98,592 research outputs found
II—Resemblance Nominalism, Conjunctions and Truthmakers
The resemblance nominalist says that the truthmaker of 〈Socrates is white〉 ultimately involves only concrete particulars that resemble each other. Furthermore he also says that Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of 〈Socrates resembles Plato〉, and Socrates and Aristotle those of 〈Socrates resembles Aristotle〉. But this, combined with a principle about the truthmakers of conjunctions, leads to the apparently implausible conclusion that 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle〉 and 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Plato resembles Aristotle〉 have the same truthmakers, namely, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. I shall argue that the resemblance nominalist can say that those conjunctions have the same truthmakers but these truthmakers make them true in different ways. I shall also use this view to account for the truthmakers of propositions like 〈Socrates is white〉, and respond to previous objections by Cian Dorr and Jessica Wilson
Solving the Socratic Problem—A Contribution from Medicine
This essay provides a medical theory that could clarify enigmas surrounding the historical Socrates. It offers textual evidence that Socrates had temporal lobe epilepsy and that its two types of seizure manifested as recurrent voices and peculiar behaviour, both of which were notorious hallmarks of Socrates. Common and immediate criticisms against the methodology of retrospective diagnosis are addressed first. Next, the diagnostic reasoning is presented in detail. The possibility of temporal lobe personality in Socrates is also considered. The important implication of this theory is that one of the charges against Socrates, introducing new divinities, was a now well-known neurologic symptom
The grammatical puzzles of Socrates' last words
Socrates says "we owe" in the last words as head of his οἶκος, a collectivity owing a debt for the recovery from disease of one of Socrates' young sons. Socrates addresses Crito in the plural as head of his οἶκος, whose servants will perform the sacrifice as their master directs. Socrates had instructed that the youngest son be brought to the prison. The baby's presence is not adventitious, for had Socrates primarily summoned Xanthippe, the baby would have been left at home in the care of the οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες. The dying Socrates instructs that the debt be paid for the baby who recovered from a bout of illness and did not die. The rhetorical arrangement of the facts that inform the instruction (dying/speaking versus not yet talking/living) is Plato's invention
Does Socrates vindicate the coherence theory of truth?
Within Plato's Socratic Dialogues we routinely observe the character of Socrates employing a formal, yet largely unexplained method of investigation into the beliefs that his interlocutors hold as true. Socrates even goes so far as to claim there will be discord within them their whole life should they not be able refute one of his controversial and counter-intuitive revealed truths. With the beliefs under investigation striking to the core of how one should live a good life, this paper seeks to investigate whether Socrates' formal method justifies him in making the claims he does. After exposing the methodology of his technique, we turn to investigate the theory of truth that the method represents, seeking to ascertain a greater understanding of what truth means to Socrates when he makes the claim that a belief is true
What Rules and Laws does Socrates Obey
Socrates ́ thought of justice and obedience to laws is moti- vated by a will to avoid the destructive effects of Sophistic criti- cisms and theories of laws. He thus requires–against theories of natural law–an almost absolute obedience to the law, as far as this law respects the legal system of the city. But, against legal positivism, Socrates would not admit that a law is just simply because it is a law: he is looking for the true Just. However, as often in Socratic philosophy, Socrates cannot accept that two equally justified and legitimate rights or moral values conflict
Teleology, Causation and the Atlas Motif in Plato's Phaedo
In this paper, I propose a new reading of Phaedo 99b6-d2. My main thesis is that in 99c6-9, Socrates does not refer to the teleological αἰτία but to the αἰτία that will be provided by a stronger ‘Atlas’ (99c4-5). This means that the passage offers no evidence that Socrates abandons teleology or modifies his views about it. He acknowledges, instead, that he could not find or learn any αἰτία stronger than the teleological one. This, I suggest, allows an interpretation of the Phaedo in which Socrates offers a consistent account of the αἰτία of generation and destruction
Aristippus and Xenophon as Plato’s contemporary literary rivals and the role of gymnastikè (γυμναστική)
Plato was a Socrates’ friend and disciple, but he wasn’t the only one. No doubt,
Socrates had many followers, however, the majority of their work is lost. Was there any antagonism among his followers? Who succeeded in interpreting Socrates? Who could be considered as his successor? Of course, we don’t know if these questions emerged after the death of Socrates, but the Greek doxography suggests that there was a literary rivalry. As we underlined earlier, most unfortunately, we can’t examine all of them thoroughly due to the lack of their work, but we can scrutinize Xenophon’s and Aristippus’ work. All of them, Plato, Xenophon and Aristippus, presented to a certain extent their ideas concerning education. Furthermore, they have not neglected the matter of gymnastikè, but what is exactly the role of physical education in their work? Are there any similarities or any differences between them? Since, Xenophon and Aristippus (as well as Plato) seem to be in favor of gymnastikè, it is necessary to understand its role
Swift J1644+57: An Ultra-Luminous X-ray Event
The photon spectral energy distribution of the powerful transient Sw J1644+57
resembles those of the brightest Ultra-Luminous X-ray sources (ULXs). The
transient nature of Sw J1644+57 is likely the result of a tidal disruption of a
star by a super-massive black hole. The stellar disk generates accretion power
at super-Eddington rates and the observational properties of Sw J1644+57
indicate -- in analogy with ULXs -- that the accretion flow maintains a high
level of radiative efficiency with a corresponding super-Eddington luminosity.
Due to its similarity to ULXs, this powerful transient may be thought of as an
Ultra-Luminous X-ray event (ULX-E). Observational tests for this ULX-E model
are proposed as well.Comment: ApJL accepte
Socrates, Piety, and Nominalism
The argument used by Socrates to refute the thesis that piety is what all the gods love is one of the most well known in the history of philosophy. Yet some fundamental points of interpretation have gone unnoticed. I will show that (i) the strategy of Socrates' argument refutes not only Euthyphro's theory of piety and such neighboring doctrines as cultural relativism and subjectivism, but nominalism in general; moreover, that (ii) the argument needs to assume much less than is generally thought, and finally that (iii) while Socrates' argument, properly understood in its full force, appears to be inconsistent with the goal of his own inquiry, his own 'Platonic' position escapes the inconsistency
Dangerous Voices: On Written and Spoken Discourse in Plato’s Protagoras
Plato’s Protagoras contains, among other things, three short but puzzling remarks
on the media of philosophy. First, at 328e5–329b1, Plato makes Socrates worry that
long speeches, just like books, are deceptive, because they operate in a discursive
mode void of questions and answers. Second, at 347c3–348a2, Socrates argues that
discussion of poetry is a presumptuous affair, because, the poems’ message, just
like the message of any written text, cannot be properly examined if the author is not
present. Third, at 360e6–361d6, it becomes clear that even if the conversation
between Socrates and Protagoras was conducted by means of short questions and
answers, this spoken mode of discourse is problematic too, because it ended up
distracting the inquiry from its proper course. As this paper 2 sets out to argue, Plato
does not only make Socrates articulate these worries to exhibit the hazards of discursive commodifi cation. In line with Socrates’ warning to the young Hippocrates
of the dangers of sophistic rhetoric, and the sophists’ practice of trading in teachings,
they are also meant to problematize the thin line between philosophical and
sophistical practice. By examining these worries in the light of how the three relevant
modes of discourse are exemplifi ed in the dialogue, this paper aims to isolate
and clarify the reasons behind them in terms of deceit, presumptuousness and distraction; and to argue that these reasons cast doubts on the common assumption that the dialogue’s primary aim is to show how sophistical rhetoric must succumb to
Socratic dialectic
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