Almost structural completeness; an algebraic approach

A deductive system is structurally complete if its admissible inference rules are derivable. For several important systems, like modal logic S5, failure of structural completeness is caused only by the underivability of passive rules, i.e. rules that can not be applied to theorems of the system. Neglecting passive rules leads to the notion of almost structural completeness, that means, derivablity of admissible non-passive rules. Almost structural completeness for quasivarieties and varieties of general algebras is investigated here by purely algebraic means. The results apply to all algebraizable deductive systems. Firstly, various characterizations of almost structurally complete quasivarieties are presented. Two of them are general: expressed with finitely presented algebras, and with subdirectly irreducible algebras. One is restricted to quasivarieties with finite model property and equationally definable principal relative congruences, where the condition is verifiable on finite subdirectly irreducible algebras. Secondly, examples of almost structurally complete varieties are provided Particular emphasis is put on varieties of closure algebras, that are known to constitute adequate semantics for normal extensions of S4 modal logic. A certain infinite family of such almost structurally complete, but not structurally complete, varieties is constructed. Every variety from this family has a finitely presented unifiable algebra which does not embed into any free algebra for this variety. Hence unification in it is not unitary. This shows that almost structural completeness is strictly weaker than projective unification for varieties of closure algebras

A Meta-Logic of Inference Rules: Syntax

This work was intended to be an attempt to introduce the meta-language for working with multiple-conclusion inference rules that admit asserted propositions along with the rejected propositions. The presence of rejected propositions, and especially the presence of the rule of reverse substitution, requires certain change the definition of structurality

Intuitionism and the Modal Logic of Vagueness

Intuitionistic logic provides an elegant solution to the Sorites Paradox. Its acceptance has been hampered by two factors. First, the lack of an accepted semantics for languages containing vague terms has led even philosophers sympathetic to intuitionism to complain that no explanation has been given of why intuitionistic logic is the correct logic for such languages. Second, switching from classical to intuitionistic logic, while it may help with the Sorites, does not appear to offer any advantages when dealing with the so-called paradoxes of higher-order vagueness. We offer a proposal that makes strides on both issues. We argue that the intuitionist’s characteristic rejection of any third alethic value alongside true and false is best elaborated by taking the normal modal system S4M to be the sentential logic of the operator ‘it is clearly the case that’. S4M opens the way to an account of higher-order vagueness which avoids the paradoxes that have been thought to infect the notion. S4M is one of the modal counterparts of the intuitionistic sentential calculus and we use this fact to explain why IPC is the correct sentential logic to use when reasoning with vague statements. We also show that our key results go through in an intuitionistic version of S4M. Finally, we deploy our analysis to reply to Timothy Williamson’s objections to intuitionistic treatments of vagueness

Noncomparabilities & Non Standard Logics

Many normative theories set forth in the welfare economics, distributive justice and cognate literatures posit noncomparabilities or incommensurabilities between magnitudes of various kinds. In some cases these gaps are predicated on metaphysical claims, in others upon epistemic claims, and in still others upon political-moral claims. I show that in all such cases they are best given formal expression in nonstandard logics that reject bivalence, excluded middle, or both. I do so by reference to an illustrative case study: a contradiction known to beset John Rawls\u27s selection and characterization of primary goods as the proper distribuendum in any distributively just society. The contradiction is avoided only by reformulating Rawls\u27s claims in a nonstandard form, which form happens also to cohere quite attractively with Rawls\u27s intuitive argumentation on behalf of his claims

Noncomparabilities & Non Standard Logics

Many normative theories set forth in the welfare economics, distributive justice and cognate literatures posit noncomparabilities or incommensurabilities between magnitudes of various kinds. In some cases these gaps are predicated on metaphysical claims, in others upon epistemic claims, and in still others upon political-moral claims. I show that in all such cases they are best given formal expression in nonstandard logics that reject bivalence, excluded middle, or both. I do so by reference to an illustrative case study: a contradiction known to beset John Rawls\u27s selection and characterization of primary goods as the proper distribuendum in any distributively just society. The contradiction is avoided only by reformulating Rawls\u27s claims in a nonstandard form, which form happens also to cohere quite attractively with Rawls\u27s intuitive argumentation on behalf of his claims