5,266 research outputs found

    Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximization

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    We consider (approximate) revenue maximization in auctions where the distribution on input valuations is given via "black box" access to samples from the distribution. We observe that the number of samples required -- the sample complexity -- is tightly related to the representation complexity of an approximately revenue-maximizing auction. Our main results are upper bounds and an exponential lower bound on these complexities

    A General Theory of Sample Complexity for Multi-Item Profit Maximization

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    The design of profit-maximizing multi-item mechanisms is a notoriously challenging problem with tremendous real-world impact. The mechanism designer's goal is to field a mechanism with high expected profit on the distribution over buyers' values. Unfortunately, if the set of mechanisms he optimizes over is complex, a mechanism may have high empirical profit over a small set of samples but low expected profit. This raises the question, how many samples are sufficient to ensure that the empirically optimal mechanism is nearly optimal in expectation? We uncover structure shared by a myriad of pricing, auction, and lottery mechanisms that allows us to prove strong sample complexity bounds: for any set of buyers' values, profit is a piecewise linear function of the mechanism's parameters. We prove new bounds for mechanism classes not yet studied in the sample-based mechanism design literature and match or improve over the best known guarantees for many classes. The profit functions we study are significantly different from well-understood functions in machine learning, so our analysis requires a sharp understanding of the interplay between mechanism parameters and buyer values. We strengthen our main results with data-dependent bounds when the distribution over buyers' values is "well-behaved." Finally, we investigate a fundamental tradeoff in sample-based mechanism design: complex mechanisms often have higher profit than simple mechanisms, but more samples are required to ensure that empirical and expected profit are close. We provide techniques for optimizing this tradeoff

    Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms

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    Motivated by the growing prominence of third-party data providers in online marketplaces, this paper studies the impact of the presence of third-party data providers on mechanism design. When no data provider is present, it has been shown that simple mechanisms are "good enough" -- they can achieve a constant fraction of the revenue of optimal mechanisms. The results in this paper demonstrate that this is no longer true in the presence of a third-party data provider who can provide the bidder with a signal that is correlated with the item type. Specifically, even with a single seller, a single bidder, and a single item of uncertain type for sale, the strategies of pricing each item-type separately (the analog of item pricing for multi-item auctions) and bundling all item-types under a single price (the analog of grand bundling) can both simultaneously be a logarithmic factor worse than the optimal revenue. Further, in the presence of a data provider, item-type partitioning mechanisms---a more general class of mechanisms which divide item-types into disjoint groups and offer prices for each group---still cannot achieve within a loglog\log \log factor of the optimal revenue. Thus, our results highlight that the presence of a data-provider forces the use of more complicated mechanisms in order to achieve a constant fraction of the optimal revenue
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