Police Reforms in Peace Agreements, 1975–2011: Introducing the PRPA dataset

This article presents new data on provisions for police reform in peace agreements (PRPA) between 1975 and 2011. The PRPA dataset complements past research on the determinants and effects of specific terms in agreements with detailed data on police reform provisions. The PRPA dataset also adds a quantitative dimension to the thus far largely qualitative literature on post-conflict security sector reform (SSR). It includes information on six subtypes of police reform: capacity, training, human rights standards, accountability, force composition, and international training and monitoring. We show that there is currently a high global demand for the regulation of police reform through peace agreements: police reform provisions are now more regularly included in agreements than settlement terms that call for power-sharing or elections. We observe interesting variations in the inclusion of police reform provisions in relation to past human rights violations, regime type, or the scope of international peacekeeping prior to negotiations, and illustrate the implications of police reform provisions for the duration of post-conflict peace. Finally, we stimulate ideas on how scholars and policymakers can use the PRPA dataset in future to study new questions on post-conflict police reform

The Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED): a new dataset on the promises and practices of power-sharing in post-conflict countries

Past research on the relationship between power-sharing arrangements and the recurrence of civil conflict has primarily analyzed the promises of power-sharing stipulated in peace agreements. What happens afterwards, however, has not yet been sufficiently explored. This represents a major research gap, as the actual practices of power-sharing in post-conflict countries are likely to be influential in the possibility of civil conflict recurring. To address this shortcoming, we present a new global dataset on the promises and practices of power-sharing between the government of a state and former rebels in post-conflict countries. The collected data captures if, when and how power-sharing institutions have been promised and/or put into place, and whether they have subsequently been modified or abolished. The dataset encompasses every peace agreement signed after the cessation of a civil conflict in the years between 1989 and 2006, and covers a five-year period after the signature of each of these agreements (unless violence recurred earlier). The unit of analysis is the government–rebel dyad during the post-conflict period and data is recorded in an event data format. A first analysis of the Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) reveals that the effects of the promises of power-sharing on civil conflict recurrence follow a different logic than the effects of their practices. This finding emphasizes the necessity for in-depth analyses of post-conflict situations for which the PSED provides the necessary data

NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020

This open access volume surveys the state of the field to examine whether a fifth wave of deterrence theory is emerging. Bringing together insights from world-leading experts from three continents, the volume identifies the most pressing strategic challenges, frames theoretical concepts, and describes new strategies. The use and utility of deterrence in today’s strategic environment is a topic of paramount concern to scholars, strategists and policymakers. Ours is a period of considerable strategic turbulence, which in recent years has featured a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons used in defence postures across different theatres; a dramatic growth in the scale of military cyber capabilities and the frequency with which these are used; and rapid technological progress including the proliferation of long-range strike and unmanned systems. These military-strategic developments occur in a polarized international system, where cooperation between leading powers on arms control regimes is breaking down, states widely make use of hybrid conflict strategies, and the number of internationalized intrastate proxy conflicts has quintupled over the past two decades. Contemporary conflict actors exploit a wider gamut of coercive instruments, which they apply across a wider range of domains. The prevalence of multi-domain coercion across but also beyond traditional dimensions of armed conflict raises an important question: what does effective deterrence look like in the 21st century? Answering that question requires a re-appraisal of key theoretical concepts and dominant strategies of Western and non-Western actors in order to assess how they hold up in today’s world. Air Commodore Professor Dr. Frans Osinga is the Chair of the War Studies Department of the Netherlands Defence Academy and the Special Chair in War Studies at the University Leiden. Dr. Tim Sweijs is the Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a Research Fellow at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda

LONG-RUN ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM PLANNING ENHANCEMENTS TO ADDRESS THE INEFFICIENCIES OF REACTIVE, CONFLICT-IGNORANT, DETERMINISTIC PLANNING

