Coding of details in very low bit-rate video systems

In this paper, the importance of including small image features at the initial levels of a progressive second generation video coding scheme is presented. It is shown that a number of meaningful small features called details should be coded, even at very low data bit-rates, in order to match their perceptual significance to the human visual system. We propose a method for extracting, perceptually selecting and coding of visual details in a video sequence using morphological techniques. Its application in the framework of a multiresolution segmentation-based coding algorithm yields better results than pure segmentation techniques at higher compression ratios, if the selection step fits some main subjective requirements. Details are extracted and coded separately from the region structure and included in the reconstructed images in a later stage. The bet of considering the local background of a given detail for its perceptual selection breaks the concept ofPeer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Consciousness and information integration

Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory, Global Workspace Theory, and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory. We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize. We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Unlike GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness. We present empirical evidence indicating that simple features are experienced in the absence of feature integration and argue that it challenges IIT’s necessity claim. In addition, we challenge IIT’s sufficiency claim by presenting evidence from hemineglect cases and amodal completion indicating that contents may be integrated and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. Moreover, we present empirical evidence from subjects with frontal lesions who are unable to carry out simple instructions and argue that they are irreconcilable with GWT. Lastly, we argue that empirical evidence indicating that patients with visual agnosia fail to identify objects they report being conscious of present a challenge to AIR’s necessity claim

Audio Cartography: Visual Encoding of Acoustic Parameters

Our sonic environment is the matter of subject in multiple domains which developed individual means of its description. As a result, it lacks an established visual language through which knowledge can be connected and insights shared. We provide a visual communication framework for the systematic and coherent documentation of sound in large-scale environments. This consists of visual encodings and mappings of acoustic parameters into distinct graphic variables that present plausible solutions for the visualization of sound. These candidate encodings are assembled into an application-independent, multifunctional, and extensible design guide. We apply the guidelines and show example maps that acts as a basis for the exploration of audio cartography

Depth map compression via 3D region-based representation

In 3D video, view synthesis is used to create new virtual views between encoded camera views. Errors in the coding of the depth maps introduce geometry inconsistencies in synthesized views. In this paper, a new 3D plane representation of the scene is presented which improves the performance of current standard video codecs in the view synthesis domain. Two image segmentation algorithms are proposed for generating a color and depth segmentation. Using both partitions, depth maps are segmented into regions without sharp discontinuities without having to explicitly signal all depth edges. The resulting regions are represented using a planar model in the 3D world scene. This 3D representation allows an efficient encoding while preserving the 3D characteristics of the scene. The 3D planes open up the possibility to code multiview images with a unique representation.Postprint (author's final draft

Mental Structures

An ongoing philosophical discussion concerns how various types of mental states fall within broad representational genera—for example, whether perceptual states are “iconic” or “sentential,” “analog” or “digital,” and so on. Here, I examine the grounds for making much more specific claims about how mental states are structured from constituent parts. For example, the state I am in when I perceive the shape of a mountain ridge may have as constituent parts my representations of the shapes of each peak and saddle of the ridge. More specific structural claims of this sort are a guide to how mental states fall within broader representational kinds. Moreover, these claims have significant implications of their own about semantic, functional, and epistemic features of our mental lives. But what are the conditions on a mental state's having one type of constituent structure rather than another? Drawing on explanatory strategies in vision science, I argue that, other things being equal, the constituent structure of a mental state determines what I call its distributional properties—namely, how mental states of that type can, cannot, or must co‐occur with other mental states in a given system. Distributional properties depend critically on and are informative about the underlying structures of mental states, they abstract in important ways from aspects of how mental states are processed, and they can yield significant insights into the variegation of psychological capacities