The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices

New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990's, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match, by observing the differences in the outcomes and organization of the market when a match was operating, and when it was not. After the GI match ended, the market unraveled. Contracts were signed earlier each year, at diffuse times, often with exploding offers. The market became less national, more local. This allows us to discern the effect of the clearinghouse: it coordinated the timing of the market, in a way that increased its thickness and scope. The clearinghouse does not seem to have had an effect on wages. As this became known among gastroenterologists, an opportunity arose to reorganize the market to once again use a centralized clearinghouse. However it proved necessary to adopt policies that would allow employers to safely delay hiring and coordinate on using the clearinghouse. The market for gastroenterologists provides a case study of market failures, the way a centralized clearinghouse can fix them, and the effects on market outcomes. In the conclusion we discuss aspects of the experience of the gastroenterology labor market that seem to generalize fairly widely.

The collapse of a medical clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare)

The collapse of the clearinghouse for the entry-level gastroenterology labor market offers a unique opportunity to study how stable clearinghouses succeed and fail. To explore the reasons for the failure of the clearinghouse (and why failures of this kind of clearinghouse have been so rare), we conduct an experimental investigation of demand shocks of the kind that occurred in the gastroenterology market. We find that a reduction in demand for positions leads to the collapse of the match only when it is detectable by firms before being detected by workers (as in the unexpected shock that took place in 1996, which could be seen by firms in their reduced applicant pools). Simple demand and supply imbalances do not seem to interfere with the operation of the centralized match. Our results suggest an affirmative answer to the question posed by market participants about whether the clearinghouse could be successfully restarted, and that this would relieve some of the distress now reported in that market, by allowing it to operate later, at a more uniform time, and with more national scope.

Modernizing payment systems in emerging economies

The authors address the following questions in this overview of payment systems: What is a payment system? How can efficient systems contribute to the development of modern, market-based financial institutions and markets? What elements are necessary for payment systems to operate efficiently? What are the operational characteristics of a modern payment system? What is the World Bank approach to selected payment system initiatives, design, and development? Effective, efficient payment systems, they conclude, are vital for the economic development of emerging economies. Efficient payment systems help promote the development of commerce, enhance economic policy oversight, control the risk inherent in moving large values, and reduce the financial, capital and human resources devoted to the transfer of payments. Many emerging economies lack the financial and technical resources to develop such systems. Many turn technical resources to develop such systems. Many turn to the World Bank and other international agencies for assistance. Unfortunately, some believe that the entire solution for an effective payment system rests in obtaining modern computer hardware and believe the World Bank's sole contribution is to finance hardware costs. Hardware procurement alone will not solve problems of payment systems. These countries need organizational plans and structure for national payment systems before they spend money on computer equipment. They often lack the expertise to design and operate modern payment systems, so they may need technical assistance from financial experts before they invest in systems development. The design of a new payment system should be kept simple. Many emerging economies lack the infrastructure and banking sophistication to leapfrog from basic to state-of-the-art payment systems. The first task is to fix the most serious problems. The second is to upgrade the current systems incrementally, to meet basic standards of timeliness, security, and reliability. As these improvements are made, the countries can turn their attention to long-term, advanced solutions. Each country's payments system is unique. To simply import another country's system without adjusting for the target country's geography, infrastructure, banking and legal structures, culture, and needs could lead to suboptimal solutions. Development of the system should follow a disciplined plan for defining the needs of users and for organizing the project team and project goals.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Financial Intermediation,Information Technology

Payment systems in Latin America : a tale of two countries - Colombia and El Salvador

