Short-Term and Long-Term Solutions for Secure Verification of Aircraft- Reported ADS-B Location in Air Traffic Networks

Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADSB) is the foundation of next-generation air traffic management systems. The precision granted by ADS-B will allow for the network to support the huge growth in air traffic in the coming decades and assist both air traffic controllers and pilots in improving safety in flight. However, the ADS-B protocol has serious security vulnerabilities. Coupled with the importance of ADS-B in the air transportation system, these security issues make ADS-B an appealing target for attack by adversaries. This paper dismisses the need for encryption and focuses security strategies on location verification. Multilateration is combined with data fusion and location tracking for effective and undemanding short-term and long-term location verification. By taking input from air traffic controllers, a secondary location tracking systems allows for a backup record of controlled aircraft that can easily be referred to in emergencies

On the Security of the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Protocol

Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is the communications protocol currently being rolled out as part of next generation air transportation systems. As the heart of modern air traffic control, it will play an essential role in the protection of two billion passengers per year, besides being crucial to many other interest groups in aviation. The inherent lack of security measures in the ADS-B protocol has long been a topic in both the aviation circles and in the academic community. Due to recently published proof-of-concept attacks, the topic is becoming ever more pressing, especially with the deadline for mandatory implementation in most airspaces fast approaching. This survey first summarizes the attacks and problems that have been reported in relation to ADS-B security. Thereafter, it surveys both the theoretical and practical efforts which have been previously conducted concerning these issues, including possible countermeasures. In addition, the survey seeks to go beyond the current state of the art and gives a detailed assessment of security measures which have been developed more generally for related wireless networks such as sensor networks and vehicular ad hoc networks, including a taxonomy of all considered approaches.Comment: Survey, 22 Pages, 21 Figure

Challenges of Implementing Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast in the Nextgen Air Traffic Management System

The Federal Aviation Administration is in the process of replacing the current Air Traffic Management (ATM) system with a new system known as NextGen. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is the aircraft surveillance protocol currently being introduced as a part of the NextGen system deployment. The evolution of ADS-B spans more than two decades, with development focused primarily on increasing the capacity of the Air Traffic Control (ATC) system and reducing operational costs. Security of the ADS-B communications network has not been a high priority, and the inherent lack of security measures in the ADS-B protocol has come under increasing scrutiny as the NextGen ADS-B implementation deadline draws near. The research conducted in this thesis summarizes the ADS-B security vulnerabilities that have been under recent study. Thereafter, we survey both the theoretical and practical efforts which have been conducted concerning these issues, and review possible security solutions. We create a classification of the ADS-B security solutions considered and provide a ranking of the potential solutions. Finally, we discuss the most compatible approaches available, given the constraints of the current ADS-B communications system and protocol

Interoperable ADS-B Confidentiality

The worldwide air traffic infrastructure is in the late stages of transition from legacy transponder systems to Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) based systems. ADS-B relies on position information from GNSS and requires aircraft to transmit their identification, state, and position. ADS-B promises the availability of high-fidelity air traffic information; however, position and identification data are not secured via authentication or encryption. This lack of security for ADS-B allows non-participants to observe and collect data on both government and private flight activity. This is a proposal for a lightweight, interoperable ADS-B confidentiality protocol which uses existing format preserving encryption and an innovative unidirectional key handoff to ensure backward compatibility. Anonymity and data confidentiality are achieved selectively on a per-session basis. This research also investigates the effect of false replies unsynchronized in time (FRUIT) on the packet error ratio (PER) for Mode S transmissions. High PERs result in range and time limits being imposed on the key handoff mechanism of this proposal. Overall, this confidentiality protocol is ready for implementation, however further research is required to validate a revised key handoff mechanism

Addressing Operator Privacy in Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B)

We investigate security of ADS-B system and propose a framework composed of two solutions that would require minimal change to the existing system. The investigation focuses on providing an encrypted ADS-B system that provides confidentiality, availability, and integrity while requiring minimal changes to the existing ADS-B specification. The proposed framework consisting of two solutions is envisioned to be implemented through software updates while providing backwards compatibility. The most challenging requirement during this study was to work within the constraints of the existing ADS-B system

Air traffic modernization and control: ADS-B system implementation update 2022: A review

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is a multiparameter surveillance system designed to improve key segments of air traffic: enabling real-time surveillance, raising safety and efficiency levels, and improving flight information and weather services. ADS-B consists of two subsystems, ADS-B Out and ADS-B In. Although only a complete system, ADS-B In/Out provides numerous benefits (additional situational awareness, more efficient oceanic routing, etc.) FAA and EASA only require ADS-B Out (by January and June 2020, respectively), whereby ADS-B In remains optional. Because of its many advantages, ADS-B In/Out will be popular, but there are some weaknesses, which are primarily related to its cyber vulnerabilities due to insufficient authentication and encryption in the applied protocol. In this paper, an overview of the ADS-B system is presented as an aid to understanding the security problems and the different ways of potential attack. In addition, this review deals with the current state of ADS-B deployment and its future perspective and challenges

Pilot3 D1.1 - Technical resources and problem definition

This deliverable starts with the proposal of Pilot3 but incorporates the development produced during the first four months of the project: activities on different workpackages, interaction with Topic Manager and Project Officer, and input received during the first Advisory Board meeting. This deliverable presents the definition of Pilot3 concept and methodology. It includes the high level the requirements of the prototype, preliminary data requirements, preliminary indicators that will be considered and a preliminary definition of case studies. The deliverable aims at defining the view of the consortium on the project at these early stages, while highlighting the feedback obtained from the Advisory Board and the further activities required to define some of the aspects of the project