Upside-down Deduction

Over the recent years, several proposals were made to enhance database systems with automated reasoning. In this article we analyze two such enhancements based on meta-interpretation. We consider on the one hand the theorem prover Satchmo, on the other hand the Alexander and Magic Set methods. Although they achieve different goals and are based on distinct reasoning paradigms, Satchmo and the Alexander or Magic Set methods can be similarly described by upside-down meta-interpreters, i.e., meta-interpreters implementing one reasoning principle in terms of the other. Upside-down meta-interpretation gives rise to simple and efficient implementations, but has not been investigated in the past. This article is devoted to studying this technique. We show that it permits one to inherit a search strategy from an inference engine, instead of implementing it, and to combine bottom-up and top-down reasoning. These properties yield an explanation for the efficiency of Satchmo and a justification for the unconventional approach to top-down reasoning of the Alexander and Magic Set methods

Theorem proving support in programming language semantics

We describe several views of the semantics of a simple programming language as formal documents in the calculus of inductive constructions that can be verified by the Coq proof system. Covered aspects are natural semantics, denotational semantics, axiomatic semantics, and abstract interpretation. Descriptions as recursive functions are also provided whenever suitable, thus yielding a a verification condition generator and a static analyser that can be run inside the theorem prover for use in reflective proofs. Extraction of an interpreter from the denotational semantics is also described. All different aspects are formally proved sound with respect to the natural semantics specification.Comment: Propos\'e pour publication dans l'ouvrage \`a la m\'emoire de Gilles Kah

The Logic of the Method of Agent-Based Simulation in the Social Sciences: Empirical and Intentional Adequacy of Computer Programs

The classical theory of computation does not represent an adequate model of reality for simulation in the social sciences. The aim of this paper is to construct a methodological perspective that is able to conciliate the formal and empirical logic of program verification in computer science, with the interpretative and multiparadigmatic logic of the social sciences. We attempt to evaluate whether social simulation implies an additional perspective about the way one can understand the concepts of program and computation. We demonstrate that the logic of social simulation implies at least two distinct types of program verifications that reflect an epistemological distinction in the kind of knowledge one can have about programs. Computer programs seem to possess a causal capability (Fetzer, 1999) and an intentional capability that scientific theories seem not to possess. This distinction is associated with two types of program verification, which we call empirical and intentional verification. We demonstrate, by this means, that computational phenomena are also intentional phenomena, and that such is particularly manifest in agent-based social simulation. Ascertaining the credibility of results in social simulation requires a focus on the identification of a new category of knowledge we can have about computer programs. This knowledge should be considered an outcome of an experimental exercise, albeit not empirical, acquired within a context of limited consensus. The perspective of intentional computation seems to be the only one possible to reflect the multiparadigmatic character of social science in terms of agent-based computational social science. We contribute, additionally, to the clarification of several questions that are found in the methodological perspectives of the discipline, such as the computational nature, the logic of program scalability, and the multiparadigmatic character of agent-based simulation in the social sciences.Computer and Social Sciences, Agent-Based Simulation, Intentional Computation, Program Verification, Intentional Verification, Scientific Knowledge