Comparing policy gradient and value function based reinforcement learning methods in simulated electrical power trade

In electrical power engineering, reinforcement learning algorithms can be used to model the strategies of electricity market participants. However, traditional value function based reinforcement learning algorithms suffer from convergence issues when used with value function approximators. Function approximation is required in this domain to capture the characteristics of the complex and continuous multivariate problem space. The contribution of this paper is the comparison of policy gradient reinforcement learning methods, using artificial neural networks for policy function approximation, with traditional value function based methods in simulations of electricity trade. The methods are compared using an AC optimal power flow based power exchange auction market model and a reference electric power system model

A Survey of Agent-Based Modeling Practices (January 1998 to July 2008)

In the 1990s, Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) began gaining popularity and represents a departure from the more classical simulation approaches. This departure, its recent development and its increasing application by non-traditional simulation disciplines indicates the need to continuously assess the current state of ABM and identify opportunities for improvement. To begin to satisfy this need, we surveyed and collected data from 279 articles from 92 unique publication outlets in which the authors had constructed and analyzed an agent-based model. From this large data set we establish the current practice of ABM in terms of year of publication, field of study, simulation software used, purpose of the simulation, acceptable validation criteria, validation techniques and complete description of the simulation. Based on the current practice we discuss six improvements needed to advance ABM as an analysis tool. These improvements include the development of ABM specific tools that are independent of software, the development of ABM as an independent discipline with a common language that extends across domains, the establishment of expectations for ABM that match their intended purposes, the requirement of complete descriptions of the simulation so others can independently replicate the results, the requirement that all models be completely validated and the development and application of statistical and non-statistical validation techniques specifically for ABM.Agent-Based Modeling, Survey, Current Practices, Simulation Validation, Simulation Purpose

Socio-Economic Mechanisms to Coordinate the Internet of Services: The Simulation Environment SimIS

Visions of 21st century information systems show highly specialized digital services and resources, which interact continuously and with a global reach. Especially with the emergence of technologies, such as the semantic web or software agents, intelligent services within these settings can be implemented, automatically communicating and negotiating over the Internet about digital resources without human intervention. Such environments will eventually realize the vision of an open and global Internet of Services (IoS). In this paper we present an agent-based simulation model and toolkit for the IoS: 'SimIS - Simulating an Internet of Services'. Employing SimIS, distributed management mechanisms and protocols can be investigated in a simulated IoS environment before their actual deployment.Multi-Agent Simulation, Internet, Simulation Tools

A Grey-Box Approach to Automated Mechanism Design

Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional game theoretic, analytic approaches and in searching through the large space of possible auction mechanisms. This paper presents an approach to automated mechanism design (AMD) in the domain of double auctions. We describe a novel parametrized space of double auctions, and then introduce an evolutionary search method that searches this space of parameters. The approach evaluates auction mechanisms using the framework of the TAC Market Design Game and relates the performance of the markets in that game to their constituent parts using reinforcement learning. Experiments show that the strongest mechanisms we found using this approach not only win the Market Design Game against known, strong opponents, but also exhibit desirable economic properties when they run in isolation.Comment: 18 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables, and 1 algorithm. Extended abstract to appear in the proceedings of AAMAS'201

An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used in solving real-world optimization problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges. Auctions also provide a very valuable testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in computer-based control systems. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to designing auction mechanisms and trading strategies with more weights on empirical ones, and build the foundation for further research in the field