Learning-assisted Theorem Proving with Millions of Lemmas

Large formal mathematical libraries consist of millions of atomic inference steps that give rise to a corresponding number of proved statements (lemmas). Analogously to the informal mathematical practice, only a tiny fraction of such statements is named and re-used in later proofs by formal mathematicians. In this work, we suggest and implement criteria defining the estimated usefulness of the HOL Light lemmas for proving further theorems. We use these criteria to mine the large inference graph of the lemmas in the HOL Light and Flyspeck libraries, adding up to millions of the best lemmas to the pool of statements that can be re-used in later proofs. We show that in combination with learning-based relevance filtering, such methods significantly strengthen automated theorem proving of new conjectures over large formal mathematical libraries such as Flyspeck.Comment: journal version of arXiv:1310.2797 (which was submitted to LPAR conference

An Algebra of Hierarchical Graphs and its Application to Structural Encoding

We define an algebraic theory of hierarchical graphs, whose axioms characterise graph isomorphism: two terms are equated exactly when they represent the same graph. Our algebra can be understood as a high-level language for describing graphs with a node-sharing, embedding structure, and it is then well suited for defining graphical representations of software models where nesting and linking are key aspects. In particular, we propose the use of our graph formalism as a convenient way to describe configurations in process calculi equipped with inherently hierarchical features such as sessions, locations, transactions, membranes or ambients. The graph syntax can be seen as an intermediate representation language, that facilitates the encodings of algebraic specifications, since it provides primitives for nesting, name restriction and parallel composition. In addition, proving soundness and correctness of an encoding (i.e. proving that structurally equivalent processes are mapped to isomorphic graphs) becomes easier as it can be done by induction over the graph syntax

What is a logical diagram?

Robert Brandom’s expressivism argues that not all semantic content may be made fully explicit. This view connects in interesting ways with recent movements in philosophy of mathematics and logic (e.g. Brown, Shin, Giaquinto) to take diagrams seriously - as more than a mere “heuristic aid” to proof, but either proofs themselves, or irreducible components of such. However what exactly is a diagram in logic? Does this constitute a semiotic natural kind? The paper will argue that such a natural kind does exist in Charles Peirce’s conception of iconic signs, but that fully understood, logical diagrams involve a structured array of normative reasoning practices, as well as just a “picture on a page”

Some Logical Notations for Pragmatic Assertions

The pragmatic notion of assertion has an important inferential role in logic. There are also many notational forms to express assertions in logical systems. This paper reviews, compares and analyses languages with signs for assertions, including explicit signs such as Frege’s and Dalla Pozza’s logical systems and implicit signs with no specific sign for assertion, such as Peirce’s algebraic and graphical logics and the recent modification of the latter termed Assertive Graphs. We identify and discuss the main ‘points’ of these notations on the logical representation of assertions, and evaluate their systems from the perspective of the philosophy of logical notations. Pragmatic assertions turn out to be useful in providing intended interpretations of a variety of logical systems

The hardness of the iconic must: Can Peirce’s existential graphs assist modal epistemology?

Charles Peirce’s diagrammatic logic - the Existential Graphs - is presented as a tool for illuminating how we know necessity, in answer to Benacerraf’s famous challenge that most “semantics for mathematics” do not “fit an acceptable epistemology”. It is suggested that necessary reasoning is in essence a recognition that a certain structure has the structure that it has. This means that, contra Hume and his contemporary heirs, necessity is observable. One just needs to pay attention, not just to individual things but to how those things are related in larger structures, certain aspects of which force certain others to be a particular way