitive truth monism”, which holds that only true answers to relevant questions are of fundamental epistemic value. Which questions are relevant is a function of an inquirer’s perspective, which is characterized by his/her interests, social role, and background assumptions. Using examples of several different scientific practices, we argue that inquisitive truth monism outperforms true-belief monism
Knowability Relative to Information
We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models the topic-sensitivity of information, allowing us to invalidate controversial forms of epistemic closure while validating less controversial ones. Thus, unlike the standard modal framework for epistemic logic, KRI accommodates plausible approaches to the Kripke-Harman dogmatism paradox, which bear on non-monotonicity, or on topic-sensitivity. KRI also strikes a better balance between agent idealization and a non-trivial logic of knowledge ascriptions
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