Sequential Keystroke Behavioral Biometrics for Mobile User Identification via Multi-view Deep Learning

With the rapid growth in smartphone usage, more organizations begin to focus on providing better services for mobile users. User identification can help these organizations to identify their customers and then cater services that have been customized for them. Currently, the use of cookies is the most common form to identify users. However, cookies are not easily transportable (e.g., when a user uses a different login account, cookies do not follow the user). This limitation motivates the need to use behavior biometric for user identification. In this paper, we propose DEEPSERVICE, a new technique that can identify mobile users based on user's keystroke information captured by a special keyboard or web browser. Our evaluation results indicate that DEEPSERVICE is highly accurate in identifying mobile users (over 93% accuracy). The technique is also efficient and only takes less than 1 ms to perform identification.Comment: 2017 Joint European Conference on Machine Learning and Knowledge Discovery in Database

Keystroke dynamics as signal for shallow syntactic parsing

Keystroke dynamics have been extensively used in psycholinguistic and writing research to gain insights into cognitive processing. But do keystroke logs contain actual signal that can be used to learn better natural language processing models? We postulate that keystroke dynamics contain information about syntactic structure that can inform shallow syntactic parsing. To test this hypothesis, we explore labels derived from keystroke logs as auxiliary task in a multi-task bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (bi-LSTM). Our results show promising results on two shallow syntactic parsing tasks, chunking and CCG supertagging. Our model is simple, has the advantage that data can come from distinct sources, and produces models that are significantly better than models trained on the text annotations alone.Comment: In COLING 201

PILOT: Password and PIN Information Leakage from Obfuscated Typing Videos

This paper studies leakage of user passwords and PINs based on observations of typing feedback on screens or from projectors in the form of masked characters that indicate keystrokes. To this end, we developed an attack called Password and Pin Information Leakage from Obfuscated Typing Videos (PILOT). Our attack extracts inter-keystroke timing information from videos of password masking characters displayed when users type their password on a computer, or their PIN at an ATM. We conducted several experiments in various attack scenarios. Results indicate that, while in some cases leakage is minor, it is quite substantial in others. By leveraging inter-keystroke timings, PILOT recovers 8-character alphanumeric passwords in as little as 19 attempts. When guessing PINs, PILOT significantly improved on both random guessing and the attack strategy adopted in our prior work [4]. In particular, we were able to guess about 3% of the PINs within 10 attempts. This corresponds to a 26-fold improvement compared to random guessing. Our results strongly indicate that secure password masking GUIs must consider the information leakage identified in this paper