Systematic Characterization of Power Side Channel Attacks for Residual and Added Vulnerabilities

Power Side Channel Attacks have continued to be a major threat to cryptographic devices. Hence, it will be useful for designers of cryptographic systems to systematically identify which type of power Side Channel Attacks their designs remain vulnerable to after implementation. It’s also useful to determine which additional vulnerabilities they have exposed their devices to, after the implementation of a countermeasure or a feature. The goal of this research is to develop a characterization of power side channel attacks on different encryption algorithms\u27 implementations to create metrics and methods to evaluate their residual vulnerabilities and added vulnerabilities. This research studies the characteristics that influence the power side leakage, classifies them, and identifies both the residual vulnerabilities and the added vulnerabilities. Residual vulnerabilities are defined as the traits that leave the implementation of the algorithm still vulnerable to power Side Channel Attacks (SCA), sometimes despite the attempt at implementing countermeasures by the designers. Added vulnerabilities to power SCA are defined as vulnerabilities created or enhanced by the algorithm implementations and/or modifications. The three buckets in which we categorize the encryption algorithm implementations are: i. Countermeasures against power side channel attacks, ii. IC power delivery network impact to power leakage (including voltage regulators), iii. Lightweight ciphers and applications for the Internet of Things (IoT ) From the characterization of masking countermeasures, an example outcome developed is that masking schemes, when uniformly distributed random masks are used, are still vulnerable to collision power attacks. Another example outcome derived is that masked AES, when glitches occur, is still vulnerable to Differential Power Analysis (DPA). We have developed a characterization of power side-channel attacks on the hardware implementations of different symmetric encryption algorithms to provide a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of state-of-the-art countermeasures against local and remote power side-channel attacks. The characterization is accomplished by studying the attributes that influence power side-channel leaks, classifying them, and identifying both residual vulnerabilities and added vulnerabilities. The evaluated countermeasures include masking, hiding, and power delivery network scrambling. But, vulnerability to DPA depends largely on the quality of the leaked power, which is impacted by the characteristics of the device power delivery network. Countermeasures and deterrents to power side-channel attacks targeting the alteration or scrambling of the power delivery network have been shown to be effective against local attacks where the malicious agent has physical access to the target system. However, remote attacks that capture the leaked information from within the IC power grid are shown herein to be nonetheless effective at uncovering the secret key in the presence of these countermeasures/deterrents. Theoretical studies and experimental analysis are carried out to define and quantify the impact of integrated voltage regulators, voltage noise injection, and integration of on-package decoupling capacitors for both remote and local attacks. An outcome yielded by the studies is that the use of an integrated voltage regulator as a countermeasure is effective for a local attack. However, remote attacks are still effective and hence break the integrated voltage regulator countermeasure. From experimental analysis, it is observed that within the range of designs\u27 practical values, the adoption of on-package decoupling capacitors provides only a 1.3x increase in the minimum number of traces required to discover the secret key. However, the injection of noise in the IC power delivery network yields a 37x increase in the minimum number of traces to discover. Thus, increasing the number of on-package decoupling capacitors or the impedance between the local probing site and the IC power grid should not be relied on as countermeasures to power side-channel attacks, for remote attack schemes. Noise injection should be considered as it is more effective at scrambling the leaked signal to eliminate sensitive identifying information. However, the analysis and experiments carried out herein are applied to regular symmetric ciphers which are not suitable for protecting Internet of Things (IoT) devices. The protection of communications between IoT devices is of great concern because the information exchanged contains vital sensitive data. Malicious agents seek to exploit those data to extract secret information about the owners or the system. Power side channel attacks are of great concern on these devices because their power consumption unintentionally leaks information correlatable to the device\u27s secret data. Several studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of authenticated encryption with advanced data (AEAD), in protecting communications with these devices. In this research, we have proposed a comprehensive evaluation of the ten algorithm finalists of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) IoT lightweight cipher competition. The study shows that, nonetheless, some still present some residual vulnerabilities to power side channel attacks (SCA). For five ciphers, we propose an attack methodology as well as the leakage function needed to perform correlation power analysis (CPA). We assert that Ascon, Sparkle, and PHOTON-Beetle security vulnerability can generally be assessed with the security assumptions Chosen ciphertext attack and leakage in encryption only, with nonce-misuse resilience adversary (CCAmL1) and Chosen ciphertext attack and leakage in encryption only with nonce-respecting adversary (CCAL1) , respectively. However, the security vulnerability of GIFT-COFB, Grain, Romulus, and TinyJambu can be evaluated more straightforwardly with publicly available leakage models and solvers. They can also be assessed simply by increasing the number of traces collected to launch the attack

