Pension-Induced Rigidities in the Labor Market for School Leaders

Educators in public schools in the United States are typically enrolled in defined-benefit pension plans, which penalize across-plan mobility. We use administrative data from Missouri to examine how the mobility penalties affect the labor market for school leaders. We show that pension borders greatly affect leadership flows across schools – for two groups of schools separated by a pension border, our estimates indicate that removing the border will increase leadership mobility between them by 97 to 163 percent. We consider the implications of the pension-induced rigidities in the leadership labor market for schools near pension borders in Missouri. Our findings are of general interest given that thousands of public schools operate near pension boundaries nationwide.Educator pensions, backloaded compensation, principal quality, leadership quality, compensation in education

Pension-Induced Rigidities in the Labor Market for School Leaders

Educators in public schools in the United States are typically enrolled in defined-benefit pension plans, which penalize across-plan mobility. We use administrative data from Missouri to examine how the mobility penalties affect the labor market for school leaders. We show that pension borders greatly affect leadership flows across schools – for two groups of schools separated by a pension border, our estimates indicate that removing the border will increase leadership mobility between them by 97 to 163 percent. We consider the implications of the pension-induced rigidities in the leadership labor market for schools near pension borders in Missouri. Our findings are of general interest given that thousands of public schools operate near pension boundaries nationwide.

Forced Saving, Redistribution and Nonlinear Social Security Schemes

This paper studies the design of a nonlinear social security scheme in a society where individuals differ in two respects: productivity and degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save “enough” for their retirement because their “myopic self” emerges when labor supply and savings decisions are made. The social welfare function is paternalistic: the rate of time preference of the far-sighted (which corresponds to the “true” preferences of the myopics) is used for both types. We show that the paternalistic solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics. This is because paternalistic considerations are mitigated or even outweighed by incentive effects. Our numerical results suggest that as the number of myopic individuals increases, there is less redistribution and more forced saving. Furthermore, as the number of myopic increases, the desirability of social security (measured by the difference between social welfare with and without social security) increases.non-linear social security, myopia, dual self model

State-contingent modelling of the Murray Darling Basin: implications for the design of property rights

Questions relating to the allocation and management of risk have played a central role in the development of the National Water Initiative, particularly as it has applied to the Murray-Darling Basin. The central issues of efficiency and equity in allocations are best understood by considering water licenses as bundles of state-contingent claims. The interaction of property rights and uncertainty regarding water flows, production and output prices is modelled using a state-contingent representation of production under uncertainty. The role of technology and investment in the determination of efficient adaptation strategies to manage risks is explored using an illustrative example.

Demographic Change and Public Sector Budgets in a Federal System

This paper examines the effects of demographic change on public finances in a federal system. We develop a simple methodical procedure to measure the effect of demographic changes on public revenues and expenditures. We apply our method to the local, state and federal government sector as well as on the social security system in Germany. Our results suggest that demographic change will lead to significant vertical fiscal imbalances between the different layers of government. In addition we show, that subnational governments can generate a demographic dividend whereas the social security system and the federal government have to carry an additional burden due to ageing.fiscal federalism, demographic change, sustainability of public finances

Measuring the impact of market coupling on the Italian electricity market using ELFO++

This paper evaluates the impact on the Italian electricity market of replacing the current explicit auction mechanism with market coupling. Maximizing the use of the cross-border interconnection capacity, market coupling increases the level of market integration and facilitates the access to low-cost generation by consumers located in high-cost generation countries. Thus, it is expected that a high-priced area such as Italy could greatly benefit from the introduction of this mechanism. In this paper, the welfare benefits are estimated under alternative market scenarios for 2012, employing the optimal dispatch model ELFO++. The results of the simulations suggest that the improvement in social surplus is likely to be significant, especially when market fundamentals are tight.Market coupling; market integration; Italian day-ahead electricity market.