The Logic of the Method of Agent-Based Simulation in the Social Sciences: Empirical and Intentional Adequacy of Computer Programs

The classical theory of computation does not represent an adequate model of reality for simulation in the social sciences. The aim of this paper is to construct a methodological perspective that is able to conciliate the formal and empirical logic of program verification in computer science, with the interpretative and multiparadigmatic logic of the social sciences. We attempt to evaluate whether social simulation implies an additional perspective about the way one can understand the concepts of program and computation. We demonstrate that the logic of social simulation implies at least two distinct types of program verifications that reflect an epistemological distinction in the kind of knowledge one can have about programs. Computer programs seem to possess a causal capability (Fetzer, 1999) and an intentional capability that scientific theories seem not to possess. This distinction is associated with two types of program verification, which we call empirical and intentional verification. We demonstrate, by this means, that computational phenomena are also intentional phenomena, and that such is particularly manifest in agent-based social simulation. Ascertaining the credibility of results in social simulation requires a focus on the identification of a new category of knowledge we can have about computer programs. This knowledge should be considered an outcome of an experimental exercise, albeit not empirical, acquired within a context of limited consensus. The perspective of intentional computation seems to be the only one possible to reflect the multiparadigmatic character of social science in terms of agent-based computational social science. We contribute, additionally, to the clarification of several questions that are found in the methodological perspectives of the discipline, such as the computational nature, the logic of program scalability, and the multiparadigmatic character of agent-based simulation in the social sciences.Computer and Social Sciences, Agent-Based Simulation, Intentional Computation, Program Verification, Intentional Verification, Scientific Knowledge

The concept of Index for the Assessment of Regulations' Significance (IARS) in regulatory impact evaluation

This article aims to present the concept of the Index for the Assessment of Regulations’ Significance as a tool used in parliamentary regulatory impact assessment, with a special focus on expost assessment. The Index is an element of the broadly defined economic analysis of law, which can facilitate a more effective scrutiny of parliamentary lawmaking. The Index also enables theRIA (Regulatory Impact Assessment) to be verified by the act originator at the stage of the ex-ante regulatory impact assessment. Furthermore, the Index can also serve as a tool for conducting an analysis of the overall legislation process employed in parliament over a given period of time, on the basis of the adopted legal and substantive criteria.Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie koncepcji wskaźnika oceny istotności regulacji jako narzędzia do wykorzystania w parlamentarnej ocenie skutków regulacji, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem oceny ex-post. Wskaźnik jest elementem szeroko rozumianej ekonomicznej analizy prawa, która umożliwić może skuteczniejszą kontrolę stanowienia prawa przez parlamenty. Wskaźnik umożliwia także weryfikację RIA przeprowadzonego przez projektodawcę na etapie oceny skutków regulacji ex-ante. Ponadto wskaźnik służyć może do przeprowadzenia analizy całego procesu legislacyjnego w parlamencie w danym okresie na podstawie przyjętych kryteriów prawnych i merytorycznych

Hyperintensional semantics: a Fregean approach

In this paper, we present a new semantic framework designed to capture a distinctly cognitive or epistemic notion of meaning akin to Fregean senses. Traditional Carnapian intensions are too coarse-grained for this purpose: they fail to draw semantic distinctions between sentences that, from a Fregean perspective, differ in meaning. This has led some philosophers to introduce more fine-grained hyperintensions that allow us to draw semantic distinctions among co-intensional sentences. But the hyperintensional strategy has a flip-side: it risks drawing semantic distinctions between sentences that, from a Fregean perspective, do not differ in meaning. This is what we call the ‘new problem’ of hyperintensionality to distinguish it from the ‘old problem’ that faced the intensional theory. We show that our semantic framework offers a joint solution to both these problems by virtue of satisfying a version of Frege’s so-called ‘equipollence principle’ for sense individuation. Frege’s principle, we argue, not only captures the semantic intuitions that give rise to the old and the new problem of hyperintensionality, but also points the way to an independently motivated solution to both problems

Frequency Response of Uncertain Systems: Strong Kharitonov-Like Results

In this paper, we study the frequency response of uncertain systems using Kharitonov stability theory on first order complex polynomial set. For an interval transfer function, we show that the minimal real part of the frequency response at any fixed frequency is attained at some prescribed vertex transfer functions. By further geometric and algebraic analysis, we identify an index for strict positive realness of interval transfer functions. Some extensions and applications in positivity verification and robust absolute stability of feedback control systems are also presented.Comment: 18 pages, 8 figure

Where do meanings come from?

What is the relation between the bearer of meaning and the source of meaning, and what is it for something to bear meaning? This essay explores two sets of metaphors: on the first, the bearer of meaning is the source of the meaning, and meaning is something revealed, disclosed, or brought out from within the bearer; on the second, the bearer of meaning is distinct from the source of meaning, and meaning is something imposed, added, or placed onto the bearer from outside. Through readings of André Bazin, Denis Donoghue, Adam Phillips, Walter Pater, Stanley Cavell, Henry David Thoreau, William James, Charles Tomlinson, William Carlos Williams, and Marianne Moore, the conflict between the two sets of metaphors is seen to open up onto the question: What are the limits of sense, and are they to be acknowledged or overcome? The author invites us to think of the limits of sense as facts we need to acknowledge if we are to make sense. The essay ends with a discussion of how we might acknowledge limits of sense as limits of sense and of how we might acknowledge fact as fact.Philosoph

The discovery of ETI as a high-consequence, low-probability event

The authors use the opportunity of presenting a paper during the 51st International Astronautical Congress in Rio de Janeiro to introduce a numerical method of characterizing the potential significance of any announcement of discovery of extraterrestrial intelligence. This approach uses the Torino Scale (for characterizing asteroid impacts) as a model for constructing a proposed “Rio Scale” to assist the discussion and interpretation of any claimed discovery of ETI