The 21st century energy challenges of climate change and energy access call for enhancements in power system planning models. This thesis studies three enhancements that make planning models proactive, conflict-aware, and aware of exogenous uncertainties and estimates potential benefits for case studies from developed and developing countries. Chapter 1 starts with a brief history of power system planning and introduces the challenges that renewable energy poses on transmission planning; conflict risk on electrification efforts; and climate change uncertainty on deterministic planning models. Chapter 2 compares traditional transmission planning practices — which invest in transmission to deliver energy from an assumed generation build-out — to a proactive transmission planning paradigm — which accounts for generators’ response to transmission additions. It estimates the costs proactive planning could save for a stakeholder-agreed representation of the Eastern Interconnection. Chapter 3 proposes a conflict-aware power system planning framework. The framework considers civil conflict’s multiple effects on power systems as well as uncertainty on how conflict will evolve. The results for a case study of South Sudan demonstrate how status-quo power system planning models underestimate the costs and unserved energy of conventional strategies due to omission of conflict. The results also show how a conflict-aware framework differentiates investment plans based on the conflict trajectory and finds postponement and diversification of investments worthwhile under specific circumstances. Chapter 4 compares Robust Decision Making (RDM) to Stochastic Programming (SP) across three criteria: practical applicability, modeling capability, and contribution to decision making. Both methods can handle climate change and other exogenous uncertainties in power system planning. Results indicate that while both methods can model the uncertainties that power system planning in Bangladesh faces, SP is more practical whereas RDM provides more information to decision-makers. Using practical case studies, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 extend and assess enhancements to power system planning models that, in theory, improve their fidelity and usefulness. The results shed light on omissions and resulting unintended biases that status-quo models have. Chapter 5 concludes this thesis by discussing extensions of the three enhancements and additional enhancements analysts must implement to address the 21st century energy challenges

Rationalizing Chinese hegemony

Doctor of PhilosophySecurity Studies Interdepartmental ProgramDavid GraffThis dissertation examines the Chinese style of imperialism in the early 21st century through China’s self-justifying rationalization and strategic thought. It develops a theory called Cultural Subjectivism to explore the PRC’s preferred world order. Specifically, it analyzes the characteristics of Chinese subjectivity and how Beijing shapes the roles of the self and others through the othering and altercating processes in order to justify the country’s overseas expansion. The international order that Beijing espouses reflects a realistic assessment of world politics. This realpolitik, however, is denied in the narratives for public consumption. Several idealistic principles that China claims are guiding its foreign policy (and devoid of strategic calculations) create a false impression that Beijing is an altruistic actor occupying the moral high ground. Anchoring Chinese behavior to the inherent benevolence of the PRC underpins an unfalsifiable self-justifying logic that, regardless of shifts in policies, Beijing’s behavior is always defensive, peaceful, non-expansionist and non-hegemonic. In accord with Beijing’s assessments of the post-Cold War peace, its narratives have grown more inclusive in that the opposing roles (the othering) between the self and others becomes less salient while the role congruence (the altercasting) that indicates shared interests gets more prevalent. This is tailored to meet China’s strategic needs of the attainment of material strength and international status in the era of post-Cold War globalization through engagement with countries around the world. Paralleling the increasing usage of inclusive rhetoric to rationalize Beijing’s overseas expansion is the growing discursive assertiveness of a China-espoused world order in which Chinese institutions and Chinese culture are said, due to their innate benevolence compared to hegemonic capitalism, to bring the world peace and prosperity. After all, the inclusive narratives and the role (re)construction spin around the concept of Chinese socialism, an embodiment of the PRC’s self-centeredness, and how it is good for both domestic development and international community. Beijing’s role construction operates within a quasi-world-like “Asia Pacific” that includes the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Eurasian continent. Within this expansive geographical scope, China adopts the grand strategy of “winning without fighting” which consists of the strategies of “cooperation” and limited provocations. The purpose is to amass resources through the land to cope with the challenges from the sea. As the strategic logic of winning without fighting dictates, the PRC intends to achieve its political goals during peacetime while, through disarming enemies and strengthening itself in its overseas expansion, preparing for a possible future war if non-war solutions prove impossible for obtaining its goals. Accordingly, “active defense” needs to be understood as a strategic guideline that directs the generation of resources and abilities for both non-war and war solutions. From a Chinese perspective, regardless of the means adopted, China’s behavior is always defensive and for the sake of peace wherever the activities occur. This unfalsifiable rationalization that relies on the benevolent nature of the self, rather than an admission of realistic calculations, to explain its own behavior functions on a global level and characterizes active defense. From the perspective of discursive rationalization, China exhibits the height of imperialism. Compared to Japan and the US, Beijing shows an unprecedented degree and scale in claiming itself moral in that it is altruistic and inclusive, while firmly believing in its own claims. It is the gulf between complicated realities and the extent of the PRC’s willingness to systematically deny such or cover up what happens on the ground and a lower degree of transparency in its strategic calculations for self-interests that make Chinese imperialism different from others

