1,412 research outputs found
Cloud/fog computing resource management and pricing for blockchain networks
The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle,
which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high
computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time,
consider edge computing as an enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we
study edge computing resource management and pricing to support mobile
blockchain applications in which the mining process of miners can be offloaded
to an edge computing service provider. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg
game to jointly maximize the profit of the edge computing service provider and
the individual utilities of the miners. In the first stage, the service
provider sets the price of edge computing nodes. In the second stage, the
miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed prices.
We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in
each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For the uniform
pricing where the same price is applied to all miners, the existence and
uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best
response strategies of the miners. For the discriminatory pricing where the
different prices are applied to different miners, the Stackelberg equilibrium
is proved to exist and be unique by capitalizing on the Variational Inequality
theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our
proposed model.Comment: 16 pages, double-column version, accepted by IEEE Internet of Things
Journa
Atomic Appends: Selling Cars and Coordinating Armies with Multiple Distributed Ledgers
The various applications using Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) or blockchains, have led to the introduction of a new "marketplace" where multiple types of digital assets may be exchanged. As each blockchain is designed to support specific types of assets and transactions, and no blockchain will prevail, the need to perform interblockchain transactions is already pressing.
In this work we examine the fundamental problem of interoperable and interconnected blockchains. In particular, we begin by introducing the Multi-Distributed Ledger Objects (MDLO), which is the result of aggregating multiple Distributed Ledger Objects - DLO (a DLO is a formalization of the blockchain) and that supports append and get operations of records (e.g., transactions) in them from multiple clients concurrently. Next we define the AtomicAppends problem, which emerges when the exchange of digital assets between multiple clients may involve appending records in more than one DLO. Specifically, AtomicAppend requires that either all records will be appended on the involved DLOs or none. We examine the solvability of this problem assuming rational and risk-averse clients that may fail by crashing, and under different client utility and append models, timing models, and client failure scenarios. We show that for some cases the existence of an intermediary is necessary for the problem solution. We propose the implementation of such intermediary over a specialized blockchain, we term Smart DLO (SDLO), and we show how this can be used to solve the AtomicAppends problem even in an asynchronous, client competitive environment, where all the clients may crash
Oceanic Games: Centralization Risks and Incentives in Blockchain Mining
To participate in the distributed consensus of permissionless blockchains,
prospective nodes -- or miners -- provide proof of designated, costly
resources. However, in contrast to the intended decentralization, current data
on blockchain mining unveils increased concentration of these resources in a
few major entities, typically mining pools. To study strategic considerations
in this setting, we employ the concept of Oceanic Games, Milnor and Shapley
(1978). Oceanic Games have been used to analyze decision making in corporate
settings with small numbers of dominant players (shareholders) and large
numbers of individually insignificant players, the ocean. Unlike standard
equilibrium models, they focus on measuring the value (or power) per entity and
per unit of resource} in a given distribution of resources. These values are
viewed as strategic components in coalition formations, mergers and resource
acquisitions. Considering such issues relevant to blockchain governance and
long-term sustainability, we adapt oceanic games to blockchain mining and
illustrate the defined concepts via examples. The application of existing
results reveals incentives for individual miners to merge in order to increase
the value of their resources. This offers an alternative perspective to the
observed centralization and concentration of mining power. Beyond numerical
simulations, we use the model to identify issues relevant to the design of
future cryptocurrencies and formulate prospective research questions.Comment: [Best Paper Award] at the International Conference on Mathematical
Research for Blockchain Economy (MARBLE 2019
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