Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Multi-Homing

This paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing; that is, they can participate in multiple platforms in order to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific exclusive contents available to more consumers, which is also beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare-enhancing if multi-homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi-homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi-homing is prevalent.tying, two-sided markets, (indirect) network effects, multi-homing

Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and Applying Emergent Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy

This Article presents some specific ways that U.S. policymakers should use teachings from the latest thinking in economics to create a conceptual framework in order to grapple with current controversies in communications law and regulation. First, it provides a brief overview of Emergence Economics, with an emphasis on the rough formula of emergence and the unique role of technological change in creating and furthering innovation and economic growth. Second, this paper explicates the general concept of Adaptive Policymaking by governments and includes some proposed guiding principles, an outline of the public policy design space, and an adaptive toolkit to be used by policymakers. Third, this Article discusses devising a policy design space specifically for communications policy, with an emphasis on the institutional and organizational challenges facing the FCC as it seeks to fulfill the suggested goal of furthering More Good Ideas. Finally, this paper explores the conceptual framework for the fitness landscape, including a searching critique of the notion of enabling without dictating evolutionary forces in the marketplace

The Political Economy of Corruption & the Role of Financial Institutions

In many developing and transition countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as the majority of people in a corrupt country suffer from high corruption levels. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt offcials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions can lead to more corruption as more voters are part of the corrupt system and, more importantly, as the rents from corruption are distributed differently. Thus, the economic system has an effect on political outcomes. Well-functioning financial institutions, in turn, increase the political support for anti-corruption measures.Corruption, Financial Markets, Institutions, Development, Voting

Efficient copyright filters for online hosting platforms

This paper documents the existence of significant gender gaps in STEM occupations in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Mexico and estimates the aggregate costs associated with these gaps in Mexico. For Mexico we calibrate and simulate a version of the general equilibrium occupational choice model of Hsieh et al. (2019) to estimate the output losses associated with these differences since 1992. We find that if barriers in STEM occupations were eliminated aggregate output would have been between 1% and 10% larger, depending on the year. If female-specific social norms were also eliminated, the rise in aggregate output would be between 1.4% and 14%. For comparison purposes, we also compute the gains of eliminating all the distortions in high-skilled occupations as well as in all occupations. We find that aggregate output would rise between 16.5% and 3.6% in the former group of occupations and between 36.7% and 12% in the latter