Quantum social networks

We introduce a physical approach to social networks (SNs) in which each actor is characterized by a yes-no test on a physical system. This allows us to consider SNs beyond those originated by interactions based on pre-existing properties, as in a classical SN (CSN). As an example of SNs beyond CSNs, we introduce quantum SNs (QSNs) in which actor is characterized by a test of whether or not the system is in a quantum state. We show that QSNs outperform CSNs for a certain task and some graphs. We identify the simplest of these graphs and show that graphs in which QSNs outperform CSNs are increasingly frequent as the number of vertices increases. We also discuss more general SNs and identify the simplest graphs in which QSNs cannot be outperformed.Comment: REVTeX4, 6 pages, 3 figure

Social Networks

We survey the literature on social networks by putting together the economics, sociological and physics/applied mathematics approaches, showing their similarities and differences. We expose, in particular, the two main ways of modeling network formation. While the physics/applied mathematics approach is capable of reproducing most observed networks, it does not explain why they emerge. On the contrary, the economics approach is very precise in explaining why networks emerge but does a poor job in matching real-world networks. We also analyze behaviors on networks, which take networks as given and focus on the impact of their structure on individuals’ outcomes. Using a game-theoretical framework, we then compare the results with those obtained in sociology.Random Graph; Game Theory; Centrality Measures; Network Formation; Weak

Social Networks

We survey the literature on social networks by putting together the economics, sociological and physics/applied mathematics approaches, showing their similarities and differences. We expose, in particular, the two main ways of modeling network formation. While the physics/applied mathematics approach is capable of reproducing most observed networks, it does not explain why they emerge. On the contrary, the economics approach is very precise in explaining why networks emerge but does a poor job in matching real-world networks. We also analyze behaviors on networks, which take networks as given and focus on the impact of their structure on individuals’ outcomes. Using a game-theoretical framework, we then compare the results with those obtained in sociology.random graph, game theory, centrality measures, network formation, weak and strong ties

The social networks and the new social order between the individualized socialization and the socialized individualism: Empirical study on the case of Morocco

The new Social Networks (SN) evolved very quickly. They conquered of wide population as well in the cities as in the campaigns. They pushed aside values, attitudes, behavior…; In countries with strong social culture, they modified these values and modified the social rules formerly considered as unchanging.In this paper, an empirical study concerned the case of the Moroccans and their behavior with regard to the social networks in numerous domains as those of society, economy, consumption, social and societal relationships, information and communication, politics, etc. The traditional conventional social order is today in deep transformation. This paper contributes to the understanding of behavior change currently facing Moroccan society at all levels.The designers of software or applications bound to the social networks have to integrate these new behavior in their strategies

Collaboration in Social Networks

The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of others, in a strategic forward looking manner. Game theory of repeated games shows that these circumstances are conducive to the emergence of collaboration in simple games of two players. We investigate the extension of this concept to the case where players are engaged in a local contribution game and show that rationality and credibility of threats identify a class of Nash equilibria -- that we call "collaborative equilibria" -- that have a precise interpretation in terms of sub-graphs of the social network. For large network games, the number of such equilibria is exponentially large in the number of players. When incentives to defect are small, equilibria are supported by local structures whereas when incentives exceed a threshold they acquire a non-local nature, which requires a "critical mass" of more than a given fraction of the players to collaborate. Therefore, when incentives are high, an individual deviation typically causes the collapse of collaboration across the whole system. At the same time, higher incentives to defect typically support equilibria with a higher density of collaborators. The resulting picture conforms with several results in sociology and in the experimental literature on game theory, such as the prevalence of collaboration in denser groups and in the structural hubs of sparse networks