Execution Of Rights Under The Designation Of Liability By Auction Of State Court Of Pekalongan

This researchaims to determine how the execution Encumbrance through an auction to be determined by the District Court of Pekalongan and what weaknesses and execution Mortgage solution through an auction to be determined by the District Court of Pekalongan. Mortgage execution through an auction based on the determination District Court of Pekalongan held upon the request of the winning bidder. Request execution Mortgage by auction by the auction winner made after terlelang not willing to vacate voluntarily execution object. Mortgage weakness execution through an auction based on the determination that the District Court Pekalongan there are two opinions on the application process execution Encumbrance through an auction to be determined by the District Court if there is a lawsuit against the object of the auction following the application execution. The first opinion the petition can still be processed until the issuance of the determination of the District Court. The second opinion request for execution should be delayed pending completion of a lawsuit against the auction object. This is due to the absence of explicit provision governing the execution Mortgage application process through the auction in case there is a lawsuit in the execution object, especially if there is a lawsuit against the object of execution in case the application execution has been carried out. Similarly, in the case of the emergence of a lawsuit before the application for execution is done. Whether the execution can be carried out or not. This gives rise to a variety of opinions that may be detrimental to the winning bidder. For it should be no explicit provision governing the execution Mortgage application process through the auction in case there is a lawsuit in the execution object other drawback is the resistance of the current terkesekusi will be executed.Keywords: Execution; Mortgage; Auctions; Determination

Divorce and the Catholic Lawyer

On January 28, 2002, Pope John Paul II focused his annual address to the officials of the Roman Rota on the topic of the indissolubility of marriage. At the conclusion of this theological and canonical analysis, the Holy Father made a few short statements cautioning civil lawyers about divorces cases. The following day, a story in The New York Times carried the headline John Paul Says Catholic Bar Must Refuse Divorce Cases. The article construed the pope\u27s reference as a blanket prohibition against Catholic lawyers handling divorce cases. It further questioned whether the prohibition contradicted the Pontiff\u27s prior emphasis on compassion and pastoral sensitivity for divorced persons. The reaction to the pope\u27s address was certain to cause some concern among Catholics who take pontifical teaching seriously, and especially among those of us who are attorneys. More careful examination, however, reveals that the pope\u27s statement flows from a well-developed and coherent doctrine on marriage, which belies a reductionistic approach. In this brief article, I provide an overview of the scriptural and historical tradition as well as contemporary theoretical underpinnings of the principle of indissolubility. My modest purpose is not to present a comprehensive study, but to attempt a fair exposition of the Holy Father\u27s remarks and their application to lawyers and judges. Pope John Paul II\u27s advice to lawyers about divorces cases was a bit more nuanced than the media depicted. The papal position reflects the radical teaching of Jesus and its rich development through two millennia of Catholic tradition. Given the culture of divorce and its negative impact on individuals and society, the Holy Father has affirmed the principle of indissolubility to advance the sanctity of marriage and family life. In accord with the principle, Catholic lawyers should not contribute to the culture of divorce, but they should be active participants in establishing a legal order that promotes genuine human fulfillment and social well being. When divorce remains the only way to ensure certain good effects, the lawyer as an independent professional may facilitate the case consistent with the right intention of the client. For judges and lawyers who enjoy less autonomy in the selection of cases, the traditional norms of material cooperation apply. This requires a careful consideration of the issues of proportionality. The application of the norms of proportionality does not afford simple answers and must be considered on a case by case basis. The Catholic judge or attorney who handles a divorce case should guard against an unreflective and technical approach, and rather always be guided by the truth of the tradition, which respects individuals and the common good

Imprisonment as a form of punishment: a case study of Maldives

Today punishment of imprisonment is seen to be given a less prominent significance in terms of punishing offenders as a means of rehabilitation and reducing recidivism rates throughout the world. However, it is found that the Maldivian courts have adopted a pattern of punishing offenders through imprisonment as a general form of punishment for almost all types of crimes despite considering the severity and mitigating factors of a given case. This pattern of punishing offenders through imprisonment alone is practiced by an authority of discretion given to the judges in the Penal Code of Maldives even though the same Penal Code allows for the application of other forms of alternative punishments. Whilst some may argue on the effectiveness of imprisonment as a general form of punishment, our argument lies in resorting away from a punishment that yields less possible avenues for rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders back into the society and that the preference should be given to alternative forms of punishments based on the circumstances surrounding any individual case

