205 research outputs found
Improved OR-Composition of Sigma-Protocols
In [CDS94] Cramer, Damg̊ard and Schoenmakers (CDS) devise an OR-composition technique for Σ-protocols that allows to construct highly-efficient proofs for compound statements. Since then, such technique has found countless applications as building block for designing efficient protocols. Unfortunately, the CDS OR-composition technique works only if both statements are fixed before the proof starts. This limitation restricts its usability in those protocols where the theorems to be proved are defined at different stages of the protocol, but, in order to save rounds of communication, the proof must start even if not all theorems are available. Many round-optimal protocols ([KO04, DPV04, YZ07, SV12]) crucially need such property to achieve round-optimality, and, due to the inapplicability of CDS’s technique, are currently implemented using proof systems that requires expensive NP reductions, but that allow the proof to start even if no statement is defined (a.k.a., LS proofs from Lapidot-Shamir [LS90]). In this paper we show an improved OR-composition technique for Σ-protocols, that requires only one statement to be fixed when the proof starts, while the other statement can be define
Compact E-Cash and Simulatable VRFs Revisited
Abstract. Efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are a powerful tool for solving many cryptographic problems. We apply the recent Groth-Sahai (GS) proof system for pairing product equations (Eurocrypt 2008) to two related cryptographic problems: compact e-cash (Eurocrypt 2005) and simulatable verifiable random functions (CRYPTO 2007). We present the first efficient compact e-cash scheme that does not rely on a random oracle. To this end we construct efficient GS proofs for signature possession, pseudo randomness and set membership. The GS proofs for pseudorandom functions give rise to a much cleaner and substantially faster construction of simulatable verifiable random functions (sVRF) under a weaker number theoretic assumption. We obtain the first efficient fully simulatable sVRF with a polynomial sized output domain (in the security parameter).
A Framework for Efficient Adaptively Secure Composable Oblivious Transfer in the ROM
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a fundamental cryptographic protocol that finds a
number of applications, in particular, as an essential building block for
two-party and multi-party computation. We construct a round-optimal (2 rounds)
universally composable (UC) protocol for oblivious transfer secure against
active adaptive adversaries from any OW-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme
with certain properties in the random oracle model (ROM). In terms of
computation, our protocol only requires the generation of a public/secret-key
pair, two encryption operations and one decryption operation, apart from a few
calls to the random oracle. In~terms of communication, our protocol only
requires the transfer of one public-key, two ciphertexts, and three binary
strings of roughly the same size as the message. Next, we show how to
instantiate our construction under the low noise LPN, McEliece, QC-MDPC, LWE,
and CDH assumptions. Our instantiations based on the low noise LPN, McEliece,
and QC-MDPC assumptions are the first UC-secure OT protocols based on coding
assumptions to achieve: 1) adaptive security, 2) optimal round complexity, 3)
low communication and computational complexities. Previous results in this
setting only achieved static security and used costly cut-and-choose
techniques.Our instantiation based on CDH achieves adaptive security at the
small cost of communicating only two more group elements as compared to the
gap-DH based Simplest OT protocol of Chou and Orlandi (Latincrypt 15), which
only achieves static security in the ROM
Post-Quantum Simulatable Extraction with Minimal Assumptions: Black-Box and Constant-Round
From the minimal assumption of post-quantum semi-honest oblivious transfers, we build the first -simulatable two-party computation (2PC) against quantum polynomial-time (QPT) adversaries that is both constant-round and black-box (for both the construction and security reduction). A recent work by Chia, Chung, Liu, and Yamakawa (FOCS\u2721) shows that post-quantum 2PC with standard simulation-based security is impossible in constant rounds, unless either or relying on non-black-box simulation. The -simulatability we target is a relaxation of the standard simulation-based security that allows for an arbitrarily small noticeable simulation error . Moreover, when quantum communication is allowed, we can further weaken the assumption to post-quantum secure one-way functions (PQ-OWFs), while maintaining the constant-round and black-box property.
Our techniques also yield the following set of constant-round and black-box two-party protocols secure against QPT adversaries, only assuming black-box access to PQ-OWFs:
- extractable commitments for which the extractor is also an -simulator;
- -zero-knowledge commit-and-prove whose commit stage is extractable with -simulation;
- -simulatable coin-flipping;
- -zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge for for which the knowledge extractor is also an -simulator;
- -zero-knowledge arguments for .
