65,129 research outputs found
On the inverse power index problem
Weighted voting games are frequently used in decision making. Each voter has
a weight and a proposal is accepted if the weight sum of the supporting voters
exceeds a quota. One line of research is the efficient computation of so-called
power indices measuring the influence of a voter. We treat the inverse problem:
Given an influence vector and a power index, determine a weighted voting game
such that the distribution of influence among the voters is as close as
possible to the given target value. We present exact algorithms and
computational results for the Shapley-Shubik and the (normalized) Banzhaf power
index.Comment: 17 pages, 2 figures, 12 table
Three Puzzles on Mathematics, Computation, and Games
In this lecture I will talk about three mathematical puzzles involving
mathematics and computation that have preoccupied me over the years. The first
puzzle is to understand the amazing success of the simplex algorithm for linear
programming. The second puzzle is about errors made when votes are counted
during elections. The third puzzle is: are quantum computers possible?Comment: ICM 2018 plenary lecture, Rio de Janeiro, 36 pages, 7 Figure
Obama’s election campaign and the integrated use of social\ud media
When Barack Obama won the 2008 US Presidential election he\ud
did so partly as a result of harnessing the power of social media to\ud
communicate with, and enlist the support of, millions of Americans who\ud
had never previously been active in the processes of an election campaign.\ud
As a result of Obama‘s invitation and his use of new media, some of the\ud
poorest members of the world‘s wealthiest nation found themselves able\ud
to make a critical contribution through a myriad of small activities starting\ud
from seemingly inconsequential choices such as the selection of a mobile\ud
phone ring tone. Although ‗people power‘ is not a new force in politics,\ud
the Obama campaign set a fresh benchmark for inclusive ways in which to\ud
communicate to and with a holistic cross section of the American people,\ud
including many who would not have been previously seen as a critical\ud
‗target market‘. This paper examines Obama‘s use of integrated\ud
communications and considers the potential implications for other\ud
campaigns which may have an inclusion agenda
Heuristics in Multi-Winner Approval Voting
In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting.
Moreover, scenarios such as committee or board elections require voting rules
that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent
may vote for as many candidates as they wish. Winners are chosen by tallying up
the votes and choosing the top- candidates receiving the most votes. An
agent may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way
that does not reflect their true preferences. In complex and uncertain
situations, agents may use heuristics to strategize, instead of incurring the
additional effort required to compute the manipulation which most favors them.
In this paper, we examine voting behavior in multi-winner approval voting
scenarios with complete information. We show that people generally manipulate
their vote to obtain a better outcome, but often do not identify the optimal
manipulation. Instead, voters tend to prioritize the candidates with the
highest utilities. Using simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of these
heuristics in situations where agents only have access to partial information
New Strategies for Latino Voter Mobilization: The Nevada Democratic Caucus as a Case Study
Describes the 2008 Democratic caucus in Nevada with a focus on the large Hispanic/Latino population. Reviews earlier efforts to raise historically low voter participation rates and the role of the media and suggests new models for voter mobilization
The men who weren't even there: Legislative voting with absentees
Voting power in voting situations is measured by the probability of changing decisions by altering the cast 'yes' or 'no' votes. Recently this analysis has been extended by strategic abstention. Abstention, just as 'yes' or 'no' votes can change decisions. This theory is often applied to weighted voting situations, where voters can cast multiple votes. Measuring the power of a party in a national assembly seems to fit this model, but in fact its power comprises of votes of individual representatives each having a single vote. These representatives may vote yes or no, or may abstain, but in some cases they are not even there to vote. We look at absentees not due to a conscious decision, but due to illness, for instance. Formally voters will be absent, say, ill, with a certain probability and only present otherwise. As in general not all voters will be present, a thin majority may quickly melt away making a coalition that is winning in theory a losing one in practice. A simple model allows us to differentiate between winning and more winning and losing and less losing coalitions reected by a voting game that is not any more simple. We use data from Scotland, Hungary and a number of other countries both to illustrate the relation of theoretical and effective power and show our results working in the practice.a priori voting power; power index; being absent from voting; minority; Shapley-Shubik index; Shapley value
Are Condorcet and minimax voting systems the best?
For decades, the minimax voting system was well known to experts on voting
systems, but was not widely considered to be one of the best systems. But in
recent years, two important experts, Nicolaus Tideman and Andrew Myers, have
both recognized minimax as one of the best systems. I agree with that. This
paper presents my own reasons for preferring minimax. The paper explicitly
discusses about 20 systems, though over 50 are known to exist.Comment: 41 pages, no figures. The Introduction has been changed. Also fixed
some version 6 errors in referencing subsection numbers in section
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