The Significance of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Systems in Aviation Industry

Rapid globalization has introduced several problems in the business environment. These problems have added complexities in decision-making and intensified competition. As a result, organizations are forced to come up with comprehensive ways of mitigating the challenges. That together with the ever-changing needs of the airlines’ customers have heightened the value attached to information systems as a way of solving problems and gaining competitive advantage. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system is one of the most popular systems in many organizations. However, some organizations have reported negative feedback pertaining its value. In this view, the primary objective of this study is to discern the significance of ERPs in the aviation sector. The study will accomplish that goal by focusing the research on Kenya Civil Aviation Authority, Delta Airlines, United Airlines, and the aviation sector of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These cases were selected because they have successfully implemented ERP and experienced several challenges before they successfully implemented the system. The study employed secondary research methods to collect data. Literature affiliated to the topic of study particularly materials that focused on the selected cases were utilized. Critical analysis was conducted and the findings presented. To increase validity and reliability, Nvivo software was used whereby interpretive and intuitive methods were utilized. The software method gave similar results as those obtained through manual methods

Baseline Assessment and Prioritization Framework for IVHM Integrity Assurance Enabling Capabilities

Fundamental to vehicle health management is the deployment of systems incorporating advanced technologies for predicting and detecting anomalous conditions in highly complex and integrated environments. Integrated structural integrity health monitoring, statistical algorithms for detection, estimation, prediction, and fusion, and diagnosis supporting adaptive control are examples of advanced technologies that present considerable verification and validation challenges. These systems necessitate interactions between physical and software-based systems that are highly networked with sensing and actuation subsystems, and incorporate technologies that are, in many respects, different from those employed in civil aviation today. A formidable barrier to deploying these advanced technologies in civil aviation is the lack of enabling verification and validation tools, methods, and technologies. The development of new verification and validation capabilities will not only enable the fielding of advanced vehicle health management systems, but will also provide new assurance capabilities for verification and validation of current generation aviation software which has been implicated in anomalous in-flight behavior. This paper describes the research focused on enabling capabilities for verification and validation underway within NASA s Integrated Vehicle Health Management project, discusses the state of the art of these capabilities, and includes a framework for prioritizing activities

Human Factors in the Ground-Support of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems

A growing body of research has been directed at the human factors of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) flight operations, yet up to now, virtually no attention has been given to the human factors of UAS maintenance. The aim of the current research program was to identify the challenges facing the maintainers of small unmanned aircraft systems. Unlike their counterparts in conventional aviation, UAS maintenance technicians are responsible for the functioning of an entire system, comprising airborne and ground-based components. Challenges include absent or poor maintenance documentation, the need to make frequent decisions about salvaging components, difficulties in troubleshooting software problems, the maintenance of radio control model aircraft components, and the potential unfamiliarity of UAS maintenance personnel with the culture and practices of the aviation industry. A “dirty dozen” list of UAS human factors is proposed

PC-based aviation training devices (PCATDs): research, development and certification

This paper examines the development of two PCATD’s (one helicopter, one fixed-wing) and their eventual certification by CAA. Certification has demonstrated the potential these devices have for aviation training in New Zealand. Traditionally FTD‘s and PCATD’s have been sourced from foreign companies, and they represent a considerable financial investment for large flying training organisations. The procurement of these simulator types is generally beyond the financial resources of most small to medium sized flying schools. Aviation training in NZ is facing significant financial constraints as well as an increasing demand to simulate complex glass cockpit systems that are now installed in most new General Aviation (GA) aircraft. The development, utilisation and certification of this type of PCATD technology could solve these difficult challenges

