Belief merging within fragments of propositional logic

Recently, belief change within the framework of fragments of propositional logic has gained increasing attention. Previous works focused on belief contraction and belief revision on the Horn fragment. However, the problem of belief merging within fragments of propositional logic has been neglected so far. This paper presents a general approach to define new merging operators derived from existing ones such that the result of merging remains in the fragment under consideration. Our approach is not limited to the case of Horn fragment but applicable to any fragment of propositional logic characterized by a closure property on the sets of models of its formulae. We study the logical properties of the proposed operators in terms of satisfaction of merging postulates, considering in particular distance-based merging operators for Horn and Krom fragments.Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR 2014

The induced 2-tuple linguistic generalized OWA operator and its application in linguistic decision making

We present the induced 2-tuple linguistic generalized ordered weighted averaging (2-TILGOWA) operator. This new aggregation operator extends previous approaches by using generalized means, order-inducing variables in the reordering of the arguments and linguistic information represented with the 2-tuple linguistic approach. Its main advantage is that it includes a wide range of linguistic aggregation operators. Thus, its analyses can be seen from different perspectives and we obtain a much more complete picture of the situation considered and are able to select the alternative that best fits with with our interests or beliefs. We further generalize the operator by using quasi-arithmetic means, and obtain the Quasi-2-TILOWA operator. We conclude this paper by analysing the applicability of this new approach in a decision-making problem concerning product management.linguistic decision making, linguistic generalized mean, 2-tuple linguistic owa operator, 2-tuple linguistic aggregation operator

Pareto Optimality and Strategy Proofness in Group Argument Evaluation (Extended Version)

An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of arguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that the outcome is logically consistent, but also satisfies measures of social optimality and immunity to strategic manipulation. This is because agents have their individual preferences about what the outcome ought to be. In the current paper, we analyze three previously introduced argument-based aggregation operators with respect to Pareto optimality and strategy proofness under different general classes of agent preferences. We highlight fundamental trade-offs between strategic manipulability and social optimality on one hand, and classical logical criteria on the other. Our results motivate further investigation into the relationship between social choice and argumentation theory. The results are also relevant for choosing an appropriate aggregation operator given the criteria that are considered more important, as well as the nature of agents' preferences

Approximate Judgement Aggregation

In this paper we analyze judgement aggregation problems in which a group of agents independently votes on a set of complex propositions that has some interdependency constraint between them (e.g., transitivity when describing preferences). We consider the issue of judgement aggregation from the perspective of approximation. That is, we generalize the previous results by studying approximate judgement aggregation. We relax the main two constraints assumed in the current literature, Consistency and Independence and consider mechanisms that only approximately satisfy these constraints, that is, satisfy them up to a small portion of the inputs. The main question we raise is whether the relaxation of these notions significantly alters the class of satisfying aggregation mechanisms. The recent works for preference aggregation of Kalai, Mossel, and Keller fit into this framework. The main result of this paper is that, as in the case of preference aggregation, in the case of a subclass of a natural class of aggregation problems termed `truth-functional agendas', the set of satisfying aggregation mechanisms does not extend non-trivially when relaxing the constraints. Our proof techniques involve Boolean Fourier transform and analysis of voter influences for voting protocols. The question we raise for Approximate Aggregation can be stated in terms of Property Testing. For instance, as a corollary from our result we get a generalization of the classic result for property testing of linearity of Boolean functions.judgement aggregation, truth-functional agendas, computational social choice, computational judgement aggregation, approximate aggregation, inconsistency index, dependency index

A Survey on IT-Techniques for a Dynamic Emergency Management in Large Infrastructures

This deliverable is a survey on the IT techniques that are relevant to the three use cases of the project EMILI. It describes the state-of-the-art in four complementary IT areas: Data cleansing, supervisory control and data acquisition, wireless sensor networks and complex event processing. Even though the deliverable’s authors have tried to avoid a too technical language and have tried to explain every concept referred to, the deliverable might seem rather technical to readers so far little familiar with the techniques it describes

Strategy-proof judgment aggregation.

Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented” individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented” individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.