Analyzing the Virginia Workers\u27 Compensation Act\u27s Governance of Employer Non-Compliance

This essay attempts to resolve the current disconnect in the state judiciary‘s application of section 65.2-805(A) by analyzing the language of the statute as well as the various policy implications that undergird its establishment and accompany each interpretation. Part I provides a brief background of workers‘ compensation law generally, the Virginia Workers‘ Compensation Act (including section 65.2-805(A)), and the relevant case law involving section 65.2-805(A). Part II proceeds with the essay‘s argument, i.e., that section 65.2-805(A) should not be interpreted as imposing strict liability on non-compliant employers and thereby eliminating the obligation for a plaintiff-employee to plead a prima facie case of negligence. To the extent that this interpretation differs from the original intent of the General Assembly when it enacted section 65.2-805(A), or the current intent of the General Assembly for that matter, Part III invites the legislature to make an appropriate amendment through traditional means

Out of Jail... But Still Not Free to Litigate - Using Congressional Intent to Interpret 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(b)\u27s Application to Released Prisoners

This Comment argues that, based on the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)’s purpose and legislative history, prisoners who fulfilled the statute’s payment obligations while incarcerated should be entitled to apply for traditional in forma pauperis (IFP) status under § 1915(a)(1) upon release. Part I traces the historical development of prisoners’ right of access to the courts and its ties to the IFP doctrine. It then examines the PLRA’s many amendments to the federal IFP statute. Part II explains the divergent readings that circuit courts currently apply to § 1915(b). After analyzing the statute’s plain language and legislative history, Part III concludes that Congress sought to impose the filing fee requirement on prisoners because they encounter fewer financial and logistical obstacles throughout the litigation process, a justification that cannot extend to released inmates. Finally, Part IV recommends that courts decide the continuing application of the PLRA on a case-by-case basis that first takes into account a released prisoner’s prior compliance with the payment formula, a solution that upholds both the prisoner’s constitutional right of access and the countervailing government interests

Out of Jail... But Still Not Free to Litigate - Using Congressional Intent to Interpret 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(b)\u27s Application to Released Prisoners

This Comment argues that, based on the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)’s purpose and legislative history, prisoners who fulfilled the statute’s payment obligations while incarcerated should be entitled to apply for traditional in forma pauperis (IFP) status under § 1915(a)(1) upon release. Part I traces the historical development of prisoners’ right of access to the courts and its ties to the IFP doctrine. It then examines the PLRA’s many amendments to the federal IFP statute. Part II explains the divergent readings that circuit courts currently apply to § 1915(b). After analyzing the statute’s plain language and legislative history, Part III concludes that Congress sought to impose the filing fee requirement on prisoners because they encounter fewer financial and logistical obstacles throughout the litigation process, a justification that cannot extend to released inmates. Finally, Part IV recommends that courts decide the continuing application of the PLRA on a case-by-case basis that first takes into account a released prisoner’s prior compliance with the payment formula, a solution that upholds both the prisoner’s constitutional right of access and the countervailing government interests

A Better Interpretation of the Wrongful Death Act

A viable fetus is not a person under the wrongful death act, declared the Maine Law Court in a controversial decision in 1988. To reach this conclusion, the court employed one traditional and one new rule of statutory interpretation, and one traditional rule of law. The traditional rule of interpretation-that the wrongful death act is to be strictly construed because it is in derogation of the common law-dates from the earliest wrongful death cases heard by the court. The new rule of interpretation-that the death statute must be harmonized with the Maine Uniform Probate Code-derives from the enactment of the Code in 1981 and the placement of the wrongful death statute within it. The traditional rule of law-that recovery for wrongful death is exclusively governed by the terms of the wrongful death statute-is related to the rule of strict construction, but is based specifically on a mid-nineteenth century case that held the common law did not allow recovery for wrongful death. The Law Court has consistently held since then that the common law in Maine does not allow recovery for wrongful death, and, therefore, that the statute provides the sole basis for recovery. This Article argues that all three rules should be discarded. Instead of the three rules above, the Law Court should adopt a rule of fair construction, one which involves the court in a purposive analysis of the terms and provisions of the act without the presumption against coverage or application in the doubtful case that is at the heart of the rule of strict construction and without the fiction, integral to the rule, that any statutory terms are so clear and unambiguous that interpretation is unnecessary