259,328 research outputs found
Social Pressure in Opinion Games
Motivated by privacy and security concerns in online social networks, we study the role of social pressure in opinion games. These are games, important in economics and sociology, that model the formation of opinions in a social network. We enrich the definition of (noisy) best-response dynamics for opinion games by introducing the pressure, increasing with time, to reach an agreement. We prove that for clique social networks, the dynamics always converges to consensus (no matter the level of noise) if the social pressure is high enough. Moreover, we provide (tight) bounds on the speed of convergence; these bounds are polynomial in the number of players provided that the pressure grows sufficiently fast. We finally look beyond cliques: we characterize the graphs for which consensus is guaranteed, and make some considerations on the computational complexity of checking whether a graph satisfies such a condition
Video games, parental mediation and gender socialization
The study examines the parental perception of the use of video games by their preadolescent children, as well as parental beliefs, mediation practices and difficulties they encounter. In total, 186 parents have participated. The results, gathered in the quantitative and qualitative phase, reveal differences in parental perception according to the age and sex of their children; parents have more negative than positive beliefs about video games and use more strategies based on control than on support and communication. In parents’ opinion, the difficulties for mediation are related to the precocity to which they access the media and Internet, social pressure, uncontrollability and the digital divide. The paper concludes with implications for the educational intervention aimed to respond to parents’ concerns and needs for information and training
Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots
Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games
suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection
pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak.
I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experimental findings
and evolution of cooperation. By assuming a small fraction of (imperfect)
zealous cooperators, I show that a large fraction of cooperation emerges in
evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games. Even if defection is more
lucrative than cooperation for most individuals, they often mimic cooperation
of fellows unless the selection pressure is very strong. Then, zealous
cooperators can transform the population to be even fully cooperative under
standard evolutionary dynamics.Comment: 5 figure
Opinion formation models based on game theory
A way to simulate the basic interactions between two individuals with
different opinions, in the context of strategic game theory, is proposed.
Various games are considered, which produce different kinds of opinion
formation dynamics. First, by assuming that all individuals (players) are
equals, we obtain the bounded confidence model of continuous opinion dynamics
proposed by Deffuant et al. In such a model a tolerance threshold is defined,
such that individuals with difference in opinion larger than the threshold can
not interact. Then, we consider that the individuals have different
inclinations to change opinion and different abilities in convincing the
others. In this way, we obtain the so-called ``Stubborn individuals and
Orators'' (SO) model, a generalization of the Deffuant et al. model, in which
the threshold tolerance is different for every couple of individuals. We
explore, by numerical simulations, the dynamics of the SO model, and we propose
further generalizations that can be implemented.Comment: 18 pages, 4 figure
Skyrim as a Representation of the American Dominant Culture
This thesis aims to give pictures of the American values in an American cultural product, Bethesda\u27s Elder Scroll V: Skyrim. I will use ideology as the concept to show that cultural products contain ideologies or values of the dominant group. The study shows that in the games, traditional American values serve as the standard values of the American dominant group. Furthermore, I show that American values in the video game are the same, although some values are shifting. In conclusion, I find out that Elder Scroll V: Skyrim has all of the American traditional values. The medieval setting of the game somehow shifts some values like material wealth since bloodline status is appreciated. Thus, Elder Scroll V: Skyrim does represent the American society and how it should be
Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach
Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often
challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this
problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across
groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social
or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since
behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as
non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another.
To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within
and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple
populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to
different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other
factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For
example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two
interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly
punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does
cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even
revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements
between groups with conflicting interests?
Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting
results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have
implications for the evolution of language and culture as well
Consensus as a Nash Equilibrium of a Dynamic Game
Consensus formation in a social network is modeled by a dynamic game of a
prescribed duration played by members of the network. Each member independently
minimizes a cost function that represents his/her motive. An integral cost
function penalizes a member's differences of opinion from the others as well as
from his/her own initial opinion, weighted by influence and stubbornness
parameters. Each member uses its rate of change of opinion as a control input.
This defines a dynamic non-cooperative game that turns out to have a unique
Nash equilibrium. Analytic explicit expressions are derived for the opinion
trajectory of each member for two representative cases obtained by suitable
assumptions on the graph topology of the network. These trajectories are then
examined under different assumptions on the relative sizes of the influence and
stubbornness parameters that appear in the cost functions.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figure, Pre-print from the Proceedings of the 12th
International Conference on Signal Image Technology and Internet-based
Systems (SITIS), 201
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