6,975 research outputs found
Some observations on the logical foundations of inductive theorem proving
In this paper we study the logical foundations of automated inductive theorem
proving. To that aim we first develop a theoretical model that is centered
around the difficulty of finding induction axioms which are sufficient for
proving a goal.
Based on this model, we then analyze the following aspects: the choice of a
proof shape, the choice of an induction rule and the language of the induction
formula. In particular, using model-theoretic techniques, we clarify the
relationship between notions of inductiveness that have been considered in the
literature on automated inductive theorem proving. This is a corrected version
of the paper arXiv:1704.01930v5 published originally on Nov.~16, 2017
Virtual Evidence: A Constructive Semantics for Classical Logics
This article presents a computational semantics for classical logic using
constructive type theory. Such semantics seems impossible because classical
logic allows the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM), not accepted in constructive
logic since it does not have computational meaning. However, the apparently
oracular powers expressed in the LEM, that for any proposition P either it or
its negation, not P, is true can also be explained in terms of constructive
evidence that does not refer to "oracles for truth." Types with virtual
evidence and the constructive impossibility of negative evidence provide
sufficient semantic grounds for classical truth and have a simple computational
meaning. This idea is formalized using refinement types, a concept of
constructive type theory used since 1984 and explained here. A new axiom
creating virtual evidence fully retains the constructive meaning of the logical
operators in classical contexts.
Key Words: classical logic, constructive logic, intuitionistic logic,
propositions-as-types, constructive type theory, refinement types, double
negation translation, computational content, virtual evidenc
Mill on logic
Working within the broad lines of general consensus that mark out the core features of John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) logic, as set forth in his A System of Logic (1843–1872), this chapter provides an introduction to Mill’s logical theory by reviewing his position on the relationship between induction and deduction, and the role of general premises and principles in reasoning. Locating induction, understood as a kind of analogical reasoning from particulars to particulars, as the basic form of inference that is both free-standing and the sole load-bearing structure in Mill’s logic, the foundations of Mill’s logical system are briefly inspected. Several naturalistic features are identified, including its subject matter, human reasoning, its empiricism, which requires that only particular, experiential claims can function as basic reasons, and its ultimate foundations in ‘spontaneous’ inference. The chapter concludes by comparing Mill’s naturalized logic to Russell’s (1907) regressive method for identifying the premises of mathematics
Five Observations Concerning the Intended Meaning of the Intuitionistic Logical Constants
This paper contains five observations concerning the intended meaning of the intuitionistic logical constants: (1) if the explanations of this meaning are to be based on a non-decidable concept, that concept should not be that of 'proof'; (2) Kreisel's explanations using extra clauses can be significantly simplified; (3) the impredicativity of the definition of → can be easily and safely ameliorated; (4) the definition of → in terms of 'proofs from premises' results in a loss of the inductive character of the definitions of ∨ and ∃; and (5) the same occurs with the definition of ∀ in terms of 'proofs with free variables
On the equivalence of game and denotational semantics for the probabilistic mu-calculus
The probabilistic (or quantitative) modal mu-calculus is a fixed-point logic
de- signed for expressing properties of probabilistic labeled transition
systems (PLTS). Two semantics have been studied for this logic, both assigning
to every process state a value in the interval [0,1] representing the
probability that the property expressed by the formula holds at the state. One
semantics is denotational and the other is a game semantics, specified in terms
of two-player stochastic games. The two semantics have been proved to coincide
on all finite PLTS's, but the equivalence of the two semantics on arbitrary
models has been open in literature. In this paper we prove that the equivalence
indeed holds for arbitrary infinite models, and thus our result strengthens the
fruitful connection between denotational and game semantics. Our proof adapts
the unraveling or unfolding method, a general proof technique for proving
result of parity games by induction on their complexity
Proof phenomenon as a function of the phenomenology of proving
Kurt Gödel wrote (1964, p. 272), after he had read Husserl, that the notion of objectivity raises a question: “the question of the objective existence of the objects of mathematical intuition (which, incidentally, is an exact replica of the question of the objective existence of the outer world)”. This “exact replica” brings to mind the close analogy Husserl saw between our intuition of essences in Wesensschau and of physical objects in perception. What is it like to experience a mathematical proving process? What is the ontological status of a mathematical proof? Can computer assisted provers output a proof? Taking a naturalized world account, I will assess the relationship between mathematics, the physical world and consciousness by introducing a significant conceptual distinction between proving and proof. I will propose that proving is a phenomenological conscious experience. This experience involves a combination of what Kurt Gödel called intuition, and what Husserl called intentionality. In contrast, proof is a function of that process — the mathematical phenomenon — that objectively self-presents a property in the world, and that results from a spatiotemporal unity being subject to the exact laws of nature. In this essay, I apply phenomenology to mathematical proving as a performance of consciousness, that is, a lived experience expressed and formalized in language, in which there is the possibility of formulating intersubjectively shareable meanings
Technology assessment of advanced automation for space missions
Six general classes of technology requirements derived during the mission definition phase of the study were identified as having maximum importance and urgency, including autonomous world model based information systems, learning and hypothesis formation, natural language and other man-machine communication, space manufacturing, teleoperators and robot systems, and computer science and technology
- …