Modelling Smart Card Security Protocols in SystemC TLM

Smart cards are an example of advanced chip technology. They allow information transfer between the card holder and the system over secure networks, but they contain sensitive data related to both the card holder and the system, that has to be kept private and confidential. The objective of this work is to create an executable model of a smart card system, including the security protocols and transactions, and to examine the strengths and determine the weaknesses by running tests on the model. The security objectives have to be considered during the early stages of systems development and design, an executable model will give the designer the advantage of exploring the vulnerabilities early, and therefore enhancing the system security. The Unified Modeling Language (UML) 2.0 is used to model the smart card security protocol. The executable model is programmed in SystemC with the Transaction Level Modeling (TLM) extensions. The final model was used to examine the effectiveness of a number of authentication mechanisms with different probabilities of failure. In addition, a number of probable attacks on the current security protocol were modeled to examine the vulnerabilities. The executable model shows that the smart card system security protocols and transactions need further improvement to withstand different types of security attacks

Remote attestation mechanism for embedded devices based on physical unclonable functions

Remote attestation mechanisms are well studied in the high-end computing environments; however, the same is not true for embedded devices-especially for smart cards. With ever changing landscape of smart card technology and advancements towards a true multi-application platform, verifying the current state of the smart card is significant to the overall security of such proposals. The initiatives proposed by GlobalPlatform Consumer Centric Model (GP-CCM) and User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) enables a user to download any application as she desire-depending upon the authorisation of the application provider. Before an application provider issues an application to a smart card, verifying the current state of the smart card is crucial to the security of the respective application. In this paper, we analyse the rationale behind the remote attestation mechanism for smart cards, and the fundamental features that such a mechanism should possess. We also study the applicability of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for the remote attestation mechanism and propose two algorithms to achieve the stated features of remote attestation. The proposed algorithms are implemented in a test environment to evaluate their performance. © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved

Citizen Electronic Identities using TPM 2.0

Electronic Identification (eID) is becoming commonplace in several European countries. eID is typically used to authenticate to government e-services, but is also used for other services, such as public transit, e-banking, and physical security access control. Typical eID tokens take the form of physical smart cards, but successes in merging eID into phone operator SIM cards show that eID tokens integrated into a personal device can offer better usability compared to standalone tokens. At the same time, trusted hardware that enables secure storage and isolated processing of sensitive data have become commonplace both on PC platforms as well as mobile devices. Some time ago, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) released the version 2.0 of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) specification. We propose an eID architecture based on the new, rich authorization model introduced in the TCGs TPM 2.0. The goal of the design is to improve the overall security and usability compared to traditional smart card-based solutions. We also provide, to the best our knowledge, the first accessible description of the TPM 2.0 authorization model.Comment: This work is based on an earlier work: Citizen Electronic Identities using TPM 2.0, to appear in the Proceedings of the 4th international workshop on Trustworthy embedded devices, TrustED'14, November 3, 2014, Scottsdale, Arizona, USA, http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2666141.266614

LEGaTO: first steps towards energy-efficient toolset for heterogeneous computing

LEGaTO is a three-year EU H2020 project which started in December 2017. The LEGaTO project will leverage task-based programming models to provide a software ecosystem for Made-in-Europe heterogeneous hardware composed of CPUs, GPUs, FPGAs and dataflow engines. The aim is to attain one order of magnitude energy savings from the edge to the converged cloud/HPC.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

ROYALE: A Framework for Universally Composable Card Games with Financial Rewards and Penalties Enforcement

While many tailor made card game protocols are known, the vast majority of those suffer from three main issues: lack of mechanisms for distributing financial rewards and punishing cheaters, lack of composability guarantees and little flexibility, focusing on the specific game of poker. Even though folklore holds that poker protocols can be used to play any card game, this conjecture remains unproven and, in fact, does not hold for a number of protocols (including recent results). We both tackle the problem of constructing protocols for general card games and initiate a treatment of such protocols in the Universal Composability (UC) framework, introducing an ideal functionality that captures general card games constructed from a set of core card operations. Based on this formalism, we introduce Royale, the first UC-secure general card games which supports financial rewards/penalties enforcement. We remark that Royale also yields the first UC-secure poker protocol. Interestingly, Royale performs better than most previous works (that do not have composability guarantees), which we highlight through a detailed concrete complexity analysis and benchmarks from a prototype implementation