Exploitation of Unintentional Information Leakage from Integrated Circuits

Unintentional electromagnetic emissions are used to recognize or verify the identity of a unique integrated circuit (IC) based on fabrication process-induced variations in a manner analogous to biometric human identification. The effectiveness of the technique is demonstrated through an extensive empirical study, with results presented indicating correct device identification success rates of greater than 99:5%, and average verification equal error rates (EERs) of less than 0:05% for 40 near-identical devices. The proposed approach is suitable for security applications involving commodity commercial ICs, with substantial cost and scalability advantages over existing approaches. A systematic leakage mapping methodology is also proposed to comprehensively assess the information leakage of arbitrary block cipher implementations, and to quantitatively bound an arbitrary implementation\u27s resistance to the general class of differential side channel analysis techniques. The framework is demonstrated using the well-known Hamming Weight and Hamming Distance leakage models, and approach\u27s effectiveness is demonstrated through the empirical assessment of two typical unprotected implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard. The assessment results are empirically validated against correlation-based differential power and electromagnetic analysis attacks

Securing Critical Infrastructures

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Méthodes logicielles formelles pour la sécurité des implémentations cryptographiques

Implementations of cryptosystems are vulnerable to physical attacks, and thus need to be protected against them.Of course, malfunctioning protections are useless.Formal methods help to develop systems while assessing their conformity to a rigorous specification.The first goal of my thesis, and its innovative aspect, is to show that formal methods can be used to prove not only the principle of the countermeasures according to a model,but also their implementations, as it is where the physical vulnerabilities are exploited.My second goal is the proof and the automation of the protection techniques themselves, because handwritten security code is error-prone.Les implémentations cryptographiques sont vulnérables aux attaques physiques, et ont donc besoin d'en être protégées.Bien sûr, des protections défectueuses sont inutiles.L'utilisation des méthodes formelles permet de développer des systèmes tout en garantissant leur conformité à des spécifications données.Le premier objectif de ma thèse, et son aspect novateur, est de montrer que les méthodes formelles peuvent être utilisées pour prouver non seulement les principes des contre-mesures dans le cadre d'un modèle, mais aussi leurs implémentations, étant donné que c'est là que les vulnérabilités physiques sont exploitées.Mon second objectif est la preuve et l'automatisation des techniques de protection elles-même, car l'écriture manuelle de code est sujette à de nombreuses erreurs, particulièrement lorsqu'il s'agit de code de sécurité

Demystifying Internet of Things Security

Break down the misconceptions of the Internet of Things by examining the different security building blocks available in Intel Architecture (IA) based IoT platforms. This open access book reviews the threat pyramid, secure boot, chain of trust, and the SW stack leading up to defense-in-depth. The IoT presents unique challenges in implementing security and Intel has both CPU and Isolated Security Engine capabilities to simplify it. This book explores the challenges to secure these devices to make them immune to different threats originating from within and outside the network. The requirements and robustness rules to protect the assets vary greatly and there is no single blanket solution approach to implement security. Demystifying Internet of Things Security provides clarity to industry professionals and provides and overview of different security solutions What You'll Learn Secure devices, immunizing them against different threats originating from inside and outside the network Gather an overview of the different security building blocks available in Intel Architecture (IA) based IoT platforms Understand the threat pyramid, secure boot, chain of trust, and the software stack leading up to defense-in-depth Who This Book Is For Strategists, developers, architects, and managers in the embedded and Internet of Things (IoT) space trying to understand and implement the security in the IoT devices/platforms

Smart card security

Smart Card devices are commonly used on many secure applications where there is a need to identify the card holder in order to provide a personalised service. The value of access to locked data and services makes Smart Cards a desirable attack target for hackers of all sorts. The range of attacks a Smart Card and its environment can be subjected to ranges from social engineering to exploiting hardware and software bugs and features. This research has focused on several hardware related attacks and potential threats. Namely, power glitch attack, power analysis, laser attack, the potential effect on security of memory power consumption reduction techniques and using a re-configurable instruction set as method to harden opcode interpretation. A semi-automated simulation environment to test designs against glitch attacks and power analysis has been developed. This simulation environment can be easily integrated within Atmel’s design flow to bring assurance of their designs’ behaviour and permeability to such attacks at an early development stage. Previous power analysis simulation work focused on testing the implementation of part of the cryptographic algorithm. This work focuses on targeting the whole algorithm, allowing the test of a wider range of countermeasures. A common glitch detection approach is monitoring the power supply for abnormal voltage values and fluctuations. This approach can fail to detect some fast glitches. The alternative approach used in this research monitors the effects of a glitch on a mono-stable circuit sensitive to fault injection by glitch attacks. This work has resulted in a patented glitch detector that improves the overall glitch detection range. The use of radiation countermeasures as laser countermeasures and potential sensors has been investigated too. Radiation and laser attacks have similar effects on silicon devices. Whilst several countermeasures against radiation have been developed over the years, almost no explicit mention of laser countermeasures was found. This research has demonstrated the suitability of using some radiation countermeasures as laser countermeasures. Memory partitioning is a static and dynamic power consumption reduction technique successfully used in various devices. The nature of Smart Card devices restricts the applicability of some aspects of this power reduction technique. This research line has resulted in the proposal of a memory partitioning approach suitable to Smart Cards