Security Elites in Egypt and Jordan after the Arab Spring : A Case Study on Securocracies’ Role on National Security, Domestic Power Politics, Regional Order and Middle Eastern Alliance Making between 2011 and 2021

The doctoral dissertation studied changes in the balance of power, alliance making and the hegemonic struggles of security elites within a Middle Eastern regional context over a ten year reference period between 2011 and 2021. The study focused on two case study countries: Egypt and Jordan. The results were compared within a historical context to the pre-Arab Spring era. The theoretical approach combined the English School of Thought and Middle Eastern Studies with a conceptual model of securocracy developed by the author. The primary contribution of the research is the realization of the core importance of securocracy within autocratic state systems. Inside securocracies there exists rivalling groups and organisations that counterbalance each other. The study points to the fact that the power struggle between executive powers – either purely domestic one or supported by foreign involvement, is the main driver behind why case study countries were in varying degrees dragged into instability and turmoil in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Securocracies can be divided into two main types: centralised and decentralised. The centralised model occurs when different elites groups have the same ”distance” to the ruler while having equal privileges and equal access to political power. The model predicts durability and stability of the regime (status quo). In the de-centralised model, there is an ongoing struggle amongst elite groups and “distances” to ruler are not equal, neither are the privileges. In Egypt the hegemonic struggle amongst elites took precedence over the interests and stability of the state after the Arab Spring and has continued since then. The situation at the end of 2021 is a de-centralised model where all executive powers are concentrated within President al-Sisi’s family dynasty (palace) and the leadership of military intelligence. This de-centralised type of securocracy makes Egypt’s situation fragile. Any impact from the outside, such as the Biden administration’s decision to impose additional conditions on U.S. financial military aid, could lead to a new hegemonic struggle challenging al-Sisi’s power. The securocracy’s survival strategy found in the study was the use of vertical power at all levels of the state hierarchy (” the winner takes it all”). In the situation of a power struggle, the ruler uses omni-balancing i.e., alliance making with powerful foreign states in order to gain an advantage against domestic rivals and revisionist regional states. The Egyptian example is al-Sisi’s rapprochement with Russia’s President Putin and his distancing of Egypt from its previous role of being the United States’ loyal Middle Eastern ally. The Jordanian example however, is the opposite, resulting in even closer relations with the United States since January 2021 when the two countries signed an updated Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The study also highlights that decisions concerning ruler succession in authoritarian states take place behind-the-scenes amongst the securocracy as it, per rule, prefers to choose a member inside its own interest group or alternatively a political figurehead that commits to protect securocracy’s privileged interests in exchange of their own power position. Within the Middle East, the recent U.S. pivot to Asia-Pacific created an opportunity for Russia to make a come-back. Russia, however, does not have the resources to compensate for the loss of U.S. financial military aid to the security elites. This in turn, and with Russia’s consent, has given space for regional state actors, particularly, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi-Arabia, to increase their influence. Gulf support to the regional clients is not free of charge: they request their clients adopt their own threat perceptions, take sides in armed conflicts and contribute to military capabilities which support the sponsors’ regional foreign and