Solving 0-1 Knapsack Problem by Greedy Degree and Expectation Efficiency

It is well known that 0-1 knapsack problem (KP01) plays an important role in both computing theory and real life application. Due to its NP-hardness, lots of impressive research work has been performed on many variants of the problem. Inspired by region partition of items, an effective hybrid algorithm based on greedy degree and expectation efficiency (GDEE) is presented in this paper. In the proposed algorithm, initially determinate items region, candidate items region and unknown items region are generated to direct the selection of items. A greedy degree model inspired by greedy strategy is devised to select some items as initially determinate region. Dynamic expectation efficiency strategy is designed and used to select some other items as candidate region, and the remaining items are regarded as unknown region. To obtain the final items to which the best profit corresponds, static expectation efficiency strategy is proposed whilst the parallel computing method is adopted to update the objective function value. Extensive numerical investigations based on a large number of instances are conducted. The proposed GDEE algorithm is evaluated against chemical reaction optimization algorithm and modified discrete shuffled frog leaping algorithm. The comparative results show that GDEE is much more effective in solving KP01 than other algorithms and that it is a promising tool for solving combinatorial optimization problems such as resource allocation and production scheduling

Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Experimental Design

In the classical experimental design setting, an experimenter E has access to a population of $n$ potential experiment subjects $i\in \{1,...,n\}$, each associated with a vector of features $x_i\in R^d$. Conducting an experiment with subject $i$ reveals an unknown value $y_i\in R$ to E. E typically assumes some hypothetical relationship between $x_i$'s and $y_i$'s, e.g., $y_i \approx \beta x_i$, and estimates $\beta$ from experiments, e.g., through linear regression. As a proxy for various practical constraints, E may select only a subset of subjects on which to conduct the experiment. We initiate the study of budgeted mechanisms for experimental design. In this setting, E has a budget $B$. Each subject $i$ declares an associated cost $c_i >0$ to be part of the experiment, and must be paid at least her cost. In particular, the Experimental Design Problem (EDP) is to find a set $S$ of subjects for the experiment that maximizes V(S) = \log\det(I_d+\sum_{i\in S}x_i\T{x_i}) under the constraint $\sum_{i\in S}c_i\leq B$; our objective function corresponds to the information gain in parameter $\beta$ that is learned through linear regression methods, and is related to the so-called $D$-optimality criterion. Further, the subjects are strategic and may lie about their costs. We present a deterministic, polynomial time, budget feasible mechanism scheme, that is approximately truthful and yields a constant factor approximation to EDP. In particular, for any small $\delta > 0$ and $\epsilon > 0$, we can construct a (12.98, $\epsilon$)-approximate mechanism that is $\delta$-truthful and runs in polynomial time in both $n$ and $\log\log\frac{B}{\epsilon\delta}$. We also establish that no truthful, budget-feasible algorithms is possible within a factor 2 approximation, and show how to generalize our approach to a wide class of learning problems, beyond linear regression

Improved Approximation Algorithms for Stochastic Matching

In this paper we consider the Stochastic Matching problem, which is motivated by applications in kidney exchange and online dating. We are given an undirected graph in which every edge is assigned a probability of existence and a positive profit, and each node is assigned a positive integer called timeout. We know whether an edge exists or not only after probing it. On this random graph we are executing a process, which one-by-one probes the edges and gradually constructs a matching. The process is constrained in two ways: once an edge is taken it cannot be removed from the matching, and the timeout of node $v$ upper-bounds the number of edges incident to $v$ that can be probed. The goal is to maximize the expected profit of the constructed matching. For this problem Bansal et al. (Algorithmica 2012) provided a $3$-approximation algorithm for bipartite graphs, and a $4$-approximation for general graphs. In this work we improve the approximation factors to $2.845$ and $3.709$, respectively. We also consider an online version of the bipartite case, where one side of the partition arrives node by node, and each time a node $b$ arrives we have to decide which edges incident to $b$ we want to probe, and in which order. Here we present a $4.07$-approximation, improving on the $7.92$-approximation of Bansal et al. The main technical ingredient in our result is a novel way of probing edges according to a random but non-uniform permutation. Patching this method with an algorithm that works best for large probability edges (plus some additional ideas) leads to our improved approximation factors

Whom to Ask? Jury Selection for Decision Making Tasks on Micro-blog Services

It is universal to see people obtain knowledge on micro-blog services by asking others decision making questions. In this paper, we study the Jury Selection Problem(JSP) by utilizing crowdsourcing for decision making tasks on micro-blog services. Specifically, the problem is to enroll a subset of crowd under a limited budget, whose aggregated wisdom via Majority Voting scheme has the lowest probability of drawing a wrong answer(Jury Error Rate-JER). Due to various individual error-rates of the crowd, the calculation of JER is non-trivial. Firstly, we explicitly state that JER is the probability when the number of wrong jurors is larger than half of the size of a jury. To avoid the exponentially increasing calculation of JER, we propose two efficient algorithms and an effective bounding technique. Furthermore, we study the Jury Selection Problem on two crowdsourcing models, one is for altruistic users(AltrM) and the other is for incentive-requiring users(PayM) who require extra payment when enrolled into a task. For the AltrM model, we prove the monotonicity of JER on individual error rate and propose an efficient exact algorithm for JSP. For the PayM model, we prove the NP-hardness of JSP on PayM and propose an efficient greedy-based heuristic algorithm. Finally, we conduct a series of experiments to investigate the traits of JSP, and validate the efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed algorithms on both synthetic and real micro-blog data.Comment: VLDB201