Intelligent Circuits and Systems

ICICS-2020 is the third conference initiated by the School of Electronics and Electrical Engineering at Lovely Professional University that explored recent innovations of researchers working for the development of smart and green technologies in the fields of Energy, Electronics, Communications, Computers, and Control. ICICS provides innovators to identify new opportunities for the social and economic benefits of society.　 This conference bridges the gap between academics and R&D institutions, social visionaries, and experts from all strata of society to present their ongoing research activities and foster research relations between them. It provides opportunities for the exchange of new ideas, applications, and experiences in the field of smart technologies and finding global partners for future collaboration. The ICICS-2020 was conducted in two broad categories, Intelligent Circuits & Intelligent Systems and Emerging Technologies in Electrical Engineering

Dynamic partial reconfiguration management for high performance and reliability in FPGAs

Modern Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are no longer used to implement small “glue logic” circuitries. The high-density of reconfigurable logic resources in today’s FPGAs enable the implementation of large systems in a single chip. FPGAs are highly flexible devices; their functionality can be altered by simply loading a new binary file in their configuration memory. While the flexibility of FPGAs is comparable to General-Purpose Processors (GPPs), in the sense that different functions can be performed using the same hardware, the performance gain that can be achieved using FPGAs can be orders of magnitudes higher as FPGAs offer the ability for customisation of parallel computational architectures. Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration (DPR) allows for changing the functionality of certain blocks on the chip while the rest of the FPGA is operational. DPR has sparked the interest of researchers to explore new computational platforms where computational tasks are off-loaded from a main CPU to be executed using dedicated reconfigurable hardware accelerators configured on demand at run-time. By having a battery of custom accelerators which can be swapped in and out of the FPGA at runtime, a higher computational density can be achieved compared to static systems where the accelerators are bound to fixed locations within the chip. Furthermore, the ability of relocating these accelerators across several locations on the chip allows for the implementation of adaptive systems which can mitigate emerging faults in the FPGA chip when operating in harsh environments. By porting the appropriate fault mitigation techniques in such computational platforms, the advantages of FPGAs can be harnessed in different applications in space and military electronics where FPGAs are usually seen as unreliable devices due to their sensitivity to radiation and extreme environmental conditions. In light of the above, this thesis investigates the deployment of DPR as: 1) a method for enhancing performance by efficient exploitation of the FPGA resources, and 2) a method for enhancing the reliability of systems intended to operate in harsh environments. Achieving optimal performance in such systems requires an efficient internal configuration management system to manage the reconfiguration and execution of the reconfigurable modules in the FPGA. In addition, the system needs to support “fault-resilience” features by integrating parameterisable fault detection and recovery capabilities to meet the reliability standard of fault-tolerant applications. This thesis addresses all the design and implementation aspects of an Internal Configuration Manger (ICM) which supports a novel bitstream relocation model to enable the placement of relocatable accelerators across several locations on the FPGA chip. In addition to supporting all the configuration capabilities required to implement a Reconfigurable Operating System (ROS), the proposed ICM also supports the novel multiple-clone configuration technique which allows for cloning several instances of the same hardware accelerator at the same time resulting in much shorter configuration time compared to traditional configuration techniques. A faulttolerant (FT) version of the proposed ICM which supports a comprehensive faultrecovery scheme is also introduced in this thesis. The proposed FT-ICM is designed with a much smaller area footprint compared to Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) hardening techniques while keeping a comparable level of fault-resilience. The capabilities of the proposed ICM system are demonstrated with two novel applications. The first application demonstrates a proof-of-concept reliable FPGA server solution used for executing encryption/decryption queries. The proposed server deploys bitstream relocation and modular redundancy to mitigate both permanent and transient faults in the device. It also deploys a novel Built-In Self- Test (BIST) diagnosis scheme, specifically designed to detect emerging permanent faults in the system at run-time. The second application is a data mining application where DPR is used to increase the computational density of a system used to implement the Frequent Itemset Mining (FIM) problem

Modern Applications in Optics and Photonics: From Sensing and Analytics to Communication

Optics and photonics are among the key technologies of the 21st century, and offer potential for novel applications in areas such as sensing and spectroscopy, analytics, monitoring, biomedical imaging/diagnostics, and optical communication technology. The high degree of control over light fields, together with the capabilities of modern processing and integration technology, enables new optical measurement systems with enhanced functionality and sensitivity. They are attractive for a range of applications that were previously inaccessible. This Special Issue aims to provide an overview of some of the most advanced application areas in optics and photonics and indicate the broad potential for the future