198 research outputs found
Coevolutionary Genetic Algorithms for Establishing Nash Equilibrium in Symmetric Cournot Games
We use co-evolutionary genetic algorithms to model the players' learning process in several Cournot models, and evaluate them in terms of their convergence to the Nash Equilibrium. The \social-learning" versions of the two co-evolutionary algorithms we introduce, establish Nash Equilibrium in those models, in contrast to the \individual learning" versions which, as we see here, do not imply the convergence of the players' strategies to the Nash outcome. When players use \canonical co-evolutionary genetic algorithms" as learning algorithms, the process of the game is an ergodic Markov Chain, and therefore we analyze simulation results using the relevant methodology, to find that in the \social" case, states leading to NE play are highly frequent at the stationary distribution of the chain, in contrast to the \individual learning" case, when NE is not reached at all in our simulations; to ftnd that the expected Hamming distance of the states at the limiting distribution from the \NE state" is significantly smaller in the \social" than in the \individual learning case"; to estimate the expected time that the \social" algorithms need to get to the \NE state" and verify their robustness and finally to show that a large fraction of the games played are indeed at the Nash Equilibrium.Genetic Algorithms, Cournot oligopoly, Evolutionary Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium
Coevolutionary Genetic Algorithms for Establishing Nash Equilibrium in Symmetric Cournot Games
We use co-evolutionary genetic algorithms to model the players' learning
process in several Cournot models, and evaluate them in terms of their
convergence to the Nash Equilibrium. The "social-learning" versions of the two
co-evolutionary algorithms we introduce, establish Nash Equilibrium in those
models, in contrast to the "individual learning" versions which, as we see
here, do not imply the convergence of the players' strategies to the Nash
outcome. When players use "canonical co-evolutionary genetic algorithms" as
learning algorithms, the process of the game is an ergodic Markov Chain, and
therefore we analyze simulation results using both the relevant methodology and
more general statistical tests, to find that in the "social" case, states
leading to NE play are highly frequent at the stationary distribution of the
chain, in contrast to the "individual learning" case, when NE is not reached at
all in our simulations; to find that the expected Hamming distance of the
states at the limiting distribution from the "NE state" is significantly
smaller in the "social" than in the "individual learning case"; to estimate the
expected time that the "social" algorithms need to get to the "NE state" and
verify their robustness and finally to show that a large fraction of the games
played are indeed at the Nash Equilibrium.Comment: 18 pages, 4 figure
Multi-agent Learning For Game-theoretical Problems
Multi-agent systems are prevalent in the real world in various domains. In many multi-agent systems, interaction among agents is inevitable, and cooperation in some form is needed among agents to deal with the task at hand. We model the type of multi-agent systems where autonomous agents inhabit an environment with no global control or global knowledge, decentralized in the true sense. In particular, we consider game-theoretical problems such as the hedonic coalition formation games, matching problems, and Cournot games. We propose novel decentralized learning and multi-agent reinforcement learning approaches to train agents in learning behaviors and adapting to the environments. We use game-theoretic evaluation criteria such as optimality, stability, and resulting equilibria
Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints
In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.bounded rationality; genetic algorithms; individual heterogeneitybounded rationality; genetic algorithms; individual heterogeneity
Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints
In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior
An Initial Implementation of the Turing Tournament to Learning in
Abstract We report on a design of a Turing tournament and its initial implementation to learning in repeated 2-person games. The principal objectives of the tournament, named after the original Turing Test, are (1) to find learning algorithms (emulators) that most closely simulate human behavior, (2) to find algorithms (detectors) that most accurately distinguish between humans and machines, and (3) to provide a demonstration of how to implement this methodology for evaluating models of human behavior. In order to test our concept, we developed the software and implemented a number of learning models well known in the literature and developed a few detectors. This initial implementation found significant differences in data generated by these learning models and humans, with the greatest ones in coordination games. Finally, we investigate the stability of our result with respect to different evaluation approaches
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