Game Theory Meets Network Security: A Tutorial at ACM CCS

The increasingly pervasive connectivity of today's information systems brings up new challenges to security. Traditional security has accomplished a long way toward protecting well-defined goals such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity. However, with the growing sophistication of the attacks and the complexity of the system, the protection using traditional methods could be cost-prohibitive. A new perspective and a new theoretical foundation are needed to understand security from a strategic and decision-making perspective. Game theory provides a natural framework to capture the adversarial and defensive interactions between an attacker and a defender. It provides a quantitative assessment of security, prediction of security outcomes, and a mechanism design tool that can enable security-by-design and reverse the attacker's advantage. This tutorial provides an overview of diverse methodologies from game theory that includes games of incomplete information, dynamic games, mechanism design theory to offer a modern theoretic underpinning of a science of cybersecurity. The tutorial will also discuss open problems and research challenges that the CCS community can address and contribute with an objective to build a multidisciplinary bridge between cybersecurity, economics, game and decision theory

Malware in the Future? Forecasting of Analyst Detection of Cyber Events

There have been extensive efforts in government, academia, and industry to anticipate, forecast, and mitigate cyber attacks. A common approach is time-series forecasting of cyber attacks based on data from network telescopes, honeypots, and automated intrusion detection/prevention systems. This research has uncovered key insights such as systematicity in cyber attacks. Here, we propose an alternate perspective of this problem by performing forecasting of attacks that are analyst-detected and -verified occurrences of malware. We call these instances of malware cyber event data. Specifically, our dataset was analyst-detected incidents from a large operational Computer Security Service Provider (CSSP) for the U.S. Department of Defense, which rarely relies only on automated systems. Our data set consists of weekly counts of cyber events over approximately seven years. Since all cyber events were validated by analysts, our dataset is unlikely to have false positives which are often endemic in other sources of data. Further, the higher-quality data could be used for a number for resource allocation, estimation of security resources, and the development of effective risk-management strategies. We used a Bayesian State Space Model for forecasting and found that events one week ahead could be predicted. To quantify bursts, we used a Markov model. Our findings of systematicity in analyst-detected cyber attacks are consistent with previous work using other sources. The advanced information provided by a forecast may help with threat awareness by providing a probable value and range for future cyber events one week ahead. Other potential applications for cyber event forecasting include proactive allocation of resources and capabilities for cyber defense (e.g., analyst staffing and sensor configuration) in CSSPs. Enhanced threat awareness may improve cybersecurity.Comment: Revised version resubmitted to journa

Characterizing the Power of Moving Target Defense via Cyber Epidemic Dynamics

Moving Target Defense (MTD) can enhance the resilience of cyber systems against attacks. Although there have been many MTD techniques, there is no systematic understanding and {\em quantitative} characterization of the power of MTD. In this paper, we propose to use a cyber epidemic dynamics approach to characterize the power of MTD. We define and investigate two complementary measures that are applicable when the defender aims to deploy MTD to achieve a certain security goal. One measure emphasizes the maximum portion of time during which the system can afford to stay in an undesired configuration (or posture), without considering the cost of deploying MTD. The other measure emphasizes the minimum cost of deploying MTD, while accommodating that the system has to stay in an undesired configuration (or posture) for a given portion of time. Our analytic studies lead to algorithms for optimally deploying MTD.Comment: 12 pages; 4 figures; Hotsos 14, 201