5 research outputs found
Some Cryptanalytic Results on Zipper Hash and Concatenated Hash
At SAC 2006, Liskov proposed the zipper hash, a technique for constructing secure (indifferentiable from random oracles) hash functions based on weak (invertible) compression functions. Zipper hash is a two pass scheme, which makes it unfit for practical consideration. But, from the theoretical point of view it seemed to be secure, as it had resisted standard attacks for long. Recently, Andreeva {\em et al.} gave a forced-suffix herding attack on the zipper hash, and Chen and Jin showed a second preimage attack provided is strong invertible. In this paper, we analyse the construction under the random oracle model as well as when the underlying compression functions have some weakness. We show (second) preimage, and herding attacks on an -bit zipper hash and its relaxed variant with , all of which require less than online computations.
Hoch and Shamir have shown that the concatenated hash offers only -bits security when both the underlying compression functions are strong invertible. We show that the bound is tight even when only one of the underlying compression functions is strong invertible
Functional Graph Revisited: Updates on (Second) Preimage Attacks on Hash Combiners
This paper studies functional-graph-based (second) preimage attacks against hash combiners. By exploiting more properties of cyclic nodes of functional graph, we find an improved preimage attack against the XOR combiner with a complexity of , while the previous best-known complexity is . Moreover, we find the first generic second-preimage attack on Zipper hash with an optimal complexity of
New Attacks on the Concatenation and XOR Hash Combiners
We study the security of the concatenation combiner for two independent iterated hash functions with -bit outputs that are built using the Merkle-Damgård construction. In 2004 Joux showed that the concatenation combiner of hash functions with an -bit internal state does not offer better collision and preimage resistance compared to a single strong -bit hash function. On the other hand, the problem of devising second preimage attacks faster than against this combiner has remained open since 2005 when Kelsey and Schneier showed that a single Merkle-Damgård hash function does not offer optimal second preimage resistance for long messages.
In this paper, we develop new algorithms for cryptanalysis of hash combiners and use them to devise the first second preimage attack on the concatenation combiner. The attack finds second preimages faster than for messages longer than and has optimal complexity of . This shows that the concatenation of two Merkle-Damgård hash functions is not as strong a single ideal hash function.
Our methods are also applicable to other well-studied combiners, and we use them to devise a new preimage attack with complexity of on the XOR combiner of two Merkle-Damgård hash functions. This improves upon the attack by Leurent and Wang (presented at Eurocrypt 2015) whose complexity is (but unlike our attack is also applicable to HAIFA hash functions).
Our algorithms exploit properties of random mappings generated by fixing the message block input to the compression functions of and . Such random mappings have been widely used in cryptanalysis, but we exploit them in new ways to attack hash function combiners
Combiners for Backdoored Random Oracles
International audienceWe formulate and study the security of cryptographic hash functions in the backdoored random-oracle (BRO) model, whereby a big brother designs a "good" hash function, but can also see arbitrary functions of its table via backdoor capabilities. This model captures intentional (and unintentional) weaknesses due to the existence of collision-finding or inversion algorithms, but goes well beyond them by allowing, for example, to search for structured preimages. The latter can easily break constructions that are secure under random inversions. BROs make the task of bootstrapping cryptographic hardness somewhat challenging. Indeed, with only a single arbitrarily backdoored function no hardness can be bootstrapped as any construction can be inverted. However, when two (or more) independent hash functions are available, hardness emerges even with unrestricted and adaptive access to all backdoor oracles. At the core of our results lie new reductions from cryptographic problems to the communication complexities of various two-party tasks. Along the way we establish a communication complexity lower bound for set-intersection for cryptographically relevant ranges of parameters and distributions and where set-disjointness can be easy
Evaluating the Security of Merkle-Damgård Hash Functions and Combiners in Quantum Settings
In this work, we evaluate the security of Merkle-Damgård (MD) hash functions and their combiners (XOR and concatenation combiners) in quantum settings. Two main quantum scenarios are considered, including the scenario where a substantial amount of cheap quantum random access memory (qRAM) is available and where qRAM is limited and expensive to access. We present generic quantum attacks on the MD hash functions and hash combiners, and carefully analyze the complexities under both quantum scenarios. The considered securities are fundamental requirements for hash functions, including the resistance against collision and (second-)preimage. The results are consistent with the conclusions in the classical setting, that is, the considered resistances of the MD hash functions and their combiners are far less than ideal, despite the significant differences in the expected security bounds between the classical and quantum settings. Particularly, the generic attacks can be improved significantly using quantum computers under both scenarios. These results serve as an indication that classical hash constructions require careful security re-evaluation before being deployed to the post-quantum cryptography schemes