Payment systems include all the paper (including cash) and electronic systems a country uses to exchange financial value to discharge obligations. Financial markets rely on promptness and certainty of payment and settlement for borrowing and investing. Consumers want convenience, choice (of payment options), privacy, and low cost. Inefficiencies in payment systems cause a drag on the national economy. The authors compare trends and areas for improvement in payment systems in Colombia and El Salvador, two countries that differ in size, volume of check-based transactions, and national issues. Check standards have developed slowly in both countries, which has retarded automation, particularly in Colombia, where the volume of checks handled makes manual processing unmanageable. Both countries need stronger leadership from central banks and bankers associations; incentives to adopt common check standards; streamlined check sorting and encoding, microfilming, and manual data processing; alternative (especially credit-based) payment mechanisms and private check-processing bureaus; and settlement of stock exchange transactions through several banks, rather than one bank. The countries differ in important ways: 1) it will be easier to reach economies of scale in check processing in Colombia (which has too many local clearinghouses) than in El Salvador (which has too few). Both countries need a more balanced approach; 2) same day payments are possible in Colombia; payments in El Salvador are next day, at best; 3) financial markets are less mature in El Salvador and may not need to be as sophisticated as markets in other countries; and 4) Colombia has yet to create effective disincentives for writing checks against insufficient funds. Both countries must take certain actions to develop a system for electronic payment and the settlement of payments at the central bank: 1) draft new laws and regulations; 2) provide more systematic data collection and analysis of payment flows; 3) undertake more risk analysis and prevention in the central banks and supervisory agencies, and draft contingency plans for major failures; 4) reexamine the dual roles of the central banks and other government agencies in operating and supervising payment systems; 5) review check-clearing pricing policies; and 6) analyze the economics of automating check processing.Banks&Banking Reform,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Intermediation,Banking Law,Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Banking Law,Economic Theory&Research

Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study

We experimentally study the Gale and Shapley, 1962 mechanism, which is utilized in a wide set of applications, most prominently the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Several insights come out of our analysis. First, only 48% of our observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large majority culminate at the receiver-optimal stable matching. Second, receivers rarely truncate their true preferences: it is the proposers who do not make offers in order of their preference, frequently skipping potential partners. Third, market characteristics affect behavior: both the cardinal representation and core size influence whether laboratory outcomes are stable. We conclude by using our controlled results and a behavioral model to shed light on a number of stylized facts we derive from new NRMP survey and outcome data, and to explain the small cores previously documented for the NRMP

Clearinghouse Overconfidence

Regulatory reaction to the 2008-2009 financial crisis focused on complex financial instruments that deepened the crisis. A consensus emerged that these risky financial instruments should move through safe, strong clearinghouses, which would be bulwarks against systemic risk, and that the destructive impact of the failures during the crisis of AIG, Lehman Brothers, and the Reserve Primary Fund could have been softened or eliminated had strong clearing-houses been in place. Via the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, Congress instructed regulators to construct clearinghouses through which these risky financial instruments would trade and settle. Clearinghouses could cut financial risk, reduce contagion, and halt a local financial problem before it becomes an economy-wide crisis. But clearinghouses are weaker bulwarks against financial contagion, financial panic, and systemic risk than is commonly thought. They may well be unable to defend the economy against financial stress such as that of the 2008-2009 crisis. Although they are efficient financial platforms in ordinary times, they do little to reduce systemic risk in crisis times. They generally do not reduce the core risk targeted-that the failure of a financial firm will cause other firms to fail-but rather transfer that risk of loss to others. The major reduction in risk among the inside-the-clearinghouse traders is largely achieved by pushing that risk elsewhere, often to a systemically dangerous spot. Financial contagion can thus side-step the clearinghouse fortress and bring down other core financial institutions. Worse, clearinghouses could not have readily handled the major stresses that afflicted the economy in 2008-2009, could well have transmitted and magnified them, and can only weakly affect the type of financial stress that Congress targeted with Dodd-Frank. When we add in the other weaknesses of the new clearinghouses-as too-big-to-fail institutions, as institutions whose members' incentives to contain clearinghouse riskiness are weaker than the public's, and as institutions that will not be easy to regulate-even the direction of clearinghouses' impact on systemic risk is uncertain. The stakes are high in correctly assessing the value of clearing-houses in containing systemic risk. Much like an overconfidence inspired by powerful military fortresses that an invading enemy can side-step, the reigning overconfidence in clearinghouses lulls regulators to be satisfied that they have done much to arrest problems of contagion and systemic risk by building up clearing-houses, when they have not

The collapse of a medical labor clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare)

Economic