Detecting and Mitigating Denial-of-Service Attacks on Voice over IP Networks

Voice over IP (VoIP) is more susceptible to Denial of Service attacks than traditional data traffic, due to the former's low tolerance to delay and jitter. We describe the design of our VoIP Vulnerability Assessment Tool (VVAT) with which we demonstrate vulnerabilities to DoS attacks inherent in many of the popular VoIP applications available today. In our threat model we assume an adversary who is not a network administrator, nor has direct control of the channel and key VoIP elements. His aim is to degrade his victim's QoS without giving away his presence by making his attack look like a normal network degradation. Even black-boxed, applications like Skype that use proprietary protocols show poor performance under specially crafted DoS attacks to its media stream. Finally we show how securing Skype relays not only preserves many of its useful features such as seamless traversal of firewalls but also protects its users from DoS attacks such as recording of conversations and disruption of voice quality. We also present our experiences using virtualization to protect VoIP applications from 'insider attacks'. Our contribution is two fold we: 1) Outline a threat model for VoIP, incorporating our attack models in an open-source network simulator/emulator allowing VoIP vendors to check their software for vulnerabilities in a controlled environment before releasing it. 2) We present two promising approaches for protecting the confidentiality, availability and authentication of VoIP Services

PINT: Probabilistic In-band Network Telemetry

© 2020 ACM. Commodity network devices support adding in-band telemetry measurements into data packets, enabling a wide range of applications, including network troubleshooting, congestion control, and path tracing. However, including such information on packets adds significant overhead that impacts both flow completion times and application-level performance. We introduce PINT, an in-band network telemetry framework that bounds the amount of information added to each packet. PINT encodes the requested data on multiple packets, allowing per-packet overhead limits that can be as low as one bit. We analyze PINT and prove performance bounds, including cases when multiple queries are running simultaneously. PINT is implemented in P4 and can be deployed on network devices.Using real topologies and traffic characteristics, we show that PINT concurrently enables applications such as congestion control, path tracing, and computing tail latencies, using only sixteen bits per packet, with performance comparable to the state of the art