20 research outputs found
Simple Amortized Proofs of Shortness for Linear Relations over Polynomial Rings
For a public value and a linear function , giving a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a secret value that satisfies is a key ingredient in many cryptographic protocols. Lattice-based constructions, in addition, require proofs of ``shortness\u27\u27 of . Of particular interest are constructions where is a function over polynomial rings, since these are the ones that result in efficient schemes with short keys and outputs.
All known approaches for such lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs are not very practical because they involve a basic protocol that needs to be repeated many times in order to achieve negligible soundness error. In the amortized setting, where one needs to give zero-knowledge proofs for many equations for the same function , the situation is more promising, though still not yet fully satisfactory. Current techniques either result in proofs of knowledge of \u27s that are exponentially larger than the \u27s actually used for the proof (i.e. the \emph{slack} is exponential), or they have polynomial slack but require the number of proofs to be in the several thousands before the amortization advantages ``kick in\u27\u27.
In this work, we give a new approach for constructing amortized zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of short solutions over polynomial rings. Our proof has small polynomial slack and is practical even when the number of relations is as small as the security parameter
Lattice-Based proof of a shuffle
In this paper we present the first fully post-quantum proof of a shuffle for RLWE encryption schemes. Shuffles are commonly used to construct mixing networks (mix-nets), a key element to ensure anonymity in many applications such as electronic voting systems. They should preserve anonymity even against an attack using quantum computers in order to guarantee long-term privacy. The proof presented in this paper is built over RLWE commitments which are perfectly binding and computationally hiding under the RLWE assumption, thus achieving security in a post-quantum scenario. Furthermore we provide a new definition for a secure mixing node (mix-node) and prove that our construction satisfies this definition.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
Improved Lattice-Based Mix-Nets for Electronic Voting
Mix-networks were first proposed by Chaum in the late 1970s -- early 1980s as a general tool for building anonymous communication systems. Classical mix-net implementations rely on standard public key primitives (e.g. ElGamal encryption) that will become vulnerable when a sufficiently powerful quantum computer will be built. Thus, there is a need to develop quantum-resistant mix-nets. This paper focuses on the application case of electronic voting where the number of votes to be mixed may reach hundreds of thousands or even millions. We propose an improved architecture for lattice-based post-quantum mix-nets featuring more efficient zero-knowledge proofs while maintaining established security assumptions. Our current implementation scales up to 100000 votes, still leaving a lot of room for future optimisation
Practical Sublinear Proofs for R1CS from Lattices
We propose a practical sublinear-size zero-knowledge proof system for Rank-1 Constraint Satisfaction (R1CS) based on lattices. The proof size scales asymptotically with the square root of the witness size. Concretely, the size becomes - times smaller than Ligero (ACM CCS 2017), which also exhibits square root scaling, for large instances of R1CS. At the core lies an interactive variant of the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma that might be of independent interest
Lattice-based proof of a shuffle
In this paper we present the first fully post-quantum proof of a shuffle for RLWE encryption schemes. Shuffles are commonly used to construct mixing networks (mix-nets), a key element to ensure anonymity in many applications such as electronic voting systems. They should preserve anonymity even against an attack using quantum computers in order to guarantee long-term privacy. The proof presented in this paper is built over RLWE commitments which are perfectly binding and computationally hiding under the RLWE assumption, thus achieving security in a post-quantum scenario. Furthermore we provide a new definition for a secure mixing node (mix-node) and prove that our construction satisfies this definition
Practical product proofs for lattice commitments
We construct a practical lattice-based zero-knowledge argument for proving multiplicative relations between committed values. The underlying commitment scheme that we use is the currently most efficient one of Baum et al. (SCN 2018), and the size of our multiplicative proof (9Â KB) is only slightly larger than the 7Â KB required for just proving knowledge of the committed values. We additionally expand on the work of Lyubashevsky and Seiler (Eurocrypt 2018) by showing that the above-mentioned result can also apply when working over rings Zq[X]/(Xd+1) where Xd+1 splits into low-degree factors, which is a desirable property for many applications (e.g. range proofs, multiplications over
PELTA -- Shielding Multiparty-FHE against Malicious Adversaries
Multiparty fully homomorphic encryption (MFHE) schemes enable multiple parties to efficiently compute functions on their sensitive data while retaining confidentiality. However, existing MFHE schemes guarantee data confidentiality and the correctness of the computation result only against honest-but-curious adversaries. In this work, we provide the first practical construction that enables the verification of MFHE operations in zero-knowledge, protecting MFHE from malicious adversaries. Our solution relies on a combination of lattice-based commitment schemes and proof systems which we adapt to support both modern FHE schemes and their implementation optimizations. We implement our construction in PELTA. Our experimental evaluation shows that PELTA is one to two orders of magnitude faster than existing techniques in the literature
Shorter Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs via One-Time Commitments
There has been a lot of recent progress in constructing efficient zero-knowledge proofs for showing knowledge of an with small coefficients satisfying . For typical parameters, the proof sizes have gone down from several megabytes to a bit under KB (Esgin et al., Asiacrypt 2020). These are now within an order of magnitude of the sizes of lattice-based signatures, which themselves constitute proof systems which demonstrate knowledge of something weaker than the aforementioned equation. One can therefore see that this line of research is approaching optimality. In this paper, we modify a key component of these proofs, as well as apply several other tweaks, to achieve a further reduction of around in the proof output size. We also show that this savings propagates itself when these proofs are used in a general framework to construct more complex protocols
Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Applications: Shorter, Simpler, and More General
We present a much-improved practical protocol, based on the hardness of Module-SIS and Module-LWE problems, for proving knowledge of a short vector satisfying . The currently most-efficient technique for constructing such a proof works by showing that the norm of is small. It creates a commitment to a polynomial vector whose CRT coefficients are the coefficients of and then shows that (1) and (2) in the case that we want to prove that the norm is at most , the polynomial product equals to . While these schemes are already quite good for practical applications, the requirement of using the CRT embedding and only being naturally adapted to proving the -norm, somewhat hinders the efficiency of this approach.
In this work, we show that there is a more direct and more efficient way to prove that the coefficients of have a small norm which does not require an equivocation with the norm, nor any conversion to the CRT representation. We observe that the inner product between two vectors and can be made to appear as a coefficient of a product (or sum of products) between polynomials which are functions of and . Thus, by using a polynomial product proof system and hiding all but one coefficient, we are able to prove knowledge of the inner product of two vectors modulo . Using a cheap, approximate range proof, one can then lift the proof to be over instead of . Our protocols for proving short norms work over all (interesting) polynomial rings, but are particularly efficient for rings like in which the function relating the inner product of vectors and polynomial products happens to be a ``nice\u27\u27 automorphism.
The new proof system can be plugged into constructions of various lattice-based privacy primitives in a black-box manner. As examples, we instantiate a verifiable encryption scheme and a group signature scheme which are more than twice as compact as the previously best solutions