Learning optimization models in the presence of unknown relations

In a sequential auction with multiple bidding agents, it is highly challenging to determine the ordering of the items to sell in order to maximize the revenue due to the fact that the autonomy and private information of the agents heavily influence the outcome of the auction. The main contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we demonstrate how to apply machine learning techniques to solve the optimal ordering problem in sequential auctions. We learn regression models from historical auctions, which are subsequently used to predict the expected value of orderings for new auctions. Given the learned models, we propose two types of optimization methods: a black-box best-first search approach, and a novel white-box approach that maps learned models to integer linear programs (ILP) which can then be solved by any ILP-solver. Although the studied auction design problem is hard, our proposed optimization methods obtain good orderings with high revenues. Our second main contribution is the insight that the internal structure of regression models can be efficiently evaluated inside an ILP solver for optimization purposes. To this end, we provide efficient encodings of regression trees and linear regression models as ILP constraints. This new way of using learned models for optimization is promising. As the experimental results show, it significantly outperforms the black-box best-first search in nearly all settings.Comment: 37 pages. Working pape

Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round

Many algorithms that are originally designed without explicitly considering incentive properties are later combined with simple pricing rules and used as mechanisms. The resulting mechanisms are often natural and simple to understand. But how good are these algorithms as mechanisms? Truthful reporting of valuations is typically not a dominant strategy (certainly not with a pay-your-bid, first-price rule, but it is likely not a good strategy even with a critical value, or second-price style rule either). Our goal is to show that a wide class of approximation algorithms yields this way mechanisms with low Price of Anarchy. The seminal result of Lucier and Borodin [SODA 2010] shows that combining a greedy algorithm that is an $\alpha$-approximation algorithm with a pay-your-bid payment rule yields a mechanism whose Price of Anarchy is $O(\alpha)$. In this paper we significantly extend the class of algorithms for which such a result is available by showing that this close connection between approximation ratio on the one hand and Price of Anarchy on the other also holds for the design principle of relaxation and rounding provided that the relaxation is smooth and the rounding is oblivious. We demonstrate the far-reaching consequences of our result by showing its implications for sparse packing integer programs, such as multi-unit auctions and generalized matching, for the maximum traveling salesman problem, for combinatorial auctions, and for single source unsplittable flow problems. In all these problems our approach leads to novel simple, near-optimal mechanisms whose Price of Anarchy either matches or beats the performance guarantees of known mechanisms.Comment: Extended abstract appeared in Proc. of 16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'15

A General Large Neighborhood Search Framework for Solving Integer Programs

This paper studies how to design abstractions of large-scale combinatorial optimization problems that can leverage existing state-of-the-art solvers in general purpose ways, and that are amenable to data-driven design. The goal is to arrive at new approaches that can reliably outperform existing solvers in wall-clock time. We focus on solving integer programs, and ground our approach in the large neighborhood search (LNS) paradigm, which iteratively chooses a subset of variables to optimize while leaving the remainder fixed. The appeal of LNS is that it can easily use any existing solver as a subroutine, and thus can inherit the benefits of carefully engineered heuristic approaches and their software implementations. We also show that one can learn a good neighborhood selector from training data. Through an extensive empirical validation, we demonstrate that our LNS framework can significantly outperform, in wall-clock time, compared to state-of-the-art commercial solvers such as Gurobi

A New Approach to Electricity Market Clearing With Uniform Purchase Price and Curtailable Block Orders

The European market clearing problem is characterized by a set of heterogeneous orders and rules that force the implementation of heuristic and iterative solving methods. In particular, curtailable block orders and the uniform purchase price (UPP) pose serious difficulties. A block is an order that spans over multiple hours, and can be either fully accepted or fully rejected. The UPP prescribes that all consumers pay a common price, i.e., the UPP, in all the zones, while producers receive zonal prices, which can differ from one zone to another. The market clearing problem in the presence of both the UPP and block orders is a major open issue in the European context. The UPP scheme leads to a non-linear optimization problem involving both primal and dual variables, whereas block orders introduce multi-temporal constraints and binary variables into the problem. As a consequence, the market clearing problem in the presence of both blocks and the UPP can be regarded as a non-linear integer programming problem involving both primal and dual variables with complementary and multi-temporal constraints. The aim of this paper is to present a non-iterative and heuristic-free approach for solving the market clearing problem in the presence of both curtailable block orders and the UPP. The solution is exact, with no approximation up to the level of resolution of current market data. By resorting to an equivalent UPP formulation, the proposed approach results in a mixed-integer linear program, which is built starting from a non-linear integer bilevel programming problem. Numerical results using real market data are reported to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach. The model has been implemented in Python, and the code is freely available on a public repository.Comment: 15 pages, 7 figure

Coordination of Purchasing and Bidding Activities Across Markets

In both consumer purchasing and industrial procurement, combinatorial interdependencies among the items to be purchased are commonplace. E-commerce compounds the problem by providing more opportunities for switching suppliers at low costs, but also potentially eases the problem by enabling automated market decision-making systems, commonly referred to as trading agents, to make purchasing decisions in an integrated manner across markets. Most of the existing research related to trading agents assumes that there exists a combinatorial market mechanism in which buyers (or sellers) can bid (or sell) service or merchant bundles. Todayâ??s prevailing e-commerce practice, however, does not support this assumption in general and thus limits the practical applicability of these approaches. We are investigating a new approach to deal with the combinatorial interdependency challenges for online markets. This approach relies on existing commercial online market institutions such as posted-price markets and various online auctions that sell single items. It uses trading agents to coordinate a buyerâ??s purchasing and bidding activities across multiple online markets simultaneously to achieve the best overall procurement effectiveness. This paper presents two sets of models related to this approach. The first set of models formalizes optimal purchasing decisions across posted-price markets with fixed transaction costs. Flat shipping costs, a common e-tailing practice, are captured in these models. We observe that making optimal purchasing decisions in this context is NP-hard in the strong sense and suggest several efficient computational methods based on discrete location theory. The second set of models is concerned with the coordination of bidding activities across multiple online auctions. We study the underlying coordination problem for a collection of first or second-price sealed-bid auctions and derive the optimal coordination and bidding policies.

Hybrid Models for Learning to Branch

A recent Graph Neural Network (GNN) approach for learning to branch has been shown to successfully reduce the running time of branch-and-bound algorithms for Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP). While the GNN relies on a GPU for inference, MILP solvers are purely CPU-based. This severely limits its application as many practitioners may not have access to high-end GPUs. In this work, we ask two key questions. First, in a more realistic setting where only a CPU is available, is the GNN model still competitive? Second, can we devise an alternate computationally inexpensive model that retains the predictive power of the GNN architecture? We answer the first question in the negative, and address the second question by proposing a new hybrid architecture for efficient branching on CPU machines. The proposed architecture combines the expressive power of GNNs with computationally inexpensive multi-linear perceptrons (MLP) for branching. We evaluate our methods on four classes of MILP problems, and show that they lead to up to 26% reduction in solver running time compared to state-of-the-art methods without a GPU, while extrapolating to harder problems than it was trained on.Comment: Preprint. Under revie