The Mechanistic and Normative Structure of Agency

I develop an interdisciplinary framework for understanding the nature of agents and agency that is compatible with recent developments in the metaphysics of science and that also does justice to the mechanistic and normative characteristics of agents and agency as they are understood in moral philosophy, social psychology, neuroscience, robotics, and economics. The framework I develop is internal perspectivalist. That is to say, it counts agents as real in a perspective-dependent way, but not in a way that depends on an external perspective. Whether or not something counts as an agent depends on whether it is able to have a certain kind of perspective. My approach differs from many others by treating possession of a perspective as more basic than the possession of agency, representational content/vehicles, cognition, intentions, goals, concepts, or mental or psychological states; these latter capabilities require the former, not the other way around. I explain what it means for a system to be able to have a perspective at all, beginning with simple cases in biology, and show how self-contained normative perspectives about proper function and control can emerge from mechanisms with relatively simple dynamics. I then describe how increasingly complex control architectures can become organized that allow for more complex perspectives that approach agency. Next, I provide my own account of the kind of perspective that is necessary for agency itself, the goal being to provide a reference against which other accounts can be compared. Finally, I introduce a crucial distinction that is necessary for understanding human agency: that between inclinational and committal agency, and venture a hypothesis about how the normative perspective underlying committal agency might be mechanistically realized

From Verbs to Tasks: An Integrated Account of Learning Tasks from Situated Interactive Instruction.

Intelligent collaborative agents are becoming common in the human society. From virtual assistants such as Siri and Google Now to assistive robots, they contribute to human activities in a variety of ways. As they become more pervasive, the challenge of customizing them to a variety of environments and tasks becomes critical. It is infeasible for engineers to program them for each individual use. Our research aims at building interactive robots and agents that adapt to new environments autonomously by interacting with human users using natural modalities. This dissertation studies the problem of learning novel tasks from human-agent dialog. We propose a novel approach for interactive task learning, situated interactive instruction (SII), and investigate approaches to three computational challenges that arise in designing SII agents: situated comprehension, mixed-initiative interaction, and interactive task learning. We propose a novel mixed-modality grounded representation for task verbs which encompasses their lexical, semantic, and task-oriented aspects. This representation is useful in situated comprehension and can be learned through human-agent interactions. We introduce the Indexical Model of comprehension that can exploit extra-linguistic contexts for resolving semantic ambiguities in situated comprehension of task commands. The Indexical model is integrated with a mixed-initiative interaction model that facilitates a flexible task-oriented human-agent dialog. This dialog serves as the basis of interactive task learning. We propose an interactive variation of explanation-based learning that can acquire the proposed representation. We demonstrate that our learning paradigm is efficient, can transfer knowledge between structurally similar tasks, integrates agent-driven exploration with instructional learning, and can acquire several tasks. The methods proposed in this thesis are integrated in Rosie - a generally instructable agent developed in the Soar cognitive architecture and embodied on a table-top robot.PhDComputer Science and EngineeringUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/111573/1/shiwali_1.pd

Social Cognition for Human-Robot Symbiosis—Challenges and Building Blocks

The next generation of robot companions or robot working partners will need to satisfy social requirements somehow similar to the famous laws of robotics envisaged by Isaac Asimov time ago (Asimov, 1942). The necessary technology has almost reached the required level, including sensors and actuators, but the cognitive organization is still in its infancy and is only partially supported by the current understanding of brain cognitive processes. The brain of symbiotic robots will certainly not be a “positronic” replica of the human brain: probably, the greatest part of it will be a set of interacting computational processes running in the cloud. In this article, we review the challenges that must be met in the design of a set of interacting computational processes as building blocks of a cognitive architecture that may give symbiotic capabilities to collaborative robots of the next decades: (1) an animated body-schema; (2) an imitation machinery; (3) a motor intentions machinery; (4) a set of physical interaction mechanisms; and (5) a shared memory system for incremental symbiotic development. We would like to stress that our approach is totally un-hierarchical: the five building blocks of the shared cognitive architecture are fully bi-directionally connected. For example, imitation and intentional processes require the “services” of the animated body schema which, on the other hand, can run its simulations if appropriately prompted by imitation and/or intention, with or without physical interaction. Successful experiences can leave a trace in the shared memory system and chunks of memory fragment may compete to participate to novel cooperative actions. And so on and so forth. At the heart of the system is lifelong training and learning but, different from the conventional learning paradigms in neural networks, where learning is somehow passively imposed by an external agent, in symbiotic robots there is an element of free choice of what is worth learning, driven by the interaction between the robot and the human partner. The proposed set of building blocks is certainly a rough approximation of what is needed by symbiotic robots but we believe it is a useful starting point for building a computational framework

Fitting Pragmatics into the Human Mind: A philosophical investigation of the Pragmatics Module Hypothesis

This thesis focuses on the hypothesis that pragmatic understanding is underpinned by a mental module closely related to the ability to interpret others’ behaviors by inferring underlying mental states, also called ‘mindreading’. First, it aims at evaluating the plausibility of this hypothesis in light of the available data in the empirical literature by drawing on the argumentative toolbox of the philosophy of mind and language. Second, it aims at developing this hypothesis by addressing its main theoretical and empirical challenges. In Chapter One, I outline a historical overview of the different declinations of the modularity hypothesis in cognitive science, with a focus on early works in cognitive pragmatics and Theory of Mind research. In Chapter Two, I provide a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the Pragmatics Module Hypothesis by focusing on the central tenets of Relevance Theory. In Chapter Three, I explore the idea of pragmatics as a ‘sub-module’ of Theory of Mind from an empirical perspective by surveying the current state of the art in experimental and clinical pragmatics, thus ‘clearing up’ the recent controversy on the modularity of pragmatics from some misconceptions and empirical predictions which do not follow from the Pragmatics Module Hypothesis. In Chapter Four, I provide a novel cognitive framework for the modular view of pragmatics by evaluating the significance of research on ostensive communication in infancy with respect to the hypothesis of an early-developing modular heuristic for interpreting communicative behaviors. Chapters Five and Six both focus on the several ‘developmental dilemmas’ that must be confronted by intentional-inferential accounts of infant communication like the one endorsed in the present thesis, which will be disentangled, analyzed, and addressed by evaluating several possible solutions. In these two chapters, I show how the cognitive framework offered in Chapter Four can be employed and further extended to deal with such developmental dilemmas from a renewed modular perspective