Why We Cannot (Yet) Ensure the Cybersecurity of Safety-Critical Systems

There is a growing threat to the cyber-security of safety-critical systems. The introduction of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) software, including Linux, specialist VOIP applications and Satellite Based Augmentation Systems across the aviation, maritime, rail and power-generation infrastructures has created common, vulnerabilities. In consequence, more people now possess the technical skills required to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in safety-critical systems. Arguably for the first time there is the potential for cross-modal attacks leading to future ‘cyber storms’. This situation is compounded by the failure of public-private partnerships to establish the cyber-security of safety critical applications. The fiscal crisis has prevented governments from attracting and retaining competent regulators at the intersection of safety and cyber-security. In particular, we argue that superficial similarities between safety and security have led to security policies that cannot be implemented in safety-critical systems. Existing office-based security standards, such as the ISO27k series, cannot easily be integrated with standards such as IEC61508 or ISO26262. Hybrid standards such as IEC 62443 lack credible validation. There is an urgent need to move beyond high-level policies and address the more detailed engineering challenges that threaten the cyber-security of safety-critical systems. In particular, we consider the ways in which cyber-security concerns undermine traditional forms of safety engineering, for example by invalidating conventional forms of risk assessment. We also summarise the ways in which safety concerns frustrate the deployment of conventional mechanisms for cyber-security, including intrusion detection systems

On the Security of the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Protocol

Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is the communications protocol currently being rolled out as part of next generation air transportation systems. As the heart of modern air traffic control, it will play an essential role in the protection of two billion passengers per year, besides being crucial to many other interest groups in aviation. The inherent lack of security measures in the ADS-B protocol has long been a topic in both the aviation circles and in the academic community. Due to recently published proof-of-concept attacks, the topic is becoming ever more pressing, especially with the deadline for mandatory implementation in most airspaces fast approaching. This survey first summarizes the attacks and problems that have been reported in relation to ADS-B security. Thereafter, it surveys both the theoretical and practical efforts which have been previously conducted concerning these issues, including possible countermeasures. In addition, the survey seeks to go beyond the current state of the art and gives a detailed assessment of security measures which have been developed more generally for related wireless networks such as sensor networks and vehicular ad hoc networks, including a taxonomy of all considered approaches.Comment: Survey, 22 Pages, 21 Figure

Air Traffic Management Safety Challenges

The primary goal of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is to control accident risk. ATM safety has improved over the decades for many reasons, from better equipment to additional safety defences. But ATM safety targets, improving on current performance, are now extremely demanding. Safety analysts and aviation decision-makers have to make safety assessments based on statistically incomplete evidence. If future risks cannot be estimated with precision, then how is safety to be assured with traffic growth and operational/technical changes? What are the design implications for the USA’s ‘Next Generation Air Transportation System’ (NextGen) and Europe’s Single European Sky ATM Research Programme (SESAR)? ATM accident precursors arise from (eg) pilot/controller workload, miscommunication, and lack of upto- date information. Can these accident precursors confidently be ‘designed out’ by (eg) better system knowledge across ATM participants, automatic safety checks, and machine rather than voice communication? Future potentially hazardous situations could be as ‘messy’ in system terms as the Überlingen mid-air collision. Are ATM safety regulation policies fit for purpose: is it more and more difficult to innovate, to introduce new technologies and novel operational concepts? Must regulators be more active, eg more inspections and monitoring of real operational and organisational practices

Air Traffic Safety: continued evolution or a new Paradigm.

The context here is Transport Risk Management. Is the philosophy of Air Traffic Safety different from other modes of transport? – yes, in many ways, it is. The focus is on Air Traffic Management (ATM), covering (eg) air traffic control and airspace structures, which is the part of the aviation system that is most likely to be developed through new paradigms. The primary goal of the ATM system is to control accident risk. ATM safety has improved over the decades for many reasons, from better equipment to additional safety defences. But ATM safety targets, improving on current performance, are now extremely demanding. What are the past and current methodologies for ATM risk assessment; and will they work effectively for the kinds of future systems that people are now imagining and planning? The title contrasts ‘Continued Evolution’ and a ‘New Paradigm’. How will system designers/operators assure safety with traffic growth and operational/technical changes that are more than continued evolution from the current system? What are the design implications for ‘new paradigms’, such as the USA’s ‘Next Generation Air Transportation System’ (NextGen) and Europe’s Single European Sky ATM Research Programme (SESAR)? Achieving and proving safety for NextGen and SESAR is an enormously tough challenge. For example, it will need to cover system resilience, human/automation issues, software/hardware performance/ground/air protection systems. There will be a need for confidence building programmes regarding system design/resilience, eg Human-in-the-Loop simulations with ‘seeded errors’