security policy goals.Väitöstutkimuksessa tarkasteltiin kymmenen vuoden ajanjaksolla voimatasapainon muutosta Lähi-idän alueellisessa valtarakenteessa, liittolaissuhteiden muutoksia sekä turvallisuuseliittien roolia maan sisäisessä valtataistelussa. Tuloksia verrattiin historiallisessa kontekstissa arabikevättä edeltävään aikaan kahdessa tapaustutkimusmaassa: Egyptissä ja Jordaniassa. Teoriaviitekehyksenä sovellettiin Englantilaisen koulukunnan ja Lähi-idän tutkimuksen teoriamalleja, sekä tutkijan kehittelemää sekurokratian konseptuaalista mallia. Tutkimuksen keskeinen tulos on havainto sekurokratian merkittävästä roolista osana autoritaarista valtiomallia. Sekurokratian sisälle on luotu useita toinen toistaan tasapainottavia ryhmittymiä. Tapaustutkimusmaiden arabikevään jälkeisen turvallisuustilanteen muutoksia selittävien tekijöiden joukossa turvallisuuseliittien valtakamppailu nousi merkittävään rooliin. Valtakamppailua käytiin eliittien kesken joko pelkästään maan sisällä tai vaihtoehtoisesti osin myös valtion ulkopuolisten voimien tukemana. Tutkimuksen perusteella sekurokratiat voidaan jakaa kahteen päätyyppiin: keskitettyyn ja hajautettuun malliin. Jos eri turvallisuuseliitti-ryhmien edut, vallankäyttö ja etäisyys vallan keskipisteeseen ovat tasapainossa puhutaan keskitetyn sekurokratian mallista, mikä ennustaa vallassa olevan regiimin pysyvyyttä ja vakautta. Jos taas sekurokratian rakenne on hajautetun mallin mukainen, sen valtakamppailu voi johtaa yhden osan pyrkimyksiin hegemonia-asemasta. Egyptin tapauksessa arabikevään jälkeinen turvallisuuseliittien valtakamppailu asetettiin maan vakauden edelle ja eliittien valtakamppailu on jatkunut tähän päivään. Tilanteessa vuoden 2021 lopussa valta on al-Sisin perhedynastialla ja sotilastiedustelun eliitillä (hajautettu malli). Hajautettu malli ei ennusta pitkäaikaista vallassa pysymistä; vahva ulkopuolinen heräte, esimerkiksi Bidenin hallinnon sotilaallisen talousavun lopettaminen voisi johtaa uuteen valtakamppailuun ja al-Sisin valta-aseman haastamiseen. Tutkimustulokset osoittavat, että sekurokratoiden selviytymisstrategiana on vallanvertikaalin käyttö valtiohallinnon eri tasoilla. Valtakamppailun tilanteessa käytetään tasapainotusstrategiaa (omni-balancing), missä alueellisia vahvoja valtioita ja suurvaltoja pyritään yhdistämään hallitsijan puolelle kilpailevia eliittiryhmittymiä tai revisionistisia ulkovaltoja vastaan. Egyptissä presidentti al-Sisin valtaannousu johti maan lähentymiseen presidentti Putinin Venäjän kanssa sekä etääntymiseen aiemmasta Yhdysvalloille uskollisen Lähi-idän liittolaisen roolista. Jordaniassa puolestaan maa on nyt entistä tiiviimmin liittoutunut Yhdysvaltojen kanssa. Esimerkkinä tästä on tammikuussa 2021 maiden kesken solmittu sotilasyhteistyötä ja jordanialaisten tukikohtien käyttöä säätelevä isäntämaatuki-sopimus. Tutkimustulosten valossa autoritaariselle vallanperimykselle tyypillistä on se, että julkisuuteen näkymättömän sisäisen valtakamppailun jälkeen uudeksi valtionpäämieheksi pyritään nostamaan sekurokratian sisältä sen oman intressiryhmän edustaja, tai vaihtoehtoisesti sekurokratian valitsema ulkopuolinen poliitikko, jonka vastuulle korporaation intressien vaaliminen lankeaa vastapalveluksena sekurokratian tuesta keulakuva-poliitikon vallassa pitämiseksi. Alueellisen turvallisuusjärjestyksen osalta tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat sen, että Yhdysvaltojen painopisteen siirto Tyynellemerelle vii ja Aasiaan on antanut Venäjälle mahdollisuuden palauttaa vaikutusvaltaansa Lähiitään. Venäjällä ei kuitenkaan ole resursseja kompensoida Yhdysvaltojen arabivaltioiden turvallisuuseliiteille allokoimaa taloudellista tukea. Tämä on antanut tilaa alueellisten toimijoiden kuten Yhdistyneiden arabiemiirikuntien ja Saudi-Arabian vaikutusvallan kasvattamiselle - tosin Venäjän hyväksynnällä. Tuki ei myöskään tule ilmaiseksi, sillä sponsorit edellyttävät, että niille alisteisessa asemassa olevat maat omaksuvat tukijavaltioidensa uhkakuvat, sekä konfliktitilanteissa kontribuoivat sotilaallisia kyvykkyyksiä näiden valtioiden ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittisten päämäärien saavuttamiseksi