Social Learning over Weakly-Connected Graphs

In this paper, we study diffusion social learning over weakly-connected graphs. We show that the asymmetric flow of information hinders the learning abilities of certain agents regardless of their local observations. Under some circumstances that we clarify in this work, a scenario of total influence (or "mind-control") arises where a set of influential agents ends up shaping the beliefs of non-influential agents. We derive useful closed-form expressions that characterize this influence, and which can be used to motivate design problems to control it. We provide simulation examples to illustrate the results.Comment: To appear in 2017 in the IEEE Transactions on Signal and Information Processing over Network

A Formal Model for Polarization under Confirmation Bias in Social Networks

We describe a model for polarization in multi-agent systems based on Esteban and Ray's standard family of polarization measures from economics. Agents evolve by updating their beliefs (opinions) based on an underlying influence graph, as in the standard DeGroot model for social learning, but under a confirmation bias; i.e., a discounting of opinions of agents with dissimilar views. We show that even under this bias polarization eventually vanishes (converges to zero) if the influence graph is strongly-connected. If the influence graph is a regular symmetric circulation, we determine the unique belief value to which all agents converge. Our more insightful result establishes that, under some natural assumptions, if polarization does not eventually vanish then either there is a disconnected subgroup of agents, or some agent influences others more than she is influenced. We also prove that polarization does not necessarily vanish in weakly-connected graphs under confirmation bias. Furthermore, we show how our model relates to the classic DeGroot model for social learning. We illustrate our model with several simulations of a running example about polarization over vaccines and of other case studies. The theoretical results and simulations will provide insight into the phenomenon of polarization.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2104.11538, arXiv:2012.0270

The Evolution of Beliefs over Signed Social Networks

We study the evolution of opinions (or beliefs) over a social network modeled as a signed graph. The sign attached to an edge in this graph characterizes whether the corresponding individuals or end nodes are friends (positive links) or enemies (negative links). Pairs of nodes are randomly selected to interact over time, and when two nodes interact, each of them updates its opinion based on the opinion of the other node and the sign of the corresponding link. This model generalizes DeGroot model to account for negative links: when two enemies interact, their opinions go in opposite directions. We provide conditions for convergence and divergence in expectation, in mean-square, and in almost sure sense, and exhibit phase transition phenomena for these notions of convergence depending on the parameters of the opinion update model and on the structure of the underlying graph. We establish a {\it no-survivor} theorem, stating that the difference in opinions of any two nodes diverges whenever opinions in the network diverge as a whole. We also prove a {\it live-or-die} lemma, indicating that almost surely, the opinions either converge to an agreement or diverge. Finally, we extend our analysis to cases where opinions have hard lower and upper limits. In these cases, we study when and how opinions may become asymptotically clustered to the belief boundaries, and highlight the crucial influence of (strong or weak) structural balance of the underlying network on this clustering phenomenon

Forming Probably Stable Communities with Limited Interactions

A community needs to be partitioned into disjoint groups; each community member has an underlying preference over the groups that they would want to be a member of. We are interested in finding a stable community structure: one where no subset of members $S$ wants to deviate from the current structure. We model this setting as a hedonic game, where players are connected by an underlying interaction network, and can only consider joining groups that are connected subgraphs of the underlying graph. We analyze the relation between network structure, and one's capability to infer statistically stable (also known as PAC stable) player partitions from data. We show that when the interaction network is a forest, one can efficiently infer PAC stable coalition structures. Furthermore, when the underlying interaction graph is not a forest, efficient PAC stabilizability is no longer achievable. Thus, our results completely characterize when one can leverage the underlying graph structure in order to compute PAC stable outcomes for hedonic games. Finally, given an unknown underlying interaction network, we show that it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists a forest consistent with data samples from the network.Comment: 11 pages, full version of accepted AAAI-19 pape

Learning Social Affordance Grammar from Videos: Transferring Human Interactions to Human-Robot Interactions

In this paper, we present a general framework for learning social affordance grammar as a spatiotemporal AND-OR graph (ST-AOG) from RGB-D videos of human interactions, and transfer the grammar to humanoids to enable a real-time motion inference for human-robot interaction (HRI). Based on Gibbs sampling, our weakly supervised grammar learning can automatically construct a hierarchical representation of an interaction with long-term joint sub-tasks of both agents and short term atomic actions of individual agents. Based on a new RGB-D video dataset with rich instances of human interactions, our experiments of Baxter simulation, human evaluation, and real Baxter test demonstrate that the model learned from limited training data successfully generates human-like behaviors in unseen scenarios and outperforms both baselines.Comment: The 2017 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA