861 research outputs found

    Information actors beyond modernity and coloniality in times of climate change:A comparative design ethnography on the making of monitors for sustainable futures in Curaçao and Amsterdam, between 2019-2022

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    In his dissertation, Mr. Goilo developed a cutting-edge theoretical framework for an Anthropology of Information. This study compares information in the context of modernity in Amsterdam and coloniality in Curaçao through the making process of monitors and develops five ways to understand how information can act towards sustainable futures. The research also discusses how the two contexts, that is modernity and coloniality, have been in informational symbiosis for centuries which is producing negative informational side effects within the age of the Anthropocene. By exploring the modernity-coloniality symbiosis of information, the author explains how scholars, policymakers, and data-analysts can act through historical and structural roots of contemporary global inequities related to the production and distribution of information. Ultimately, the five theses propose conditions towards the collective production of knowledge towards a more sustainable planet

    LIPIcs, Volume 251, ITCS 2023, Complete Volume

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    LIPIcs, Volume 251, ITCS 2023, Complete Volum

    Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions

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    This work investigates intuitions' nature, demonstrating how philosophers can best use them in epistemology. First, the author considers several paradigmatic thought experiments in epistemology that depict the appeal to intuition. He then argues that the nature of thought experiment-generated intuitions is not best explained by an a priori Platonism. Second, the book instead develops and argues for a thin conception of epistemic intuitions. The account maintains that intuition is neither a priori nor a posteriori but multi-dimensional. It is an intentional but non-propositional mental state that is also non-conceptual and non-phenomenal in nature. Moreover, this state is individuated by its progenitor, namely, the relevant thought experiment. Third, the author provides an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of epistemic intuition. The suggestion is the fitting-ness approach: intuition alone has no epistemic status. Rather, intuition has evidentiary value as long as it fits well with other pieces into a whole, namely, the pertinent thought experiment. Finally, the book addresses the key challenges raised by supporters of anti-centrality, according to which philosophers do not regard intuition as central evidence in philosophy. To that end, the author responds to them, showing that they fail to affect the account of intuition developed in this book. This text appeals to students and researchers working in epistemology

    Ditransitives in germanic languages. Synchronic and diachronic aspects

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    This volume brings together twelve empirical studies on ditransitive constructions in Germanic languages and their varieties, past and present. Specifically, the volume includes contributions on a wide variety of Germanic languages, including English, Dutch, and German, but also Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian, as well as lesser-studied ones such as Faroese. While the first part of the volume focuses on diachronic aspects, the second part showcases a variety of synchronic aspects relating to ditransitive patterns. Methodologically, the volume covers both experimental and corpus-based studies. Questions addressed by the papers in the volume are, among others, issues like the cross-linguistic pervasiveness and cognitive reality of factors involved in the choice between different ditransitive constructions, or differences and similarities in the diachronic development of ditransitives. The volume’s broad scope and comparative perspective offers comprehensive insights into well-known phenomena and furthers our understanding of variation across languages of the same family

    Intuition and Observation

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    The motivating question of this paper is: ‘How are our beliefs in the theorems of mathematics justified?’ This is distinguished from the question ‘How are our mathematical beliefs reliably true?’ We examine an influential answer, outlined by Russell, championed by Gödel, and developed by those searching for new axioms to settle undecidables, that our mathematical beliefs are justified by intuitions, as our scientific beliefs are justified by observations. On this view, axioms are analogous to laws of nature. They are postulated to best systematize the data to be explained. We argue that there is a decisive difference between the cases. There is agreement on the data to be systematized in the scientific case that has no analog in the mathematical one. There is virtual consensus on observations but conspicuous dispute over intuitions. In this respect, mathematics more closely resembles paradigmatic philosophy. We conclude by distinguishing two ideas that have long been associated -- realism (the idea that there is an independent reality) and objectivity (the idea that in a disagreement, only one of us can be right). We argue that, while realism is true of mathematics and philosophy, these domains fail to be fully objective. One upshot of the discussion is a kind of pragmatism. Factual questions in mathematics, modality, logic, and evaluative areas go proxy for non-factual practical ones

    Indeterminacy and the law of the excluded middle

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    This thesis is an investigation into indeterminacy in the foundations of mathematics and its possible consequences for the applicability of the law of the excluded middle (LEM). It characterises different ways in which the natural numbers as well as the sets may be understood to be indeterminate, and asks in what sense this would cease to support applicability of LEM to reasoning with them. The first part of the thesis reviews the indeterminacy phenomena on which the argument is based and argues for a distinction between two notions of indeterminacy: a) indeterminacy as applied to domains and b) indefiniteness as applied to concepts. It then addresses possible attempts to secure determinacy in both cases. The second part of the thesis discusses the advantages that an argument from indeterminacy has over traditional intuitionistic arguments against LEM, and it provides the framework in which conditions for the applicability of LEM can be explicated in the setting of indeterminacy. The final part of the thesis then applies these findings to concrete cases of indeterminacy. With respect to indeterminacy of domains, I note some problems for establishing a rejection of LEM based on the indeterminacy of the height of the set theoretic hierarchy. I show that a coherent argument can be made for the rejection of LEM based on the indeterminacy of its width, and assess its philosophical commitments. A final chapter addresses the notion of indefiniteness of our concepts of set and number and asks how this might affect the applicability of LEM

    LIPIcs, Volume 261, ICALP 2023, Complete Volume

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    LIPIcs, Volume 261, ICALP 2023, Complete Volum

    Local Certification of Some Geometric Intersection Graph Classes

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    In the context of distributed certification, the recognition of graph classes has started to be intensively studied. For instance, different results related to the recognition of planar, bounded tree-width and HH-minor free graphs have been recently obtained. The goal of the present work is to design compact certificates for the local recognition of relevant geometric intersection graph classes, namely interval, chordal, circular arc, trapezoid and permutation. More precisely, we give proof labeling schemes recognizing each of these classes with logarithmic-sized certificates. We also provide tight logarithmic lower bounds on the size of the certificates on the proof labeling schemes for the recognition of any of the aforementioned geometric intersection graph classes

    Reasoning with Attitude

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    This book presents and develops inferential expressivism, a novel approach to the study of meaning which combines elements of the expressivist and inferentialist programmes. Expressivists explain the meaning of words in terms of the attitudes that they are used to express; inferentialists explain the meaning of words in terms of the inferences that they are used to draw. The book lays out the philosophical foundations of inferential expressivism by articulating and defending the view that the meaning of an expression is to be explained in terms of the inferences we draw involving the attitudes we express. The book, moreover, lays out the logical foundations of inferential expressivism by showing how to implement the view rigorously by means of novel formal systems which can deal with a variety of speech acts. As the book shows, by joining forces expressivism and inferentialism can meet their key challenges whilst retaining their distinctive insights and advantages. The book goes on to demonstrate the fruitfulness of the inferential expressivist approach to meaning by applying it to a diverse range of linguistic phenomena, including epistemic modals, probability operators, conditionals, moral predicates, the truth predicate, and propositional attitude predicates
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