On complexity of trellis structure of linear block codes

The trellis structure of linear block codes (LBCs) is discussed. The state and branch complexities of a trellis diagram (TD) for a LBC is investigated. The TD with the minimum number of states is said to be minimal. The branch complexity of a minimal TD for a LBC is expressed in terms of the dimensions of specific subcodes of the given code. Then upper and lower bounds are derived on the number of states of a minimal TD for a LBC, and it is shown that a cyclic (or shortened cyclic) code is the worst in terms of the state complexity among the LBCs of the same length and dimension. Furthermore, it is shown that the structural complexity of a minimal TD for a LBC depends on the order of its bit positions. This fact suggests that an appropriate permutation of the bit positions of a code may result in an equivalent code with a much simpler minimal TD. Boolean polynomial representation of codewords of a LBC is also considered. This representation helps in study of the trellis structure of the code. Boolean polynomial representation of a code is applied to construct its minimal TD. Particularly, the construction of minimal trellises for Reed-Muller codes and the extended and permuted binary primitive BCH codes which contain Reed-Muller as subcodes is emphasized. Finally, the structural complexity of minimal trellises for the extended and permuted, and double-error-correcting BCH codes is analyzed and presented. It is shown that these codes have relatively simple trellis structure and hence can be decoded with the Viterbi decoding algorithm

On Burst Error Correction and Storage Security of Noisy Data

Secure storage of noisy data for authentication purposes usually involves the use of error correcting codes. We propose a new model scenario involving burst errors and present for that several constructions.Comment: to be presented at MTNS 201

Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data

We provide formal definitions and efficient secure techniques for - turning noisy information into keys usable for any cryptographic application, and, in particular, - reliably and securely authenticating biometric data. Our techniques apply not just to biometric information, but to any keying material that, unlike traditional cryptographic keys, is (1) not reproducible precisely and (2) not distributed uniformly. We propose two primitives: a "fuzzy extractor" reliably extracts nearly uniform randomness R from its input; the extraction is error-tolerant in the sense that R will be the same even if the input changes, as long as it remains reasonably close to the original. Thus, R can be used as a key in a cryptographic application. A "secure sketch" produces public information about its input w that does not reveal w, and yet allows exact recovery of w given another value that is close to w. Thus, it can be used to reliably reproduce error-prone biometric inputs without incurring the security risk inherent in storing them. We define the primitives to be both formally secure and versatile, generalizing much prior work. In addition, we provide nearly optimal constructions of both primitives for various measures of ``closeness'' of input data, such as Hamming distance, edit distance, and set difference.Comment: 47 pp., 3 figures. Prelim. version in Eurocrypt 2004, Springer LNCS 3027, pp. 523-540. Differences from version 3: minor edits for grammar, clarity, and typo