Colours, Corners And Complexity

"There is a philosophical question as to what one really sees". Wittgenstein's remark raises all sorts of questions: Does one see tables and chairs, people jumping up and down, their jumps, their sadness ? Does one see colours and forms, coloured forms, dynamic and static, that are above or to the left of other coloured forms ? If the latter, are these things one sees private entities or public entities as are, presumably, tables and chairs ? If both answers are legitimate (sometimes, or whenever we see ?) what are the relations between the people we see and the coloured forms that we also see ? In other words, is what is presented to me in my visual field private, public or partly private and partly public

The logic of forbidden colours

The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to clarify Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thesis that colours possess logical structures, focusing on his ‘puzzle proposition’ that “there can be a bluish green but not a reddish green”, (2) to compare modeltheoretical and gametheoretical approaches to the colour exclusion problem. What is gained, then, is a new gametheoretical framework for the logic of ‘forbidden’ (e.g., reddish green and bluish yellow) colours. My larger aim is to discuss phenomenological principles of the demarcation of the bounds of logic as formal ontology of abstract objects

Description's Objects: Austrian Variations

What did Wittgenstein take description to involve ? What are the objects of his descriptions ? What did he think he was doing in and by describing what he described ? In order to answer these three questions it will be useful to appeal to an object of comparison. But which ? First we need an answer to another question

Eternal Truth by Convention

Within the epistemology of the sciences, conventionalism\ud has been the subject of regular criticism for over six\ud decades. Critics such as W. V. Quine and Morton White,\ud and more recently Nathan Salmon (1992), and Paul\ud Boghossian (1996), have attacked even the most basic\ud tenet of conventionalism, namely its claim that the truth of\ud certain statements is fixed not by stipulation-independent\ud facts, but by the conventions governing the meaning of\ud those statements and their constituents

Aligning Mathematics Curriculum to Create Potential for Active Learning in Pre-K Through Eighth Grade Teacher Education

In this paper, we consider some issues surrounding the teaching of mathematics to pre-service teachers. In particular. we look at the possibilities for teaching elementary mathematics from an advanced standpoint and alignments of curriculum that have the capacity to enhance student involvement in the making of the mathematics.The particulars of the James Madison University curriculum are used to illustrate many of the points

Exploiting lattice structures in shape grammar implementations

The ability to work with ambiguity and compute new designs based on both defined and emergent shapes are unique advantages of shape grammars. Realizing these benefits in design practice requires the implementation of general purpose shape grammar interpreters that support: (a) the detection of arbitrary subshapes in arbitrary shapes and (b) the application of shape rules that use these subshapes to create new shapes. The complexity of currently available interpreters results from their combination of shape computation (for subshape detection and the application of rules) with computational geometry (for the geometric operations need to generate new shapes). This paper proposes a shape grammar implementation method for three-dimensional circular arcs represented as rational quadratic Bézier curves based on lattice theory that reduces this complexity by separating steps in a shape computation process from the geometrical operations associated with specific grammars and shapes. The method is demonstrated through application to two well-known shape grammars: Stiny's triangles grammar and Jowers and Earl's trefoil grammar. A prototype computer implementation of an interpreter kernel has been built and its application to both grammars is presented. The use of Bézier curves in three dimensions opens the possibility to extend shape grammar implementations to cover the wider range of applications that are needed before practical implementations for use in real life product design and development processes become feasible

Cassirer and Steinthal on Expression and the Science of Language

Ernst Cassirer’s focus on the expressive function of language should be read, not in the context of Carnap’s debate with Heidegger, but in the context of the earlier work of Chajim (Heymann) Steinthal. Steinthal distinguishes the expressive form of language, when language is studied as a natural phenomenon, from language as a logical, inferential system. Steinthal argues that language always can be expressed in terms of logical inference. Thus, he would disagree with Heidegger, just as Carnap does. But, Steinthal insists, that is not to say that language, as a natural phenomenon, is exhausted by logic or by the place of terms or relations in inferential structures. Steinthal’s “form” of linguistic “expression” is an early version of Cassirer’s “expressive function” for language. The expressive function, then, should not be seen to place a barrier between Carnap and Cassirer. Rather, Steinthal and Cassirer deal with a question that, as far as I know, Carnap does not address directly: how should philosophers analyze human language as a natural phenomenon, as a part of our expression as animals? And how does that expression determine the semantic categories, kind terms, and other structures that develop within, and characterize, human language itself

Old School Catalog 1905-06, Annual Catalog

https://scholar.valpo.edu/oldschoolcatalogs/1034/thumbnail.jp