“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life

Is technical efficiency affected by farmers’ preference for mitigation and adaptation actions against climate change? A case study in northwest Mexico

Climate change has adverse effects on agriculture, decreasing crop quality and productivity. This makes it necessary to implement adaptation and mitigation strategies that contribute to the maintenance of technical efficiency (TE). This study analyzed the relationship of TE with farmers’ mitigation and adaptation action preferences, their risk and environmental attitudes, and their perception of climate change. Through the stochastic frontier method, TE levels were estimated for 370 farmers in Northwest Mexico. The results showed the average efficiency levels (57%) for three identified groups of farmers: High TE (15% of farmers), average TE (72%), and low TE (13%). Our results showed a relationship between two of the preferred adaptation actions against climate change estimated using the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) method. The most efficient farmers preferred “change crops,” while less efficient farmers preferred “invest in irrigation infrastructure.” The anthropocentric environmental attitude inferred from the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale was related to the level of TE. Efficient farmers were those with an anthropocentric environmental attitude, compared to less efficient farmers, who exhibited an ecocentric attitude. The climate change issues were more perceived by moderately efficient farmers. These findings set out a roadmap for policy-makers to face climate change at the regional levelPeer ReviewedPostprint (published version

The Challenge of Flexible Intelligence for Models of Human Behavior

Game theoretic predictions about equilibrium behavior depend upon assumptions of inflexibility of belief, of accord between belief and choice, and of choice across situations that share a game-theoretic structure. However, researchers rarely possess any knowledge of the actual beliefs of subjects, and rarely compare how a subject behaves in settings that share game-theoretic structure but that differ in other respects. Our within-subject experiments utilize a belief elicitation mechanism, roughly similar to a prediction market, in a laboratory setting to identify subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’ choices and beliefs. These experiments additionally allow us to compare choices in different settings that have similar game-theoretic structure. We find first, as have others,that subjects’ choices in the Trust and related games are significantly different from the strategies that derive from subgame perfect Nash equilibrium principles. We show that, for individual subjects, there is considerable flexibility of choice and belief across similar tasks and that the relationship between belief and choice is similarly flexible. To improve our ability to predict human behavior, we must take account of the flexible nature of human belief and choice

Theory of mind and decision science: Towards a typology of tasks and computational models

The ability to form a Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e., to theorize about others’ mental states to explain and predict behavior in relation to attributed intentional states, constitutes a hallmark of human cognition. These abilities are multi-faceted and include a variety of different cognitive sub-functions. Here, we focus on decision processes in social contexts and review a number of experimental and computational modeling approaches in this field. We provide an overview of experimental accounts and formal computational models with respect to two dimensions: interactivity and uncertainty. Thereby, we aim at capturing the nuances of ToM functions in the context of social decision processes. We suggest there to be an increase in ToM engagement and multiplexing as social cognitive decision-making tasks become more interactive and uncertain. We propose that representing others as intentional and goal directed agents who perform consequential actions is elicited only at the edges of these two dimensions. Further, we argue that computational models of valuation and beliefs follow these dimensions to best allow researchers to effectively model sophisticated ToM-processes. Finally, we relate this typology to neuroimaging findings in neurotypical (NT) humans, studies of persons with autism spectrum (AS), and studies of nonhuman primates

Small steps for mankind: Modeling the emergence of cumulative culture from joint active inference communication

Although the increase in the use of dynamical modeling in the literature on cultural evolution makes current models more mathematically sophisticated, these models have yet to be tested or validated. This paper provides a testable deep active inference formulation of social behavior and accompanying simulations of cumulative culture in two steps: First, we cast cultural transmission as a bi-directional process of communication that induces a generalized synchrony (operationalized as a particular convergence) between the belief states of interlocutors. Second, we cast social or cultural exchange as a process of active inference by equipping agents with the choice of who to engage in communication with. This induces trade-offs between confirmation of current beliefs and exploration of the social environment. We find that cumulative culture emerges from belief updating (i.e., active inference and learning) in the form of a joint minimization of uncertainty. The emergent cultural equilibria are characterized by a segregation into groups, whose belief systems are actively sustained by selective, uncertainty minimizing, dyadic exchanges. The nature of these equilibria depends sensitively on the precision afforded by various probabilistic mappings in each individual's generative model of their encultured niche