The (topo)logic of vagueness

Zeno's "dichotomy" paradox of the runner and the sorites paradox exhibit certain interesting similarities. Both of them involve a long series of steps, each of which seems legitimate, but which, taken together, apparently lead to an unacceptable conclusion. In this article, a particular interpretation of a common reply to Zeno's paradox is presented, which recognises that to defuse the paradox, it is necessary to assert that the number of stages that the runner has completed on Zeno's in nite sequence of times is not an appropriate measure of whether he nishes the race or not. Applying this style of reply to the sorites argument, one would reject the argument on the grounds of the inappropriateness of the number of hairs for reasoning about baldness. Such an attitude to the sorites argument implies a certain conception of the problem posed by vague terms, according to which the problem is to understand such relationships between terms as the appropriateness of one for reasoning about the other. Consequently, it poses a certain set of challenges to prospective theories of vagueness.Vagueness; theories of; problem of; sorites paradox; Zeno's paradox scale.

Has Vagueness Really No Function in Law?

When the United States Supreme Court used the expression “with all deliberate speed” in the case Brown v. Board of Education, it did so presumably because of its vagueness. Many jurists, economists, linguists, and philosophers accordingly assume that vagueness can be strategically used to one’s advantage. Roy Sorensen has cast doubt on this assumption by strictly differentiating between vagueness and generality. Indeed, most arguments for the value of vagueness go through only when vagueness is confused with generality. Sorensen claims that vagueness – correctly understood – has no function in law inter alia because judges lie systematically when confronted with borderline cases. I argue that both claims are wrong. First, judges do not need to resort to lying when adjudicating borderline cases, and even if they had to, this would not render vagueness useless. Secondly, vagueness has several important functions in law such as the reduction of decision costs and the delegation of power. Although many functions commonly attributed to the vagueness of legal expressions are in fact due to their generality or other semantic properties, vagueness has at least these two functions in law

Thinking intuitively: the rich (and at times illogical) world of concepts

Intuitive knowledge of the world involves knowing what kinds of things have which properties. We express it in generalities such as “ducks lay eggs”. It contrasts with extensional knowledge about actual individuals in the world, which we express in quantified statements such as “All US Presidents are male”. Reasoning based on this intuitive knowledge, while highly fluent and plausible may in fact lead us into logical fallacy. Several lines of research point to our conceptual memory as the source of this logical failure. We represent concepts with prototypical properties, judging likelihood and argument strength on the basis of similarity between ideas. Evidence that our minds represent the world in this intuitive way can be seen in a range of phenomena, including how people interpret logical connectives applied to everyday concepts, studies of creativity and emergence in conceptual combination, and demonstrations of the logically inconsistent beliefs that people express in their everyday language

The Mundane Computer: Non-Technical Design Challenges Facing Ubiquitous Computing and Ambient Intelligence

Interdisciplinary collaboration, to include those who are not natural scientists, engineers and computer scientists, is inherent in the idea of ubiquitous computing, as formulated by Mark Weiser in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, ubiquitous computing has remained largely a computer science and engineering concept, and its non-technical side remains relatively underdeveloped. The aim of the article is, first, to clarify the kind of interdisciplinary collaboration envisaged by Weiser. Second, the difficulties of understanding the everyday and weaving ubiquitous technologies into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it, as conceived by Weiser, are explored. The contributions of Anne Galloway, Paul Dourish and Philip Agre to creating an understanding of everyday life relevant to the development of ubiquitous computing are discussed, focusing on the notions of performative practice, embodied interaction and contextualisation. Third, it is argued that with the shift to the notion of ambient intelligence, the larger scale socio-economic and socio-political dimensions of context become more explicit, in contrast to the focus on the smaller scale anthropological study of social (mainly workplace) practices inherent in the concept of ubiquitous computing. This can be seen in the adoption of the concept of ambient intelligence within the European Union and in the focus on rebalancing (personal) privacy protection and (state) security in the wake of 11 September 2001. Fourth, the importance of adopting a futures-oriented approach to discussing the issues arising from the notions of ubiquitous computing and ambient intelligence is stressed, while the difficulty of trying to achieve societal foresight is acknowledged

Vagueness as Cost Reduction : An Empirical Test

This work was funded in part by an EPSRC Platform Grant awarded to the NLG group at Aberdeen.Publisher PD

Overinterpreting Law

Overinterpretation has attracted considerable attention in other fields, such as literary studies, science, and rhetoric, but it is undertheorized in law. This Article attempts to initiate a theory of legal overinterpretation by examining the rhetorical nature of excess, the sociological dimensions of roles in team performances, and citation to legal and non-legal sources that have discussed overinterpretation. The Article concludes by positing illustrative categories of potential legal overinterpretation, and providing an examination of ways to minimize legal overinterpretation through a judicious, pragmatic balance between abstract considerations and concrete considerations in law

Against Imperialism in Legal Concepts

The authority of government—and that of its politicians, judges, regulators, and other specific authorities—continues to grow more imperialistic. This is partly due to the imperialism of legal concepts as facilitated by Wittgenstein’s famously non-essentialist treatment of concepts through family resemblance theory. Although non-essentialism or anti-essentialism can be highly valuable in forming religious and literary concepts, and in describing the sometimes incoherent everyday usage of concepts and terms, all legal concepts should be scientific-style essentialist concepts. Such essentialism combats the broad discretion granted and obscured by non-essentialist approaches that allow concepts to absorb contradictory elements and harmfully hold them together, thus allowing legal authorities to choose from among only those elements that suit their purposes in any given case. Instead of arguing for the total exclusion of family resemblance and similar theories from use in legal concepts, I argue for translating non-essentialist concepts into essentialist ones while still using the former’s theory forms. Precise essentialist concepts, with core and non-contradictory properties clearly delineated, are necessary for maximizing the rational and moral legitimacy of law, which coercively regulates the behavior of ordinary citizens at the command of political and legal authorities. Legal rules and commands must be as clear and consistent as reasonably possible not only for optimal rationality and morality, but also for legitimacy in the eyes of those subject to law. This is especially important in an increasingly diverse society of incompatible perspectives and decreasing conscious and unconscious adherence to the Anglo-American legal tradition

How effective indeed is present-day mathematics?

We argue that E. Wigner’s well-known claim that mathematics is unreasonably effective in physics (and not in the natural sciences in general, as the title of his article suggests) is only one side of the hill. The other side is the surprising insufficiency of present-day mathematics to capture the uniformities that arise in science outside physics. We describe roughly what the situation is in the areas of (a) everyday reasoning, (b) theory of meaning and (c) vagueness. We make also the point that mathematics, as we know it today, founded on the concept of set, need not be a conceptually final and closed system, but only a stage in a developing subject

Strictly speaking

A type of argument occasionally made in metaethics, epistemology and philosophy of science notes that most ordinary uses of some expression fail to satisfy the strictest interpretation of the expression, and concludes that the ordinary assertions are false. This requires there to be a presumption in favour of a strict interpretation of expressions that admit of interpretations at different levels of strictness. We argue that this presumption is unmotivated, and thus the arguments fail