At the heart of the above results is a black-box extraction lemma showing how to efficiently extract secrets from QPT adversaries while disturbing their quantum state in a controllable manner, i.e., achieving -simulatability of the post-extraction state of the adversary
Concurrent Knowledge-Extraction in the Public-Key Model
Knowledge extraction is a fundamental notion, modelling machine possession of
values (witnesses) in a computational complexity sense. The notion provides an
essential tool for cryptographic protocol design and analysis, enabling one to
argue about the internal state of protocol players without ever looking at this
supposedly secret state. However, when transactions are concurrent (e.g., over
the Internet) with players possessing public-keys (as is common in
cryptography), assuring that entities ``know'' what they claim to know, where
adversaries may be well coordinated across different transactions, turns out to
be much more subtle and in need of re-examination. Here, we investigate how to
formally treat knowledge possession by parties (with registered public-keys)
interacting over the Internet. Stated more technically, we look into the
relative power of the notion of ``concurrent knowledge-extraction'' (CKE) in
the concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK) bare public-key (BPK) model.Comment: 38 pages, 4 figure
A New Approach to Post-Quantum Non-Malleability
We provide the first - construction of
post-quantum non-malleable commitments under the minimal assumption that
- -
exist. We achieve the standard notion of non-malleability
with respect to commitments. Prior constructions required
rounds under the same assumption.
We achieve our results through a new technique for constant-round
non-malleable commitments which is easier to use in the post-quantum setting.
The technique also yields an almost elementary proof of security for
constant-round non-malleable commitments in the classical setting, which may be
of independent interest.
When combined with existing work, our results yield the first constant-round
quantum-secure multiparty computation for both classical and quantum
functionalities ,
under the hardness of quantum fully-homomorphic
encryption and quantum learning with errors
Adaptive and Concurrent Secure Computation from New Notions of Non-Malleability
We present a unified framework for obtaining general secure computation that achieves adaptive- Universally Composable (UC)-security. Our framework captures essentially all previous results on adaptive concurrent secure computation, both in relaxed models (e.g., quasi-polynomial time simulation), as well as trusted setup models (e.g., the CRS model, the imperfect CRS model). This provides conceptual simplicity and insight into what is required for adaptive and concurrent security, as well as yielding improvements to set-up assumptions and/or computational assumptions. Moreover, using our framework we provide first constructions of concurrent secure computation protocols that are adaptively secure in the timing model, and in the non-uniform simulation model.
Conceptually, our framework can be viewed as an adaptive analogue to the recent work of Lin, Pass and Venkitasubramaniam [STOC `09], who considered only non-adaptive adversaries. Their main insight was that stand-alone non-malleability was sufficient for UC-security. A main conceptual contribution of this work is, quite surprisingly, that it is indeed the case even when considering adaptive security.
A key element in our construction is a commitment scheme that satisfies a new notion of non-malleability. The notion of concurrent equivocal non-malleable commitments, intuitively, guarantees that even when a man-in-the-middle adversary observes concurrent equivocal commitments and decommitments, the binding property of the commitments continues to hold for commitments made by the adversary. This notion is stronger than standard notions of concurrent non-malleable commitments which either consider only specific commits (e.g., statistically-binding) or specific scenarios (e.g., the commitment phase and the decommitment phase are executed in a non-overlapping manner). Previously, commitments that satisfy our definition, have been constructed in setup models, but either require existence of stronger encryption schemes such as CCA-secure encryption or require independent ``trapdoors\u27\u27 provided by the setup for every pair of parties to ensure non-malleability. We here provide a construction that eliminates these requirements and require only a single trapdoor
Multisignatures secure under the discrete logarithm assumption and a generalized forking lemma
Multisignatures allow n signers to produce a short joint signature on a single message. Multisignatures were achieved in the plain model with a non-interactive protocol in groups with bilinear maps, by Boneh et al [4], and by a three-round protocol under the Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption, by Bellare and Neven [3], with mul-tisignature verification cost of, respectively, O(n) pairings or ex-ponentiations. In addition, multisignatures with O(1) verification were shown in so-called Key Verification (KV) model, where each public key is accompanied by a short proof of well-formedness, again either with a non-interactive protocol using bilinear maps, by Ristenpart and Yilek [15], or with a three-round protocol under the Diffie-Hellman assumption, by Bagherzandi and Jarecki [1]. We improve on these results in two ways: First, we show a two-round O(n)-verification multisignature secure under the DL as
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