Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria

Designing and deploying a network protocol determines the rules by which end users interact with each other and with the network. We consider the problem of designing a protocol to optimize the equilibrium behavior of a network with selfish users. We consider network cost-sharing games, where the set of Nash equilibria depends fundamentally on the choice of an edge cost-sharing protocol. Previous research focused on the Shapley protocol, in which the cost of each edge is shared equally among its users. We systematically study the design of optimal cost-sharing protocols for undirected and directed graphs, single-sink and multicommodity networks, and different measures of the inefficiency of equilibria. Our primary technical tool is a precise characterization of the cost-sharing protocols that induce only network games with pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We use this characterization to prove, among other results, that the Shapley protocol is optimal in directed graphs and that simple priority protocols are essentially optimal in undirected graphs

Opinion Dynamics in Heterogeneous Networks: Convergence Conjectures and Theorems

Recently, significant attention has been dedicated to the models of opinion dynamics in which opinions are described by real numbers, and agents update their opinions synchronously by averaging their neighbors' opinions. The neighbors of each agent can be defined as either (1) those agents whose opinions are in its "confidence range," or (2) those agents whose "influence range" contain the agent's opinion. The former definition is employed in Hegselmann and Krause's bounded confidence model, and the latter is novel here. As the confidence and influence ranges are distinct for each agent, the heterogeneous state-dependent interconnection topology leads to a poorly-understood complex dynamic behavior. In both models, we classify the agents via their interconnection topology and, accordingly, compute the equilibria of the system. Then, we define a positive invariant set centered at each equilibrium opinion vector. We show that if a trajectory enters one such set, then it converges to a steady state with constant interconnection topology. This result gives us a novel sufficient condition for both models to establish convergence, and is consistent with our conjecture that all trajectories of the bounded confidence and influence models eventually converge to a steady state under fixed topology.Comment: 22 pages, Submitted to SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization (SICON

“Driving While Black”: A Theory for Interethnic Integration and Evolution of Prejudice

This paper studies the evolution of interethnic attitudes, the integration or segregation dynamics of ethnic minorities and the conditions for the rising of ethnic-based social hierarchies. By means of a cultural evolution framework, a dynamics of interethnic attitudes is provided and conditions for their convergence derived. Steady states implying a constant role of racism and no role for racism are identified. Deriving sufficient conditions for convergence, we find that the way in which Oblique Socialization Schemes (the way children react to out-of-family stimuli when forming their cultural values) are defined and modelled becomes crucial for the structure of the derived long run equilibria. In particular, we find that Steady States implying an Ethnic-based social ranking or full integration of ethnicities may be reached depending on whether or not agents use Reciprocity and/or Ethnocentrism in their interethnic attitudes formation schemes. Allowing different groups for asymmetric use of reciprocity and Ethnocentrism, we explain why different ethnic minorities may show different integration patterns, and what are the different roles (Cultural bridge, cultural hub) an ethnic group may play in the integration process. Moreover, in this way, we explain why attitudes of some groups towards others converge to the same values, while other groups seems to be excluded from this process. At last, we provide the first steps for the endogeneization of socialization structures.Cultural transmission, Minority integration, Evolution of preferences

A revised model of fluid transport optimization in Physarum polycephalum

Optimization of fluid transport in the slime mold Physarum polycephalum has been the subject of several modeling efforts in recent literature. Existing models assume that the tube adaptation mechanism in P. polycephalum's tubular network is controlled by the sheer amount of fluid flow through the tubes. We put forward the hypothesis that the controlling variable may instead be the flow's pressure gradient along the tube. We carry out the stability analysis of such a revised mathematical model for a parallel-edge network, proving that the revised model supports the global flow-optimizing behavior of the slime mold for a substantially wider class of response functions compared to previous models. Simulations also suggest that the same conclusion may be valid for arbitrary network topologies.Comment: To appear in Journal of Mathematical Biolog

Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games

In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large number of players can each choose one of two possible strategies, and the payoffs are i.i.d. with the possibility of ties. We provide asymptotic results about the random number of pure Nash equilibria, such as fast growth and a central limit theorem, with bounds for the approximation error. Moreover, by using a new link between percolation models and game theory, we describe in detail the geometry of Nash equilibria and show that, when the probability of ties is small, a best-response dynamics reaches a Nash equilibrium with a probability that quickly approaches one as the number of players grows. We show that a multitude of phase transitions depend only on a single parameter of the model, that is, the probability of having ties.Comment: 29 pages, 7 figure

On Nash Dynamics of Matching Market Equilibria

In this paper, we study the Nash dynamics of strategic interplays of n buyers in a matching market setup by a seller, the market maker. Taking the standard market equilibrium approach, upon receiving submitted bid vectors from the buyers, the market maker will decide on a price vector to clear the market in such a way that each buyer is allocated an item for which he desires the most (a.k.a., a market equilibrium solution). While such equilibrium outcomes are not unique, the market maker chooses one (maxeq) that optimizes its own objective --- revenue maximization. The buyers in turn change bids to their best interests in order to obtain higher utilities in the next round's market equilibrium solution. This is an (n+1)-person game where buyers place strategic bids to gain the most from the market maker's equilibrium mechanism. The incentives of buyers in deciding their bids and the market maker's choice of using the maxeq mechanism create a wave of Nash dynamics involved in the market. We characterize Nash equilibria in the dynamics in terms of the relationship between maxeq and mineq (i.e., minimum revenue equilibrium), and develop convergence results for Nash dynamics from the maxeq policy to a mineq solution, resulting an outcome equivalent to the truthful VCG mechanism. Our results imply revenue equivalence between maxeq and mineq, and address the question that why short-term revenue maximization is a poor long run strategy, in a deterministic and dynamic setting