Simulating the tail of the interference in a Poisson network model

Interference among simultaneous transmissions represents the main limitation factor for the capacity and connectivity of dense wireless networks. In this paper we provide efficient simulation laws for the tail of the interference in a simple wireless ad hoc network model. Particularly, we consider node locations distributed according to a Poisson point process and various classes of light-tailed fading distribution

Exemptions without Justice? Liberal jurisprudence on religious exemptions and its political justification

Religious exemptions to general, neutral laws of uniform application abound in modern liberal states. No other category of identity or interest receives comparable exemptions-coverage or related differential legal treatment such as constitutional constraints (e.g. disestablishment) and/or accommodations (e.g. concessional taxation regimes). This differential or “special” treatment of religion in liberal jurisprudence and state-practice has, more recently, come under increased theoretical scrutiny. A prominent criticism levelled is that there is no distinctive and normatively relevant feature of religion which justifies this differentiation vis-à-vis close non-religious analogues such as certain “deeply-held” commitments of secular morality or individual conscience. Whether religion is indeed uniquely special or just within some broader category of protection-worthy interests, the underlying question here is: to whom and in respect of what should exemptions be granted? Yet, this question already presupposes that the contested exemptions are justifiable. Exemptions to protect core liberal freedoms from directly discriminatory or targeted interference might be axiomatic, but exemptions to counteract indirect or incidental burdens on some (minority) groups by otherwise legitimate neutral laws are far from normatively straightforward. The relevance of such exemptions to liberal justice, even their coherence has been forcefully challenged. After examining the arguably intractable nature of these puzzles, this dissertation considers the possibility of a lateral solution by recasting the issues in terms of liberal political legitimacy

Legitimacy and Justice in Republican Perspective

Let justice be a feature of the social order imposed by a state and legitimacy a feature of how it is imposed: one that makes the imposition acceptable. This article argues that, so understood, legitimacy is quite a distinct concern from justice; that the core concern is with showing how state coercion is consistent with people’s being free citizens; that this does not require showing that the state exists by consensus or contract; that the best hope of satisfying the concern lies with arguing that state coercion need not be dominating; and that this is possible only within the republican theory that identifies freedom with the absence of domination, not interference

Phenomenal knowledge why: the explanatory knowledge argument against physicalism

Phenomenal knowledge is knowledge of what it is like to be in conscious states, such as seeing red or being in pain. According to the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986), phenomenal knowledge is knowledge that, i.e., knowledge of phenomenal facts. According to the ability hypothesis (Nemirow 1979; Lewis 1983), phenomenal knowledge is mere practical knowledge how, i.e., the mere possession of abilities. However, some phenomenal knowledge also seems to be knowledge why, i.e., knowledge of explanatory facts. For example, someone who has just experienced pain for the first time learns not only that this is what pain is like, but also why people tend to avoid it. Some philosophers have claimed that experiencing pain gives knowledge why in a normative sense: it tells us why pain is bad and why inflicting it is wrong (Kahane 2010). But phenomenal knowledge seems to explain not (only) why people should avoid pain, but why they in fact tend to do so. In this paper, I will explicate and defend a precise version of this claim and use it as a basis for a new version of the knowledge argument, which I call the explanatory knowledge argument. According to the argument, some phenomenal knowledge (1) explains regularities in a distinctive, ultimate or regress-ending way, and (2) predict them without induction. No physical knowledge explains and predicts regularities in the same way. This implies the existence of distinctive, phenomenal explanatory facts, which cannot be identified with physical facts. I will show that this argument can be defended against the main objections to the original knowledge argument, the ability hypothesis and the phenomenal concept strategy, even if it turns out that the original cannot. In this way, the explanatory knowledge argument further strengthens the case against physicalism

Are gauge symmetry transformations observable?

In a recent paper in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Kosso discussed the observational status of continuous symmetries of physics. While we are in broad agreement with his approach, we disagree with his analysis. In the discussion of the status of gauge symmetry, a set of examples offered by ’t Hooft has influenced several philosophers, including Kosso; in all cases the interpretation of the examples is mistaken. In this paper we present our preferred approach to the empirical significance of symmetries, re-analysing the cases of gauge symmetry and general covariance